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ABSTRACT
Comparative Direct Democracy: A Study of
Institutions and Individuals
By
Donald D. Mirjanian
Dr. John Tuman, Examination Committee Chair
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Do institutions matter? This dissertation examines the role of institutions in the
context of comparative direct democracy. Through an institutionalist framework, this
study considers how the context in which the mechanism of direct democracy is first
introduced has an impact on later usage, and how individuals operate when constrained
by those very institutions. In particular, I examine the cases of Italy, France, Uruguay,
and Venezuela and find that the inclusion of direct democracy mechanisms (most
commonly, the referendum device) is more likely to occur when previously excluded
“out-groups” participate in constitutional formation. In addition, I find that institutional
design is an important (but not a universal) factor in understanding referendum outcomes
(in particular, in explaining frequency). Finally, I argue that the rational choice
perspective does not fully explain individual level motivations of political elites, and that
an interweaving of prospect theory and the cybernetic theory of decision-making better
explains how elites operate when constrained by institutions. Along the way, I develop a
theoretical approach that may be utilized to better evaluate direct democracy outcomes
across political systems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Can citizens (including political elites) be trusted with the responsibility of
directly enacting public policy? While this question forms the underlying basis of this
dissertation, the question clearly presupposes several aspects of the political arena: that
the context of citizens enacting public policy allows for information symmetry among
participants; that the political institutions of a given state allow for policy transformation
and aggregation without placing an undue burden on the participants; more generally,
that a sense of legitimacy surrounds the process. While the focus of direct democracy is
often on the role of individuals – whether it be the individuals seeking an “end-around”
entrenched legislative or executive powers, or elites seeking the legitimation of powers –
the role of institutions in the process has become less important.
To that end, this dissertation examines the behavior of individuals acting within
institutions. In particular, this dissertation examines three key questions: first, under what
circumstances is the mechanism of direct democracy introduced within a state in the first
place? Secondly, to what degree does the institutional design affect later usage? Finally,
how much influence do individuals working within institutions have on direct democracy
outcomes?
To properly analyze these questions, I offer the following hypotheses: first, the
historical context in which direct democracy is introduced in a given state is crucial to its
later usage, and that historical institutionalism holds explanatory power in terms of how it
constrains the choices of individuals and actors who must work within them at some
1

point in the future (generally as a function of the critical juncture in which it was
created). Secondly, and in consideration of those individuals, the choices such individuals
make are guided not by ranked preferences, but rather by the loss/gain analysis offered by
prospect theory, and within the bounds of institutional arrangements.
Theoretical Framework
Do institutions matter? The broad question justifies an affirmative answer; the
process of understanding the nuanced impact that institutions have on procedural
democracy is the general purpose of this dissertation. The dissertation will focus on
several issues. However, the key research question is threefold: in what way does the
formation of an institution direct, predict, or influence its later usage; secondly, do
variations in the institutional structure affect the likelihood that direct democracy will be
used? Finally, to what degree to individuals have an impact on outcomes? Current
research related to direct democracy does not consider the context in which the
mechanism for direct democracy was introduced as a predictor of outcomes; moreover,
the unintended consequences as a function of the introductory context are also
underdeveloped. Finally, while empirical research has focused on variance in institutional
structure as a determinant of usage, such research is either limited to individual country
studies, and does not consider such effects across countries within a region, nor across
time. Considerable attention has been given to the role of individuals working to speed or
slow change via the referendum; this study continues that focus, but also argues that the
role of institutions has been increasingly neglected.
The role of institutions in the political process can be considered along that of
individuals in the political process. In this context, the question initially becomes that of
2

which “matters” more: institutions or individuals? Do individuals create institutions
according to their preferred outcomes and act accordingly? Perhaps more pointedly, are
individuals able to work within the confines of the institutions to achieve their objective,
or are they able to alter the structure of the (what should be, be definition) inherently
stable institutions to achieve their objectives? On the other side of this equation is the
focus on institutions: do institutions limit the ability of actors to operate within the
political process? Finally, is it possible that individuals and institutions work in concert to
achieve political objectives?
The overarching purpose of this dissertation is to examine the institution of direct
democracy at a comparative level; a secondary purpose, however, is to consider the
theoretical foundations of institutionalism and test its strength in explaining the relevance
of institutions in the political process. Toward that end, I offer here a brief overview of
the theoretical literature relevant to institutions and individual-level behavior.
Throughout the middle part of the 20th century, the search for methodological and
theoretical rigor provided the impetus to move towards alternative explanations grounded
in rational choice and behavioralism. No longer was the focus on the importance of
institutions, but rather, on the micro-level approach of individuals and their actions. Both
behavioralism and rational choice perspectives assumed that the individual could and did
act autonomously, and that choices could be made without constraints imposed from
above by formal or informal institutions. Such a view considered that all political
phenomena reflect the decisions of individual actors and those individual decisions are
made exogenously to the political process. In particular, Downs (1957) argued that a
rational individual can certainly make a decision when confronted with alternatives by
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following utility maximization tenets, while Mayhew (1974) argues that individual
members engage in activities that help achieve reelection. Fenno (1978) argues along
similar lines. For Mayhew and Fenno especially, and Downs to considerable degree, the
focus is on individuals rather than formal institutions (such as Congress as a whole) or
informal institutions (such as parties). Buchanan and Tullock (1962) also consider the
rational choice perspective and the importance of the individual, and in particular, the
“representative or average” individual; Ordeshook (1993) would later argue that the
perspective has led to a reintegration of politics and economics under a a common
paradigm” (76). Perhaps even more notably, Riker (1990: 177-178) argues that the
rational choice perspective accounts for “the only genuine advances ever to occur in
political science.”
This dissertation does not seek to determine the efficacy of the rational choice
paradigm, other than to argue that it is insufficient alone to account for political
outcomes 1. However, this project does seek to examine the relationship between the
individuals and the institutions that structure their behavior. Towards this end, this
dissertation utilizes a hybrid approach, known generally as “new institutionalism” (March
and Olsen 1984), and within this domain, historical institutionalism.
March and Olsen (1984) argue that the focus on individual level behavior suffers
from several faults. First, they argue that the state has lost its “position of centrality,” and
instead, the literature focuses on contextual determinants, such as class structure,
economic conditions and development, cultural aspects, and religion, which affect
politics but “are not significantly affected by politics” (735). Secondly, they argue that
1

For example, Green and Shapiro (1994) argue that the rational choice theory has been over-applied in the
discipline of political science, and that the findings associated with rational choice theory have limited
empirical support.
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“reductionism” has forced individual level analysis of what should be collective
phenomena, such as markets. Third, the authors argue that the analytical power of
utilitarianism depends largely on unrealistic assumptions related to preferences, and that
values other than personal values are important when considering outcomes. Fourth, the
authors argue that the dependence on “functionalism,” (the notion that historical
processes are efficient and move towards solutions) as a determinant is largely
unrealistic. Finally, the authors argue that “instrumentalism” in the modern literature puts
excess emphasis on symbols, rituals, and ceremonies that actually lack substantive value
in terms of determining political outcomes.
March and Olsen (1984) cast these caveats with circumspection, and they do not
argue to dismiss them without cause. Indeed, the authors instead argue that such analytic
devices should be incorporated into “old institutionalism”, resulting in a “blending of
elements of an old institutionalism into the non-institutionalist styles of recent theories of
politics” (738). In short, the authors argue that while society may shape politics, politics
(and political institutions) may also help shape society – primarily by imposing various
elements of order.
New institutionalism, as the name suggests, is similar in many ways in that the
focus remains on how institutions themselves shape politics, but focuses less on the
administrative, legal, and political structures that were once studied in a highly normative
(and descriptive) way. Instead, new institutionalism focuses more on the “relational
character” of institutions, or “how a given institutional configuration shapes political
interactions” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 6).

5

Peters (1999) finds the theoretical literature on institutions can be conceptualized
in different ways. In particular, Peters argues that a “normative institutionalism”
espoused by March and Olsen (1984) focuses on solving the structure-agency issue
through individual-level acceptance of the importance (and values) associated with
institutions, and that while choices are important, they are conditioned by membership in
political institutions. The normative aspect here derives from understanding institutions
as creating and reinforcing long-standing values, rather formal than “rules.” Secondly,
Peters finds that “rational choice institutionalists” also put a premium on institutions, but
instead of focusing on norms and values as guiding factors, behaviors are rather a
function of rules and incentives through which individuals attempt to maximize their own
utilities. Third, Peters argues that “historical institutionalists” consider the policy choices
that are made very early in the history of the policy itself as determinants of later policy
decisions, which then informs its logic. Fourth, Peters finds that “empirical
institutionalists” focus on the structure of government (e.g., presidential vs. parliamentary
systems, or perhaps, “decision points”) to understand political processes and outcomes. In
addition, he argues that “international institutionalism” focuses on the behavior of states
or other international actors as a function of other international institutions or actors.
Finally, Peters locates “societal institutionalism” as a framework focusing on the
structuring of relationships between state and society, primarily through intermediaries
such as groups.
The case for “bringing the state back in” is clear: institutions are primary
determinants of political outcomes. This dissertation focuses primarily on historical
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institutionalism, and a brief review of its features, and the basis for its utilization over
other methods considered here follows. 2
In general, institutionalists are “interested in the whole range of state and societal
institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their
relations of power to other groups” and more specifically, historical institutionalists argue
that institutions “constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole cause of the
outcome ”(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2). In large part, historical institutionalists
disagreed with the structuralist-functionalist approach that the “social, psychological, or
cultural traits of individuals” were responsible for political outcomes (Hall and Taylor
1996: 937). To further flesh out historical institutionalism, Hall and Taylor (1996) argue
that the relationship between institutions and individual behavior is conceptualized in
broad terms; that the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and
development of institutions are emphasized; that institutional development emphasizes
path dependence and unintended consequences; and finally that historical institutionalists
are especially concerned with the “contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas
can make to political outcomes” (938).
Arguing for an institutionalist perspective within international relations theory,
Krasner (1988) notes that “the basic characteristic of an institutional argument is that
prior institutional choices limit available future options” (72). The benefit of this
approach lies in its usefulness over utilitarian or functionalist approaches insofar as these
2

A theoretical question does arise here: to what degree is historical institutionalism compatible with new
institutionalism? New institutionalism “emphasizes the relative autonomy of political institutions,
possibilities for inefficiency in history, and the importance of symbolic action to an understanding of
politics (March and Olsen 1984), while at the same time, historical institutionalism aids our ability to
understand the “impact of institutions on the construction of interests….without imposing arbitrary,
‘objective’ definitions of interests (Immergut 1998:25). Thus, the two are not mutually exclusive, insofar as
new institutionalism does not disregard the emphasis on the autonomy of institutions, and historical
institutionalism does not arbitrarily delineate the concept of “interests.”
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may yield “unambiguously dysfunctional behaviors” (69), whereas the institutionalist
approach would explain such behavior not as dysfunctional, but rather, as a product of
prior choices. Krasner further develops the theoretical perspective by arguing the
“tendency of patterns of behavior, norms, or formal structures to persist through time
depends on two dimensions: vertical depth and horizontal linkage” (74). The former, he
argues, views reality as a “social construct”, which in everyday English refers to the
degree to which citizens share the acceptance of the institution in question. The latter
refers to the “density of links between a particular activity and other activities” and an
increased linkage (the inability of changing one activity without affecting another) leads
to higher levels of institutionalization. (75) 3. Perhaps most importantly, Krasner notes
that institutions are persistent, and that while institutions may alter their own environment
(e.g., by altering distribution of power among groups in civil society), institutions rarely
alter established routines because of the associated costs and unpredictable outcomes;
that path dependency is likely to determine future trajectory of developments; and
because the horizontal links with other organizations constrain the range of institutional
possibilities (85).
Thus, a significant dilemma regarding historical institutionalism is that the focus
is often on continuity, and not change. This is due mainly to the structural paradox that
exists: while the notion of punctuated equilibrium as a method to explain change enjoys
widespread acceptance, Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 6) note that institutions are the
independent variable in explaining political outcomes in times of stability, but then
become the dependent variable predicted by the very political maneuverings they once

3

The author points to the amendment process of the U.S. Constitution as an example of a highly
institutionalized process; the simple promulgation of a law, however, is not.
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predicted themselves. The authors argue that by focusing on the sources “institutional
dynamism,” (an integral part of “new institutionalism”) researchers will be able to “look
at how institutions mediate and filter politics [and also] turn the question around to
demonstrate how the impact of institutions is itself mediated by the broader political
context (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:16).
More specifically, the authors focus on four sources of institutional dynamism:
first, broad changes in the socioeconomic or political context can produce a situation in
which previously latent institutions suddenly become salient, with implications for
political outcomes; secondly, changes in socioeconomic or political balance of power can
produce a situation in which old institutions are put in service of different ends, as new
actors come into play who pursue their new goals through existing institutions; third,
exogenous changes can produce a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within
existing institutions: changes in outcomes as old actors adopt new goals within the old
institutions; and finally, political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in
the institutions themselves.
Another way of conceptualizing change within the institutionalist framework is
through the exploration of “veto points.” In particular, this helps to illustrate the
relational character of institutions in that the veto points provide “strategic openings”
(facilitated by institutions) that actors use to achieve their goals. As defined by Thelen
and Steinmo, “veto points” are areas of institutional vulnerability. Perhaps most
importantly, Thelen and Steinmo argue that while veto points may be “sticky,” they are
not permanent, and shifts in the overall balance of power can cause veto points to

9

emerge, disappear, or shift their locations, which in turn provides the aforementioned
“strategic openings” that actors may use to achieve their goals.
Along similar lines, Hug and Tsebelis (2002) argue that “veto players” (an
individual or collective player whose agreement is required for a change of the status
quo) are crucial to understanding change (or, no change) via referendums. Insofar as the
institution of direct democracy introduces one additional veto player (essentially, the
median voter) which in turn shifts the outcomes of legislative politics closer to the
population median (2002:493). The referendum essentially acts as a guard against
outcomes that would replace the status quo; the popular initiative strengthens this guard.
However, the focus on change necessitates consideration of individuals.
Institutions are key components in determining outcomes; however, they cannot change
on their own (unless purposefully designed to do so). The question remains, however: can
individual-level decision-making theories be intertwined with historical institutionalism?
Weyland (2008) argues that the theoretical underpinnings of historical
institutionalism have, in recent years, acceded to “insistent demands of rational choice
theorists and based their own arguments on choice-theoretic reasoning”, while at the
same time, rational choice theorists have “moved closer to historical institutionalism”
(312) through a more prevalent accordance to institutions that shape outcomes. Weyland
argues that a synthesis approach offers a “solid and realistic, empirically grounded
alternative” that considers the “bounded rationality” of the human psyche (333). In
particular, Weyland argues that prospect theory can explain why individual actors bring
about significant change to institutions. Prospect theory suggests that people who face the
prospect of loss tend to take very bold and often risky countermeasures in an effort to
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reduce or avoid further losses altogether. The theory further holds that individuals in such
a dire situation will refuse to accept a limited loss, and will be more likely to gamble on a
proposition that has a lower expected value, but ultimately, the chance of reaping greater
rewards. This lack of a reliance on the expected utility diverges from the strict rational
choice perspective, which holds that individuals are able to order the preferences and
maximize their outcomes accordingly. Weyland further argues that “risk seeking in the
domain of losses can explain drastic rescue efforts mounted by political actors seeking to
stem political decay and restore basic institutional functioning” (287). The opposite side
of prospect theory holds that when individuals are facing positive prospects, they tend to
proceed with caution. Now risk averse, individuals prefer the “sure gain of limited
magnitude over a lottery that offers greater expected value” (287), and this of course is
not what strict rational choice theorists would posit for their actors in a given situation.
Weyland (2008) argues that interweaving prospect theory into historical
institutionalism and rational choice strengthens both theoretical approaches, insofar as it
better explains the “punctuated equilibrium” driver of change within historical
institutionalism, but also better explains the often unexpected choices of ostensibly
rational actors as a function of risk aversion. This formulation is particularly attractive to
Weyland in certain Latin American policy determinations, but also holds promise in the
current analysis of direct democracy in Latin America, and Western Europe.
However, what happens when neither “loss” nor “gains” properly frame the
context under which individuals make decisions? Another possible theoretical
perspective may help here. Taking rational choice theory as his point of departure,
Steinbruner (1974) argues that a new “paradigm” is in order, as the “internal logic in
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rational choice theory is under strain” and that “such internal strain has generally
preceded a successful challenge to the paradigm” (12). Correctly noting that rational
choice theory assumes excessive capacity to process extraordinary amounts of
information, while at the same time, correctly identifying preferences and utility,
Steinbruner argues that cybernetics “provides and analysis of extremely simple decisionmaking mechanisms which are nonetheless highly successful in the proper environments”
(13). The cybernetic theory, then, suggests that the processes of decisions are better made
along the lines of a servomechanism: in general terms, the basic idea is that a specified
response is pre-engineered in anticipation of particular stimuli. Using the “Watt
governor” as an apparent proxy for high-level bureaucratic decision-makers, Steinbruner
argues that such a process “avoids the preference ordering, the explicit calculations of
alternatives and outcomes, and the optimizing process which form the core of the analytic
paradigm” (53). Thus, the idea is to simplify the process for the decision-maker, insofar
as a decision-maker is like a servomechanism and has the ability to determine their
systems-level output in accordance with set standards and input variation among those
standards: “the cybernetic thesis then is that the decision mechanisms screen out
information which the established set of responses are not programmed to accept” (57).
An important component of the cybernetic theory is that of values. Briefly,
Steinbruner suggests that instead of trying to integrate values, the cybernetic theory
separates values and thus “the mind actively but subjectively resolves uncertainty
because of its universal tendency to generalize” and from here (this notion is known as
cognitive theory) the servomechanism operates by confining the problem structure as
defined to the decision-maker (cf. 130-136). The value separation, the author argues,
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exists in a systematic (though not necessarily scientific manner) insofar as rationality and
logic assume a prominent role. The notion that this concept approaches analytic theory is
not missed by the author, as he suggests that cognitive theory, when used in supplement
to cybernetic theory “expects a constrained learning process which develops partial but
general models of the environment as required by the analytic paradigm, but which does
not evolve in the manner predicted by that paradigm’ (139).
On its face, such a theoretical approach may not seem useful to the study of direct
democracy. However, insofar as the referendum component of direct democracy
generally includes political elites working within the confines of the institution of direct
democracy as whole, the approach may yield insights towards understanding the
decision-making process of that individual. In several instances of referendum politics,
referendums are mandatory, in which case such an approach is obviously not a wise
choice. However, the majority of cases discussed in this work involve referendums as a
matter of choice: support by individual political elites, parties, or parliaments; in other
cases, initiatives from the people directly. Thus, in an effort to better evaluate the
decision-making process of those involved in both referendums and initiatives, I
incorporate this approach.
Theory Building for the Current Study
To put this all together, I offer the following summary: First, I hold that the
historical institutionalist perspective is useful in helping to understand why institutions
are created in the first place. That is, the historical context is crucial to the outcome.
Historical institutionalism also holds explanatory power in explaining why institutions
are “sticky”; that is, why they often constrain the choices of individuals and actors who

13

must work within them at some point in the future. After all, a defining feature of an
institution is that it is not peculiar to any individuals who operate within it at a given time
(e.g, institutions persist; lest they would not be considered institutions). The path
dependent nature of institutions within the institutionalist framework is, thus – in my
opinion – neither a defining feature nor a causal variable. Rather, path dependency is
simply a descriptor of historical institutionalism, and scholars who place more emphasis
on path dependency as an inherent problem with historical institutionalism are simply
placing too much weight on the concept as an instrumental variable, rather than viewing
it as what it is: an indicator of the presence of institutions. In addition, “critical
junctures” 4 should also be considered descriptive rather than causal: the formation of
institutions, regardless of the intention of the actors creating the institutions, constitutes a
critical juncture in and of itself; it is not axiomatic that simply because intention came
before creation, creation creates outcomes. The institution itself predicts outcomes. This
notion leads to the final point: the debate among historical institutionalists as to the
independent, causal variable is the unintended consequence of the institution itself. The
consequences of the creation of the institution create the basis for eventual change (the
“x” factor); that individuals are unable to predict the future suggests that consequences
are unintended. In other words, it is the institution, and the context in which it was
created that dictates future outcomes – and not the rational (or irrational, for that matter)
choice of political elites, parties, or parliaments. Secondary to this notion is the fact that
actors are (1) constrained by the institutions created, and (2) that the changes they make
are based on the consequences of the context in which they act (though, such
4

It should also be noted that this exercise in theory-building holds that critical junctures are antecedent to
the creation of institutions – later changes, alterations, modifications, etc. are not considered critical
junctures.
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consequences are – of course – limited by the context of the creation of the institution
itself) In short, excessive “causality” has been given to individuals over institutions, and
this dissertation seeks to reestablish the proper role of institutions as superior to the role
of individuals.
Secondly, to the degree that individuals do have an impact on outcomes I contend
that the decision-making paradigm is a combination of the cybernetic model of decisionmaking offered by Steinbruner (1974) and the synthesis of rational choice/prospect
theory offered by Weyland (1996). That is, Steinbruner’s approach avoids the preferenceordering called for by rational choice theorists; in addition, Steinbruner argues that
individuals (for our purposes, elites with decision-making capabilities) have set
standards, and that their decisions are reactions along a servo-mechanism
conceptualization in relation to those standards. As the input changes, the reaction of the
decision-maker changes based on (1) the standards of the individual and (2) the structure
of the institution in which the decision-maker operates. Thus, the key factor in the
equation becomes the capabilities of the decision-maker in a given situation: he is
constrained by competing institutions (e.g., a legislature, direct democracy mechanisms, a
bureaucracy, or perhaps a military) as well as the standards by which that decision-maker
operates (e.g., are his goals self-oriented, or does he seek collective action that benefits
the community?). When faced with a loss/gain scenario, certainly these factors play a role
as well; however, in this instance, prospect theory will also play a developmental role.
Scholarly research finds prospect theory a credible explanatory approach when working
in the domains of loss; however there are two problems here: first, what constitutes a
perceived “loss”, or the “fear of loss” is debatable. Secondly, not all situations (even in
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politics) are situated along a gain/loss scenario, and as such, prospect theory is
incomplete as a conceptual framework.
Thus, institutions are created as a result of critical junctures, the context of which
is important to understanding later outcomes (though not necessarily as a causal
explanation). The causal explanation (assuming the dependent variable is conceptualized
as “alteration” or “change” in a given system) is the choices made by rational actors who,
unable to logically order their preferences or choose accordingly, instead operate within a
sort of servo-mechanism, in which their choices are guided (forced?) by individual
standards 5 and bounded by the institutions that constrain them. In extreme cases,
punctuated equilibrium does result, but is better explained by the dynamics of prospect
theory.
The remaining question, of course is this: how does this fit into the realm of direct
democracy? The current study seeks to identify recurring examples: that the introduction
of direct democracy in a political system, and cast definitively in a constitution is a
function of the participation of out-groups (Condition 1, or C1); that the later usage of
referendums is dependent upon (1) historical institutional design (HI1) and (2) the role of
political elites in the process (P1), where (P1) are conditioned by (HI1) as well as by the
tenets of the prospect theory/cybernetic theory of decision making discussed above
(PC1).

5

The concept of “standards” is admittedly quite fuzzy. A plausible distinction here would be the range of
outcomes a decision-maker is willing to accept. A capitalist would not be willing to accept orthodox
Marxist policies; a leader committed to the rule of law would not fall victim to corruption (and vice-versa).
The wide parameters here also indicate that a partisan decision-maker would and could seek policies
adverse to his own partisan agenda such that his standards are not compromised (e.g., he holds power
without compromising standards).
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Thus, the theoretical approach developed here will be applied to case studies in an
effort to determine the (1) existence/nonexistence of “out-groups” 6 during the formation
of governing constitutions, with the hypothesis that such out-groups are a common
feature associated with inclusion of the referendum device; (2) that later usage is a
function of institution design but are also a function of the role of political elites in the
process. In this sense I argue that institutional design (primarily operationalized as the
availability of the device as well as difficulty in achieving the ballot) will certainly
influence the amount of referendums appearing on a ballot; however, institutional design
is insufficient alone as a predictor of outcomes: the role of political elites (for the
purposes of this study, elites are considered to be those individuals primarily responsible
for access to the ballot for referendums, or those interested in slowing access to the ballot
for referendums). Finally, the role of political elites (and thus outcomes facilitated by
elites) are conditioned by institutional design, but also by the tenets of prospect theory
(which suggests that when facing a “loss” scenario, elites will increase risk while seeking
larger returns, and while risk averse as a function of not facing a “loss” scenario, seek to
marginally improve returns, or at the minimum, hold their current gains); when neither
loss nor gain properly frames the scenario, I contend that the pragmatism of the
cybernetic theory of decision-making offers a better explanation than that of rational
choice when understanding outcomes as a function of individual-level behavior.

6

Operationalizing the term “out-group” is inherently problematic; however, I follow Barczak (2001), who
argues that “out-groups” can be conceptualized as “previously excluded interests ….able to capture a share
of the reform-rewriting process” , and similarly a “political outsider who had successfully harnessed
popular aggravation over a history of political exclusion” (39).
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Research Design | Chapter Overview
In an effort to advance the literature on direct democracy, I focus this theoretical
application on cases from both Europe and Latin America. Such an approach invites a
qualitative method, as the context must be fully considered. An important consideration
for historical institutionalists is that of “unintended consequences” as a result of
contextual formation, and once again, a qualitative approach will utilize historical
institutionalism in an effort to determine this model’s strength in predicting such
consequences.
I begin by utilizing the historical institutionalist approach to consider how the
political context (in particular, constitutional formation) helps to predict the availability
of direct democracy to a state. This dissertation examines constitutional origins with the
notion that inclusion of direct democracy (and in particular, the referendum) is more
likely to occur when once-marginalized interests are included in the formation of a new
constitution or regime. This follows Barczak (2001) who considers this notion to a
limited Latin American set of cases; my work seeks to extend this to the European and
other Latin American cases.
Chapter two comprises a literature review with a dual purpose. First, the chapter
seeks to review the literature on referendum politics in and at the same time, organize the
review into three parts: literature related referendum politics within the context of
constitutional formation; referendum politics as a function of institutional design, and
also a review of literature related to the campaigns of referendums themselves. Secondly,
the literature review also serves as a broad-based view (rather than an in-depth qualitative
analysis) of the hypothesis discussed above: in other words, I will examine (briefly)
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several cases of constitutional development in Europe and Latin America in an effort to
examine the variables discussed in the theoretical foundations section above. Though a
traditional literature review would be focused solely on a review of the literature and not
an application of the theoretical foundations to the case studies, I argue this approach is
beneficial for two reasons: first, the literature does discuss (in superficial terms) this
process, and thus its inclusion is warranted; secondly, in an effort to alleviate an inherent
problem in qualitative research (selecting on the dependent variable), the cases reviewed
in the literature review will serve to supplement the four cases studies that are the main
focus of this work. Thus, the dissertation considers four cases (Italy, France, Uruguay and
Venezuela) in detail and several other cases from Europe and Latin America more
superficially.
Chapter three focuses on referendum usage in Italy and France. The discussion
here begins with the historical context in which the referendum was initially introduced
into both the Italian and French political systems in an effort to show how such a context
predicts later referendum usage. At the same time, the chapter considers other relevant
variables, such as institutional design of the referendum device in Italy, the role of parties
in the Italian political system, the role of the Constitutional Court, and of course, the role
of political elites. The inherent nature of French politics requires a greater focus on the
role of the presidency, and insofar as the large majority of referendums occurred during
the Charles De Gaulle era, the chapter focuses on his role in referendum usage and
outcomes. The chapter concludes with an application of the theoretical foundations
discussed above to the Italian and French cases, and finds that the context in which the
institution of direct democracy was introduced in large part explains its later use; at the
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same time, the role of political elites who are thus constrained by institutional
development play a minor role: certainly, the have some agency, but that agency is
limited by the boundaries set by institutional design. The fact that such agency is limited
suggests that institutions are the primary causal agent of change, rather than individuals.
The purpose of chapter four is to once again apply the theoretical foundations
discussed here to additional cases: Uruguay and Venezuela. I begin with a discussion of
the formation of the institution of direct democracy within the Uruguayan system and in
particular, a focus on the work of Uruguayan President José Batlle y Ordóñez in
introducing referendum politics to Uruguay. Certainly, Batlle’s legacy is far-reaching in
Uruguayan politics, and thus, the focus of the chapter is on his work. Finally, the case of
Venezuela is examined for similar patterns. I begin by examining the context in which
the governing constitution was created (this occurrence is much more recent than the
other cases, occurring in 1999), and also examine the role of institutional design as well
as that of political elites (primarily Hugo Chávez). The research will be informed
primarily by secondary historical sources that focus on the political context of the times,
and primary sources where applicable and available; prior works (e.g., Skocpol 1979 and
1992; Thelen 2004) utilizing historical institutionalism will serve as a “guide” in terms of
the qualitative path. Such cases will also be examined for aspects of unintended
consequences.
Chapter five will serve two purposes: first, to weave together the multiple ideas
discussed in the first four chapters; secondly, to offer a review of the limitations of the
current study and possible suggestions for future research.
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Thus, chapters two, three and four will examine case studies in effort to locate the
primary condition of out-group inclusion in original constitutional development (C1,
discussed above), and its presence is dichotomous – it is either there, or not there. At the
same time, the chapters will examine later usage (in general usage/non-usage terms) in an
effort to determine whether the primary variable was historical institutional design (HI1)
or the role of political elites in the process (P1), and the degree to which their role was
conditioned by HI1 and/or prospect theory/cybernetic theories of decision-making
(PC1). If the hypotheses suggested prove true, then usage is a function of C1, HI1 and P1,
with P1 conditioned by PC1. If the hypotheses suggested do not prove correct, then
creation in a given system would occur without C1, usage would occur without regard to
HI1, and without the impact of P1, irrespective of PC1. Thus, if the study evaluates cases
more commonly associated with the former, a systematic evaluation of referendum
politics can be assumed; if the latter process occurs more commonly, the remaining
conclusions is that institutions are largely irrelevant, and that the politics of direct
democracy occur independently of established norms.
Case Selection
The theoretical foundation suggested above is capable of being applied to any
case study in which referendum politics exist (or for that matter, do not exist, as a
function of C1). Thus, a sampling frame could, theoretically, be drawn from a population
made up of all political systems. Such an examination would be better suited to a
quantitative analysis, and such a study should be undertaken at a future time. However,
the present study is qualitative in nature, and designed to examine the nuances of the
cases selected. However, regardless of the intent, the selected cases were not drawn
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randomly; and while random selection is generally the condition for valid inferences,
“such inferences can be made by a sample selected by some rule not correlated with the
dependent variable” (Geddes 1990:135). Such that the dependent variable in this case is
(1) existence of the institution of direct democracy and (2) its later usage, I have
attempted to adhere to Geddes’ condition (1990) by selecting matched pairs of study:
Italy and France, and Uruguay and Venezuela. In the first pair, France has a long history
of referendum politics with limited use, while Italy has a shorter history of referendum
politics with considerably greater usage. In addition, this pair serves the “most similar”
approach in terms of degree of democratic values, and also “most different” approach in
the sense of a stronger parliamentary system (Italy) and a stronger presidential system
(France). Within the Latin American context, systems that consistently utilize direct
democracy are rare, with Uruguay being the exception to the general rule. Uruguay has
also experienced a greater degree of democratic practices than other systems, and at the
same time, has experienced numerous constitutions – some with, and some without the
institution of direct democracy. The Venezuelan system has rarely utilized the institution
of direct democracy, and at the same time, has undergone a significant transition over the
last ten years – a transition focused (as Chávez argues) on the bringing the people into the
process.
It is worth repeating that the theoretical framework could be applied to any
political system, and in that sense, the problem of selecting cases on the dependent
variable is mitigated here. Each of the cases presented here have the institution of direct
democracy as part of their existing constitution: such a study would be futile otherwise,
and to this degree, some selection on the dependent variable is necessary. As King,
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Keohane and Verba (1994) argue, random selection is not always the ultimate goal in
qualitative research, though selection should “allow for the possibility of at least some
variation on the dependent variable” (1994:129). In the cases presented here, extensive
variation occurs in each of these dependent variables in terms of institutional constructs,
both in terms of the systems of governance as well as the availability of the referendum
device. The literature review intends also to help alleviate this concern by applying the
theoretical approach outlined here in multiple cases, though in a more superficial manner
than the case studies that follows.
At the same time, the independent variables here include the presence of “outgroups” at the time of the drafting of the constitution, which can be identified as groups
who had been traditionally excluded prior to the drafting of the constitution in question
(Barczak 2001); institutional design (the “rules of the game” – signature requirements,
quorum thresholds, and the degree to which referendums can be initiated by both the
government and the people, or by only one of the two); and finally, the role of political
elites in the process. Certainly, this variable presents operationalization difficulties
insofar at the variable does not remain constant – it changes as a function of the
individual responds to the political environment. Nonetheless, the variable is centered on
the boundaries of the earlier-discussed prospect theory/cybernetic theory of decisionmaking, which allows for inferences to be drawn: either the decisions of the political elite
can be explained by such a theoretical approach, or it cannot. That is to say, the
independent variable is limited in its approach in an effort to explain outcomes;
falsifiability is, in other words, still an option. Insofar as variation exists in the dependent
variable, inference problems are mitigated; bias as a function of causal variable
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correlation with the dependent variable is not a concern because such bias is accounted
for in the dependent variable selections (King, Keohane and Verba 1994:137). . In
addition, each of the cases here vary on the value of the independent variable as well, as
variance occurs in institutional design, the role of the political elites, as well as the
presence of “out-groups” at the time that constitutions affecting direct democracy
originated. The research forming the analysis of these independent variables is developed
from the secondary literature on the topic in each given case.

Table 1: Overview of Variables for Matched-Pair Study

Governance

Mechanisms
of Direct
Democracy
Qualification
Difficulty
Direct
Democracy
Usage

ITALY

FRANCE

Parliamentary
(strong multiparty)

Semi-presidential
system (weak
multi-party)

Government
and CitizenInitiated

GovernmentInitiated

Government and
Citizen-Initiated

Government
and CitizenInitiated

Low

High

Low

Low

Frequent

Infrequent

Frequent

Infrequent
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URUGUAY
Presidential system
(strong multi-party,
though long
dominated by two
parties)

VENEZUELA
Presidential
system (weak
multi-party)

Individual referendum data are taken primarily from the Centre for Research on
Direct Democracy (cited throughout this study as C2D). The Centre for Research on
Direct Democracy offers a worldwide database of national-level referendums including
frequency of use (dating back to the 1800s), type of referendum (citizen-initiated or
government-initiated; binding or facultative, etc), subject information, background
materials, turnout levels, and total vote percentages. The Centre is a digital archive
managed by the University of Zurich 7.
Benefits of Study
The dissertation is expected to advance the literature in several ways. First, it
separates much of the fuzzy definitions and logic used by historical institutionalists,
rational institutionalists, and rational choice theorists. Throughout much of the literature,
there seems to be a trend towards using “critical junctures”, “unintended consequences”
and “institutional stickiness” in an arbitrary fashion (mainly, when it suits the needs of
the scholar). There also seems to be considerable disagreement as to when the institution
can be considered an independent variable or a dependent variable, vis-a-vis the actors
involved. Secondly, the approach clarifies the role of actors in the process. Certainly, the
relationship between institutions and actors must be considered in tandem; institutions do
not operate on their own any more than actors operate without the constraint of
institutions. Along these same lines, the approaches clarifies the process of change within
institutions, holding that change is the result of actors responding to stimuli within the
confines of their own institutions, and when faced with risk, operate according to the

7

http://www.c2d.ch/index.php. As stated by C2D: “The c2d is an academic research center dedicated to the
study of direct democratic institutions (referendum and initiative) around the world, their history, legal
nature, functioning and political implications. It aims at running an international database, promoting
interdisciplinary scientific research, organising conferences and providing services.”
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guidelines of prospect theory. 8 Third, past and current literatures do not focus on how
the context surrounding the introduction of referendum mechanisms informs its effects on
later political outcomes. While Barczak (2001) and Altman (2011) both argue that
formation is an important aspect (and these authors disagree over its importance), neither
consider the path dependence aspect inherent in the historical institutionalist perspective.
This study focuses on such aspects. Finally, the approach offers explanatory value in
understanding outcomes as a function of the arena as a whole, rather than on either the
institutions or the actors involved; moreover, the cultural aspect is not ignored insofar as
institutional creation encompasses cultural components as does the “standards” of the
decision-maker. Though a top-down approach, the approach is still useful insofar as most
outcomes are the result of the top-down approach taken by elites (even in the case of
direct democracy).

8

The question that naturally arises here is whether or not “standards” are part of the prospect theory
approach. In other words, do decision-makers abandon their standards when operating within the prospect
theory framework? Though this could certainly use a more detailed explanation, I would offer that prospect
theory is not incompatible with the “standards” of decision-maker as I have tried to define “standards” here.
That is, the notion that decision-makers may “gamble” on a much riskier endeavor in an effort to mitigate
losses (while at the same time, foregoing certain, albeit smaller, losses) can fit within the boundaries of an
acceptable “standard”.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
In comparison to most political topics, the policy space that is referendum politics
is uncharacteristically diverse. That is, political scientists have a scholarly tendency to
focus on inclusivity and exclusivity rather than the holistic. The discipline as a whole is
subdivided into subfields (e.g., comparative politics, or security studies); theoretical
foundations utilize logic in the manner best fitting the author’s needs. For the most part,
the economical focus considered here serves the discipline well; the organization is
befitting. Referendum politics, however, defies such an approach: referendum politics is
practiced at subnational and national levels; it occurs in democratic and nondemocratic
states; it is based on institutional development but also requires individual as well as
group agency; the possible topics for referendum are limited only by the imagination of
the producer 9, and could such include such diverse topics as governance issues, political
issues, national security issues, gender issues, and natural resource policy. To further
unpack the field of referendum politics, multiple strategies may be employed in each of
one of these instances – some to be repeated (regardless of success); others to be
discarded.
This study, however, is focused on three points: first, the degree to which the
context in which direct democracy was first introduced in a political system affects later
usage; secondly, the degree to which institutional design affects later usage; and finally,

9

In some systems, the topic is actually limited by constitutional language (e.g., one cannot consider budget
issues via the referendum in Italy.)
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the degree to which individuals operating within institutions can affect referendum
outcomes. The following literature review is organized around these three general topics.
First, I consider scholarship related to referendum politics within the context of
constitutional formation by examining the method by which the institution of direct
democracy came to be included in a given constitution in various cases, and secondly,
how such a context informs later usage. As the prior chapter suggests, such an
examination is crucial to understanding how and why initiatives and referendums are
used in future instances.
Secondly, I review scholarship related to the institutional design of referendum
politics in various political system. Common sense suggests that usage in a given state
could be a simple function of institutional design: easier access equals increased usage.
Alongside this seemingly axiomatic calculation is the notion that a state may enjoy an
“initiative culture” in which mechanisms of direct democracy are common, and thus,
expected (e.g., Switzerland). Thus, an examination of institutional design is warranted
here.
Third and finally, I review the literature related to referendum campaigns, the role
of political parties in referendum campaigns, as well as the impact of political elites on
the process. Certainly, the broadest of considerations in the field of referendum politics is
that of how the institution of direct democracy reconciles with that of representative
governance more generally. That is, in the case of established representatives (and the
degree to which such representatives are democratically elected is a further question), to
what degree, and indeed, to what end, should such representatives utilize the referendum
process? If one assumes that legitimacy is a key concern for representative government,
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perhaps the institution of direct democracy becomes instrumental towards this end.
However, such an assumption precludes the possibility that referendum usage may be
used towards illegitimate ends (purposefully or otherwise). Moreover, such an
assumption also precludes the possibility that political authorities allow the voters to
decide any issue on its merits alone, and do not intervene to shape, or even quash
questions to protect their own interests. That is, the question of referendum outcomes
may be interesting; the question of which referendum did not make the ballots may be
just as interesting (and the subject of another study). Legitimacy in this sense is not
limited to policy aggregation and transformation; leadership itself may be legitimated by
referendum usage, and certainly not in the “democratic” sense of the word 10.
Additionally, a key concern within the field of referendum politics is that of change – and
the degree to which referendums facilitate (or prohibit) change. Certainly, an instrument
of direct democracy is designed to measure the status quo: whether (and how) voters
accept or reject the question under consideration. Thus, evaluating referendum politics as
a function of the campaigns and individuals involved seems a prudent topic for a
literature review.
The Current Scholarship of Direct Democracy
Usage of direct democracy mechanisms such as the initiative and referendum are
on the rise worldwide, especially since the beginning of the 20th century. In the United
States, 23 states incorporated the referendum or initiative (or both) into their state
constitutions (Cronin 1989); in the 1920s, populist movements led Canada to adopt the

10

Adolf Hitler would use a series of four referendums between 1933 and 1938 to consolidate his power; in
Italy, Mussolini would use two in 1929 and 1934 to achieve the same outcome; in Romania, General Ion
Antonescu would follow this path with two referendums in 1941. Other political figures have used the
referendum to affirm existing power.
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practice (Laycock 1990). After 1989, democratic transformations in Eastern Europe led
to 27 new constitutions, many of which contain language allowing for referendum usage
and (perhaps more importantly) that were approved via the referendum itself. Altman
(2011) evaluates the change in use of mechanisms of direct democracy by country and
year, and finds that usage has doubled over the last fifty years and quadrupled since the
turn of the twentieth century. Indeed, Scarrow (2001) finds that the primary cause of such
increased usage is institutional change: in the 1990s, states that had already
accommodated direct democracy as well as those who had previously given scant
institutional recognition both began to utilize the device more frequently.
While direct democracy itself may be on the rise worldwide (Kaufmann and
Waters 2004; Scarrow 2001), scholarship on the subject is lacking in several respects. A
review of the literature shows a lack of uniformity with regards to even the most basic
terminology: for example, the term “referendum” is often used almost interchangeably
with the word “initiative” – and while the two may share some similar characteristics,
they are most definitely two different animals. An initiative is an instrument available to
the people (and indeed, should be constitutionally granted and/or protected) that allows
the people to initiate the law-making process. A referendum, on the other hand, should
refer to policy choices referred to the people by the legislative branch for their approval
or denial. As mentioned, some characteristics are shared, most notably, that the people
can petition the legislative branch for a referendum to be placed on a ballot. Nonetheless,
the difference remains clear: in the former, the substance of the proposal, along with the
process of the proposal being placed on the ballot, its subsequent adoption (assuming
passage) and enforcement, are all independent of the legislature; the latter, of course, is

30

dependent upon the legislature in some way: they have either proposed the legislation, or
perhaps they have been forced to consider it (such as a possible EU accession vote); they
have either opted to place the proposal on the ballot, or they have been forced to via
petition (or perhaps constitutional requirement). In either case, the referendum is far from
direct democracy: even with the case of the petition, the very notion that the people are
simply voting on a policy proposal generated by the legislature questions its inclusion
within the boundaries of direct democracy (at least, in the truest sense of the term).
This distinction is far from trivial. The implications for policy outcomes – and for
democratic theory – are dependent upon the process. That is, whether or not a nation state
actually allows direct democracy (in terms of a true, California- style initiative process)
or simply permits an occasional referendum vote will result in a very different political
culture, and as a result, different policy outcomes. The reasoning behind this logic should
be clear: the ability of the people to have a “gun behind the door” of the legislature, or to
use another popular analogy, to be able to “end-around” the legislature and propose and
enact legislation is a very powerful tool. Conversely, the ability of the people to give an
up or down vote on a policy proposal may be superficially viewed as “power to the
people” but in reality, little such power exists. This is especially so when all of the variant
institutional constructs are considered (e.g., non-binding, facultative only, whether or not
the government is required to place the proposal on the ballot, quorum requirements etc.).
Such referendums often turnout to simply be a second-order (or “confidence”) vote of the
party in power (Hobolt 2007) rather than an actual up/down vote on the policy proposal
at hand.
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A second problem found within the literature is a lack of examination of the type
of electoral processes within the state itself – prior to, and then in conjunction with – the
examination of the institution of direct democracy. Although EU member states are in
many ways very similar, there are also considerable differences that may have an effect
on the outcomes. For example, majoritarian electoral processes exist along with more
traditional proportional representation systems; indeed, an examination into possible
consociational democracies and their effect would also be helpful. Indeed, some scholars
have argued that the EU itself is a consociational democracy (Bogaards and Crepaz 2002;
Gabel 1998). The benefit of an approach considering electoral processes would be to
consider the nature of policy aggregation that is typical within a nation-state, and by
extension, the degree to which compromise (in terms of coalition-building) are a common
aspect of the democratic process. Such an avenue may help to explain both the frequency
as well as the expected outcome of both initiative and referenda.
Another recurring feature in the current literature on direct democracy is a lack of
empirical analysis regarding the economic aspect of the nation state and its impact on the
outcome of initiative and referenda voting. Certainly, a consideration of some measure of
economic well-being may be beneficial when attempting to understand why voters
approve or disapprove of a certain measure, and may be perhaps more beneficial in
understanding why some initiatives are considered and eventually pass or fail. The
implication here is that a prosperous country would have a different outlook from both an
individual-level perspective (that is, their own financial well-being) as well as grouplevel perspectives (that is, group-level evaluation of the overall economy within their
own nation) than those from an economically challenged nation. Moreover, economic
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performance may have clear effects in both public policy areas of citizen lawmaking, as
well as governance related areas of direct democracy.
On a more fundamental level, however, is the lack of scholarship dedicated to the
role that institutions beyond the institution of direct democracy have on the process. That
is, while the individual state-level institutional rules (e.g, restrictions on types of
questions that may be asked, restrictions on signature requirements, differences between
facultative and binding resolutions, etc.) obviously influence the usage of direct
democracy within a given state, this does not fully account for when a state is more or
less likely to utilize mechanism of direct democracy. For example, a study of the
historical context of the timing in which the institution of direct democracy was first
introduced may play a significant role in its later usage, primarily because the context of
the times often dictates later usage in other political institutions. Certainly, the context of
the times in which a constitution is created affects (and generally constrains) outcomes at
a later date. Thus, while a state may recognize certain civil liberties or civil rights within
a constitution, the constitution itself was created at a fixed point in time, and the drafters’
views of civil liberties or civil rights may enforce how those rights and liberties are
enforced. Future generations may be able to “mold” outcomes related to civil liberties or
civil rights recognition, but a complete reconceptualization is generally not possible –
future generations are constrained by the original drafting.
Finally, an empirical study of the institution of direct democracy may reveal the
impact of excluded interests on the process of institutional change. For example, Barczak
(2001) examines the reform and rewriting of several Latin American constitutions and
notes that many of them emerged with direct democracy mechanisms in place. She finds
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that such mechanisms are contained within constitutions when one of two conditions is
met: when (1) the reform and rewriting process is controlled by traditionally excluded
political interests; or (2) traditionally excluded interests mobilize to capture a significant
(but not controlling) share of authority over the reform-rewriting process (39). By way of
example, Barczak points to Peru (1990), Argentina (1996), Brazil (1996), Ecuador (1996
and 1998) and Venezuela (1999) as cases in which the rewriting process becomes
controlled by traditionally excluded interests. Fewer cases fall under the second
condition: Colombia (1991) and Paraguay (1992). The remaining cases (Uruguay, Chile,
and Bolivia) also saw new constitutions developed (1997, 1980, and 1993-1996,
respectively) and either did not expand the direct democracy status quo (Uruguay and
Chile) or did not introduce the mechanism (Bolivia).
The idea that direct democracy measures are included when traditionally excluded
interests have a say in the matter is neither new nor unique to the Latin American system.
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century brought tremendous changes to the
American system of government in the form of direct democracy. This “founding” of
direct democracy in the U.S. can be considered a function of several components: the
deleterious effects of the Industrial Revolution on many farmers and ranchers in America;
the desire on the part of Progressives and Populists to install a mechanism that could
“check” the powerful hold of special-interest groups over state legislatures; and the
widely-held desire to improve government by making it “more responsive” to the people
in general – which would in turn, the Progressives argued, lead to a more politically
efficacious citizenry, which would again in turn, lead to a better overall government
(Cain and Miller 2001; Polhill 2001) In the late 1800s, disenchanted groups (mainly
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alliances of farmers, miners, and laborers) formed the People’s (or Populist) Party,
favoring governmental ownership of railroads, elimination of monopolies, a graduated
income tax, free coinage of silver, an expanded money supply, and similar efforts aimed
at improving the livelihood of rural families (Cronin 1989: 43). With bankers, railroaders,
and land speculators in their sights, the Populists attempted to enter politics and change
the system, as they could envision gaining little relief from the two main political parties
that they believed were controlled by the influence of railroads, trusts, and monopolies. In
1892, the Populists codified their beliefs at their first national convention, where they
introduced a platform that called for the direct election of senators, limiting the president
and vice-president to a single term, and most importantly for our purposes, the
introduction of the initiative and referendum (Cronin 1989). In 1897, South Carolina
became the first state to adopt direct democracy measures, and several states followed,
each with support of traditionally excluded or marginal groups.
Constitutional Formation and Referendum Politics
The preceding chapter discussed a theoretical foundation suggesting that
usage/non usage of referendums could be considered within the context of the initial
presence of out-group inclusion in the original constitutional development (C1); and that
later usage may be a function of historical institutional design (HI1) or the role of
political elites in the process (P1), and the degree to which their role was conditioned by
HI1 and/or prospect theory/cybernetic theories of decision-making (PC1). The following
section considers literature related to Europe and Latin America, but also applies the
theoretical foundation (though it should be noted, this is done superficially here).
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The (Former) Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
The democratic revolutions that occurred throughout Eastern Europe in the 1990s
provided no fewer than 27 new constitutions, many of which were considered and
approved by popular referendum. However, the region was no stranger to the referendum
device: The Soviet Constitution of July 1923 allowed such a process (allowing each of
the union republics to withdraw, though the particular method was unspecified), and
Bolsheviks more generally were supportive of self-determination and referendums 11.
When the Congress of Soviets of the Soviet Union clearly defined the role of the
Communist Party in 1936 and redesigned the government under Stalin, Article 48
allowed for the Supreme Soviet Presidium to conduct a referendum on its own initiative,
or at the demand of one of the union republics, though no actual referendums occurred.
In the 1960s, debate and discussion occurred regarding the move towards increased
usage of the referendum, and a particularly scholarly debate erupted between Viktor
Kotok and M.I Baitin over the normative aspects of the referendum: the degree to which
the practice should be mandatory for constitutional questions (historian and commentator
Roy Medvedev would argue for a compulsory referendum for each republic once every
ten years), and the degree to which the practice would increase civic engagement 12
(White and Hill 1996). Discussion, however, did not translate to usage. This pattern
would be repeated in 1977, when the “Brezhnev” Constitution would specifically allow
for the referendum in Article 5 – but for all the debate that had occurred regarding the
proper usage of the referendum, Article 5 did not set provisions for what would be
11

Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky demanded the use of referendums to decide the fate
of occupied areas; the Soviet government also promised referendum usage with initial relations with the
Ukraine and Georgia (Wambaugh 1933).
12 The normative concern is especially prevalent in the initiative and referendum literature in the United
States. See especially Brown (2004).
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binding, what would be consultative, nor did it provide guidance in terms of which types
of questions could be asked. Indeed, it would not be until 1990 that such concerns would
be addressed: such referendums could adopt a new law, to amend or rescind a law, or to
determine public opinion on important issues. The policies of perestroika (a plan to
restructure the political and economic systems) and glasnost (the effort to increase
openness and transparency in government institutions) would help deliver thirty-three
referendum questions between 1987 and 1993, twenty-five of which occurred in the
former Soviet Union, 13 and can be considered within the context of a state facing a major
transition. Mikhail Gorbachev turned to the public at large to transform his desired
policies into realities, and Gorbachev would set his sights quite high 14: replacing (though
reaffirming) the Union Treaty that had created the Soviet Union in 1922. For their firstever referendum, the Soviet population was asked on March 17, 1991 whether they
…consider necessary the preservation of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of
equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms
of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?
The ambiguity in the question became quite problematic for voters and member
states alike. Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia and Armenia proposed their own
independence referendums in response to the question; six of the republics worked to

13

For comparative purposes, between 1946 and 1986, no referendums occurred in the Soviet Union; seven
referendum questions were posed in Eastern Europe; four of these were noncompetitive: approval for three
Romanian questions, two of which approved the Antonescu government (99.9% each); one to approve the
1968 German Democratic Republic Constitution (94.5%); and one to end the Bulgarian monarchy (95%).
The remaining three were more competitive, and each occurred in Poland on 30 June 1946: to abolish the
Senate, to make a more permanent economic system, and to approve Baltic and eastern frontiers (68, 77
and 91%, respectively).
14
In addition to the importance of the topic, the referendum would set records for votes cast (149 million),
and the largest geographic expanse covered by a referendum question.
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disable the voting mechanism; five other republics either changed or added questions of
their own (Brady and Kaplan 1994). Though Gorbachev would win the vote (in some
areas, by greater than a 90% margin), the fractured process led to inconclusive
outcomes, 15 and Gorbachev learned first-hand what many others had also come to learn:
the unintended consequences of referendum can be difficult to accept. Though Gorbachev
had intended the use of the referendum to legitimize his own agenda, 16Yeltsin would
utilize the same tactic on his own behalf: putting to the voters the question of a strong
republican presidency, viewed by scholars as an offensive quest for power (White and
Hill). While Gorbachev would win 76%, Yeltsin also claimed victory with 70%. In this
case, the purpose of the referendum was designed to settle the issue of the permanency of
the union; instead, the spark for independence referendum ignited across Eastern Europe:
in December 1991, 84% of the Ukrainian electors turned out to vote in an independence
referendum, with 90% voting for independence. Gorbachev would resign on December
25, 1991.
The case of the Soviet Union suggests a number of relevant outcomes. First, that
the context in which the institution of direct democracy was introduced in large part
explains its usage. In the case of the Soviet Union, the referendum mechanism was
introduced and reaffirmed multiple times; its use, however, did come about until both
Gorbachev and Yeltsin found it necessary to utilize the device against political enemies
individually, but also against subnational units. As the last chapter suggests, the lack of

15

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1991) argued that “the first referendum in
Soviet history produced plebiscitary paralysis, and the standoff between the center and the republics
continues” http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015024951678;view=1up;seq=2
16
Gorbachev refers to his own agenda as “more socialism, and therefore, more democracy”, arguing that
socialism itself was not internally flawed, as many argue, but rather, that principles of socialism had been
insufficiently applied (Gorbachev, 1987: 46).
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an “out-group” in the 1922, 1936, 1944 and 1977 constitutional revisions results in a
fewer items being referred to the people (even with the presence of debate on the issue),
and thus the Soviet Union in this instance did not meet (C1). Facing a possible loss
scenario however, Gorbachev utilized the mechanism in an attempt to legitimize his own
power, while at the same time certifying the legitimacy of others (individuals and
republics alike) to utilize the same mechanism. Paradoxically, through an attempt to
strengthen and legitimize his own (individual) power, Gorbachev set in motion the
process of power destabilization through affirming the use of the very tool that would
undermine centralized (institutional) power in the Soviet Union. Certainly, Gorbachev
had other options: Walker (2003) argues he could have allowed each republic to decide
its status, or brokered a compromise with the republics, or perhaps let the Politburo or
Supreme Soviet decide; certainly, a crackdown on the separatists would be an option on
the table as well.
Historically, then, C1 (the primary condition of out-group inclusion) is lacking in
this case, suggesting reduced usage in later years. Also, an important variable responsible
for usage/non usage was historical institutional design (HI1), but perhaps more
importantly was the role of the political elites operating within that institution (P1),
operating within the confines of historical institutional design (HI1), and certainly
conditioned by PC1. Gorbachev had a number of options, as discussed, and instead – as
prospect theory suggests – opted for the larger gamble when facing a loss scenario, but of
course, operated within the confines of the options available to him, without regard to
values, as the cybernetic theory of decision-making suggests.

39

Germany and Austria
Historical developments in Germany offer additional insights into referendum
politics in the context of transitional governance. Prior to the Weimar Republic, the
German Constitution of 1871 supported a high degree of state sovereignty, but the 1919
Constitution gave the power of the referendum to the people. Suksi (1993) argues that
while the constitution did give the state the literal power of the referendum, the practice
was severely limited: significant limitations existed for the subject matters (budget issues,
tax statutes, and salary regulations did not have to be placed before the people, and thus
parliament was insulated from these issues) as well as majority requirements in both
approval and turnout (the latter causing those wishing to oppose to simply not go to the
polls). The initiative was also available to citizens, though only two of sixty attempts
were able to reach the voters, and both of these would fail the majority quorum
requirements (C2D). Suksi (1993:96) finds that the initiative was used primarily by
parties to further their own ends, but at the same time, the institution of the referendum
provided a “constitutional channel” that would preclude “unconstitutional action.” Such
an argument is supported by scholars writing at the time: Thoma (1928) argues that that
“there is every reason to expect that this moderation in resorting to…(direct
democracy)…will continue to be shown in future so long as the principle of proportional
representation is applied in the Reich” (73).
After the rise of the National Socialist Party in 1933, the powers of legislation and
constitutional amendment were given to a cabinet headed by Hitler, and while the
parliament was now of little importance, a Law on Referendum was enacted by the
cabinet (though no initiative was provided). As Suski (1993) argues, the referendum in
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this context was not designed to achieve mathematical majorities, but rather to secure the
assent of the people, insofar as the whole society was based on the concept of the
“organic personality of leadership” (99). The three referendums that took place in this era
support this notion: the German populace approved the withdraw from the League of
Nations in 1933, the merger of the offices of the President and the Chancellor into a
single unit in 1934, and in 1938, approved the annexation of Austria while at the same
time electing a Nazi list to the national parliament (C2D) 17.
Certainly, legitimation was a key concern here: though policy confirmation was
the ostensible goal, regime legitimation was the real motivation. As Suski observes, “the
conclusion that can be drawn from the Nazi referendums seems to be that a device which
is a part of the formal or mechanistic decision-making procedures …can be used to
further the purposes of a substance-based political system” (102).
Once again, however, out-group inclusion (C1) was not a factor here in either the
Weimar Republic or the Nazi era, suggesting reduced usage in later years; the case also
presents an interesting historical institutional design (one in which the focus was on
organic power of leadership, rather than institutions during the Nazi era) but overall, the
same result occurs: the context in which the institution was developed played a role in
later usage, suggesting relevance for HI1, and of course, political elites played a role in
both the Weimar Republic and the Nazi era with both (obviously for different reasons)
not utilizing the device often. Finally, PC1 plays a role here, too: interestingly, the
parliament-centered Weimar Republic opted to maintain their small victories rather than
gamble (and, not facing a loss scenario, the option supports the theory).

17

German voters may have been “tipped off” in terms of elite support: the “approval” circle was quite
large; the “disapproval”, placed next to the “approval” circle, was quite small (Suski 1993:102).
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Though the Austrians included the provision of referendum (allowing any act of
legislation to be submitted to the people through a simple majority vote in the
Nationalrat, and mandatory referendums for amendment or alteration of the
Constitution), in practice the procedure is rarely used. Introduced with the Constitution in
1920 and in large part reflecting the general political mood in Europe after 1918 (Pelinka
and Greiderer 1996), only three referendums have been placed before the voters.
The question of whether or not the Zwentendorf nuclear power plant should begin
operating became a catalyst for expressing discontent with the status quo at the time of
the 1978 referendum. The discontent focused especially on the established party
structure, and by extension, the lack of opportunity for active participation, and the
discontent showed in the outcome: parties that had experienced longstanding particular
demographic support found those demographics bolting the party line (Pelinka and
Greiderer 1996), and voters ultimately rejected the opening, though turnout was a scant
64.1% (C2D).
In 1994, Austrians voted on the EU referendum, and instead of discontent, voters
decided the fate of the question primarily on economic terms: concerns about
unemployment motivated both affirmative and negative votes, while concerns over the
loss of sovereignty and the deterioration in the quality of products drove the “no” vote.
As Pelinka and Greiderer (2003) argue, the “differences in voting behavior were strongly
related to party preference”.
Finally, in January 2013, Austrians were invited to give their opinion on
mandatory conscription, which drafts some 22,000 men per year into the Austrian
military for service of six months in the military or nine months in civilian service. Once
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again, party divisiveness played a role: in a coalition parliament, the center-left Social
Democrats argued for moving away from a conscripted military towards a professional
military (and such an action would follow Germany and France, each of whom ended
conscription policies), while conservative members argued that increased spending would
hinder economic improvements and at the same time move the nation away from the
neutrality stance it has observed since 1955. 18Though the parties may be divided on the
issue, the electorate does not see this issue as a possible referendum on power overall;
60% voted to retain the compulsory conscription practice.
The Austrian case is thus focused on representative over direct democracy.
Pelinka and Greiderer argue that “it almost seems as politics have feared the pressure that
might result from direct democracy, as if they feared the potential damage that might be
done to the established, highly concentrated political system by direct participation”
(1996:29), suggesting that elite-level behavior is highly useful for predicting referendum
usage and outcomes. Moreover, the context in which the constitution was created also
suggests that a lack of usage was likely, insofar as “out-groups” were not an important
factor.
Latin America
Though historical institutionalism often has trouble defining how institutions are
established, rational institutionalism suggests that institutions are created when the
benefits of that institution help to maximize the preference of the creators. Such instances
result in “critical junctures.” In terms of governance, the rewriting or reworking of a

18

Austrians vote to keep compulsory military service” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21110431
3/24/13
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constitution would certainly qualify as a critical juncture (even in Latin America, where
constitutional fortitude and longevity are not always apparent).
The role of political elite in shaping the introduction of measures of direct
democracy into the system cannot be overemphasized. Thus, to what degree does a
rational institutionalist theory take hold in helping to explain extant direct democracy in
Latin America? Bruer (2008) argues that “the decision of Latin American governments to
resort to referendum is mainly rooted in specific problems in executive-legislative
interaction and may be additionally spurred by contextual factors such as the
government’s need for rehabilitation, whether because of preceding corruption scandals
or a lack of democratic legitimation” (13). The case of Bolivia illustrates how the
motivations of political elites in maximizing favorable outcomes (but working within the
constraints of the institutions) shaped direct democracy measures.
As Breuer (2008) notes, the Bolivian transition to democracy in 1982 was largely
successful, and based on the hybrid presidential system as well as the introduction of a
mixed-member proportional electoral system. However, the author argues that the actual
outcome of this process, while designed to limit the problems inherent to Latin American
instability (e.g., minority governments and legislative deadlock) actually resulted in
legislative support “dominated by presidential patronage strategies rather than by
programmatic compromises” (14) which resulted in corruption and an alienated
electorate. This system was replaced in 1994 by a traditional List Proportional
Representation system that was intended to reconnect voters with parties was successful
only in encouraging party system fragmentation and polarization by “aggravating existent
ethnic and regional cleavages” (14). After increased fragmentation and eventual civil
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unrest over the plan to export natural gas to California, President Sanchez de Lozada’s
government collapsed, and was replaced by vice-president Mesa, who sought the legal
introduction of the referendum.
In the Bolivian case, Breuer argues that four factors were largely responsible for
Mesa’s action. First, since the idea of referendum was initially brought up by Mesa’s
predecessor, Mesa could not ignore it without preventing further escalation of the
situation; secondly, the lack of a direct popular mandate required him to seek continued
favorable approval ratings; third, that a lack of stable support basis made the ordinary
route of legislative approval (especially with energy policies) quite difficult; and finally,
Mesa’s own preferences shaped his desire to find a balance between an unhappy
electorate on the one hand and international lending organizations on the other by
increasing taxes on foreign companies operating in Bolivia (16). The final version of the
referendum process was accepted as part of a constitutional reform package passed in
June 2004. The Bolivian case thus shows how the historical context shapes the
introduction of measures of direct democracy, but also that institutionalism plays a large
part in the choices that political elites make (indeed, those who have control over the
institutions) such that their preferences are maximized as a result of the institutions they
create. Breuer also finds that the Bolivian case “parallels the Peruvian case in which
Fujimori resorted to a referendum in order to make up for the lack of a democratic
legitimation of his government” (20). For Mesa, the first usage of the referendum came
in 2004, and initially the results seemed to be regarded as a “solid vote of confidence for
Mesa” (Breuer 2008:17); however, strategic decisions resulting from the outcome of the
referendums ultimately led to further civil unrest, and culminated in Mesa’s resignation
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in 2005. For Mesa in particular, and for scholars more generally, the notion of unintended
consequences 19 could not be clearer.
Other cases show how the historical context, critical junctures, the cybernetic theory
of decision-making, and the prospect theory blend together to form an explanatory
framework. Breuer (2009) finds in a cross-nation quantitative study that several factors
are responsible for the introduction and continued use of measures of direct democracy.
First, she argues that presidential systems in Latin America are a key determinant, insofar
as “presidents facing situations of civil unrest may attempt to use referendums to several
strategic ends: a means to divert public attention from unpopular policies or personal
misdemeanor; as a political offering to mobilized groups of citizens; and as a way to
delegate responsibility for unpopular decisions by “passing the buck to the voter” (29).
Secondly, she finds that multi-party systems are more likely to result in difficulty within
interparty negotiation and increase the problems inherent in presidential systems, and in
such a case, the executive or oppositional legislators “could use a referendum to outplay
their political rivals in the opposite branch of government” (29). Along this same line of
reasoning, the author finds that a common result of multiparty systems is divided
government, and depending on institutional constraints (e.g., whether the direct
democracy measure is available to the legislature, the executive, either or both), a
referendum may offer a way to break a stalemate. Yet another cause of direct democracy
usage for Breuer is instances in which the executive does not have direct democratic
legitimation, such as in the case of an automatic successor. Finally, Breuer argues that
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Though I have referenced unintended consequences in terms of Mesa individually, the concept would of
course refer to the institution of direct democracy in Bolivia (e.g., would direct democracy, instituted as a
measure to increase democratic stability, actually be able to resolve conflict between state functions and
enhance participation and legitimacy). The irony was just too blatant to pass over.
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constitutional rigidity is a predictor of referendum usage insofar as constitutional
amendment processes often take a supermajority, and thus referendum becomes a more
viable alternative. Extending these suppositions to Western Europe finds support; as the
dissertation will show, the semi-presidential system in France has facilitated such
outcomes; in Italy, multi-party organization has also has significant effects on outcomes.
A correlated finding in Breuer’s (2008a; 2009) study is that it also disproves the
notion that the introduction (and later usage) is primarily based on “personalistic, neopopulist leadership”, suggesting that institutions (and institutionalist theory) matter more
than individuals (and a strict rational choice theory). Such an examination is worthwhile.
O’Donnell (1994) offers that many Latin American countries that can be considered
“democracies” in the definitional sense of the term (e.g., the Dahl polyarchy test), are
actually “delegative democracies” that lack the institutional framework necessary to
control the flow of political power. Instead, the delegative democracy described here
implies that the “the president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and the main
custodian and definer of its interests” (60). In particular, O’Donnell points to Argentina,
Brazil, and Peru as examples (at least at the time of his writing) of delegative
democracies. However, as Breuer (2008a) points out, the institutional constraints and
decision-making aspects of the leader are not fully considered. She argues that “the
capacity to obtain policies consistent with the executive preferences….vary according to
the interaction [several] institutional variables” (64). In particular, presidential system
executives are likely to use the government-instituted referendum when the position of
the median voter reflects their preferences (and the interaction of negative preference
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distribution in the legislature) as well as constitutional rules regulating the competences
of elected officials 20 and minimum turnout requirements 21.
In 1983, Argentines chose a new president in Raul Alfonsin and the Union Civica
Radical (UCR), and returned to constitutional rule. However, a reworking of a
constitution did not take place until Carlos Menem took power with the Partido
Justicialista. Scholars note that Menem ruled by decree on many occasions, offering 336
“need and urgency decrees” in a five year span, all in an effort to avoid legislature
approval (Barczak 2001). The Menem administration sought economic stability through
neoliberal economic and social policies, including privatization of state enterprises,
deregulation of economic activities, and efforts at a balanced budget (Vacs 2006).
However, the important point for the purposes of this study is that the new constitution –
in collaboration with former president Alfonsin and the Radical Party – included
authorization for “consultas” and initiatives (Barczak 2001). In this case, Barczak argues
that the instrumental variable for the inclusion of direct democracy components was the
rise of Menem and the decline of the UCR, but that the process included collaboration of
the traditionally excluded elements in the form of Alfonsin.
The case of Brazil also follows the idea that the critical juncture resulting in
constitutional inclusion of direct democracy was the fact that “new parties ended up
dominating the constituent assembly of 1987-1988, which opened the door for the
introduction of direct democracy” (Barczak 2001). Chafee (2006) notes that the 1988
Constitution had a “strong liberal content”, primarily a reaction against the centralization
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This refers to the executive’s ability to conduct a referendum.
Minimum turnout requirements are an important institutional constraint: in countries with “low levels of
democratization, governments confront politically apathetic citizens” (Breuer 2008a: 67). In most Latin
American countries, a threshold must be met before the referendum is valid (this varies between 25-51%).
21
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and excesses of the military regime. The Constitution increased the voting population
from 1891 stipulation of literate white males to both illiterates and those over 16, brought
rural workers into the social security system, and also expanded labor rights.
Barczak also finds that the case of Ecuador’s inclusion of direct democracy was
the result of a critical juncture that included outsider interests. In this case, however, three
constitutions were written between 1979 and 1996, and while the 1979 Constitution
introduced direct democracy, it was expanded by “newly organized forces” (47). The
original Constitution was itself a product of a referendum between different constitutional
plans drawn up by civilian politicians and scholars, and the result was dramatic changes,
including the enfranchisement of illiterates and the abolishment of the Senate, in addition
to the allowance of limited direct democracy measures, such as indirect initiatives and
allowing the president to call a consulta (48). Future administrations, such as Leon
Febres Cordero sought to expand the ability to call a referendum, and the rise of the
Ecuadorian Roldosista Party and the PSC (both relatively new players, at least in terms of
electoral success), resulted in the expansion of the president’s ability to call a consulta
(51). Each of these cases, Barczak argues, are predicted by the fact that traditionally
excluded interests held power over the reform or rewriting process, which would
certainly be considered a critical junction.
In a related but ultimately different context, Barczak finds that Colombia and
Paraguayan inclusions of direct democracy were the result of traditionally excluded
interests capturing a significant, though not controlling, share of the reform process. In
the former, the author notes the emergence of direct democracy was the result of
traditionally excluded groups, in this case, the ADM-19 and representatives from social
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groups also won seats in the legislature charged with approving the 1991 Constitution.
The author notes that participatory democracy was important to the agenda of the
minority groups (52). In the Paraguayan case, the 1992 constitutional rewrite process in
the legislature was dominated by the traditional Colorado Party, but the 76 of 198 seats
not held by the Colorado Party went to a main opposition party and a newly formed
independent movement (53), and the end result included provisions for consultas and
indirect initiatives.
Thus, the scholarship reviewed here shows that the inclusion of direct democracy
is not always a function of “out-group” participation; certainly, the introduction of the
mechanism occurs without it. However, there does seem to be an evident pattern:
inclusion of out-groups in the constitutional formation process does lead to increased
usage of the referendum process in later instances, while the lack of such a group is
associated with a lower usage in later instances. Such a finding will be useful in the casestudy application in future chapters.
Institutional Design, Turnout, and Outcomes
That direct democracy is on the rise both in the United States (Cronin 1989,
Waters 1999) but also around the world (Butler and Ranney 1994; Uleri 1996) is hardly a
revelation. Scarrow (2001) finds that widespread institutional reforms have incorporated
access to the referendum process, particularly at the local level.
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In Europe, two main

causes can be attributed to this rise: the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe during
the 1990s produced almost thirty new constitutions (many of which were actually passed
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Though not discussed by the Scarrow, this could be an indirect attempt at overcoming the problems that
had been solved by federalism. A study examining the relationship between federalism (though rare in
Europe) and local referendums could be of interest here.
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by referendum), and the integration process within the European Union that has reignited
both national and transnational direct democracy mechanisms (Kaufmann and Waters
2004). Other scholars have argued that increases in referendum usage reflects the
“unfreezing of political alignments and institutions” that had characterized the early part
of the twentieth century (Bogdanor 1994). In this sense, the increases in referendum are a
function of the challenge to the longstanding representative institutions in the form of
participatory forms of democracy. However, further research suggests that such usage has
increased where provisions for referendum usage currently exist; in states that had
offered minimal referendum usage, or in states where citizens lack the abilty to trigger a
referendum, institutional constructs have not given way to increased usage (Setala 1999).
Leaving aside the purely institutional aspect for a moment, other scholars suggest
that aspects such as cognitive mobilization (Dalton 1996), or the increases in popular
demand for access to the policy-making process as a function of the increases in
resources and skills available to the general (non-political) elite. Significant research
focuses on the role of direct democracy as a method of countering the growing cynicism
and disaffection with extant government structures, and insofar as the referendum offers a
direct voice, their use is a function of an increased desire for responsiveness (Gerber
2001). Craig, et al (2001) argue that evidence from the United States suggest that while
each of these hypotheses has some plausibility, a stronger causal element is that of
“policy entrepreneurs” who seek their own ends while at the same time capturing public
support for the institution of direct democracy itself. Insofar as the process of direct
democracy was intended as a process through which individual could counter the power
of political elites (whether they be elected officials or interest groups), the capture of the
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process by elites suggest negative outcomes in terms of the original purposes of the
institution. At the same time, the individual-led approach (rather than institutional-led)
approach offered by Morel (2001) is that increases in the use of the referendum are in
part a “path dependent” issue: as a state utilizes the process (regardless of the purpose),
its use not only legitimizes the issue at hand, but also legitimizes the process itself. This,
of course, makes it difficult for the state to eschew the process in the future. Moreover,
Morel argues that the increases in referendum usage in Europe is a consequence of the
increases in obligatory referendums as well as increases in uses of direct democracy in
the Italian system. In each of the European cases, Morel finds that the process is not fully
consultative; that is, the process is not used by a representative government seeking the
honest, objective opinion of the people. Rather, political elites are interested in resolving
tensions within their own parties, furthering their legislative agenda, and increasing their
own power (2001:62).
Significant variations occur across the countries with respect to the availability of
various types of initiative and referendums. Unlike the United States, where the only
variation is in terms of a popular initiative versus a legislative referendum and the
requirements of each for ballot access (in terms of signature gathering, available
provisions, and general availability) European countries have a host of options among
them. For example, referendums can either be binding or non-binding. In the latter, such
referendums are consultative or advisory in nature and the government may or may not
choose to implement the results. Moreover, the referendums may be mandatory (i.e.,
required when constitutional issues or EU accession are considered) or facultative (i.e.,
instituted at the will of a public authority or by a petition of the people). In yet another
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twist, some countries may adopt a simple majority rule for adoption; others, however,
may require a supermajority for passage, and in still other, a “quorum” 23 of sorts must be
met in terms of voter turnout before adoption will be considered.
A consideration of the mechanics now complete, the question becomes one of
empirical and normative value: who uses direct democracy? What are the benefits and
drawbacks of such a mechanism? What are the consequences for democracy as a whole?
Donovan and Karp (2006) consider the first of these questions by examining the demand
side of the equation: are I & R initiatives preferred by those who embrace the notion of
greater demand in citizen involvement in the governmental process, or do those who may
find themselves on the periphery (or may be largely disenchanted with the status quo)
prefer the availability of direct democracy? Their study considered the direct democracy
mechanism in countries across Europe, as well as the Americas and New Zealand. Survey
data results indicate overall support for the process itself but also that, between groups,
the politically interested and engaged are more likely to assume the increased costs
associated with referendum voting, as are the young. Additionally, increased support was
found among those on the left of the political spectrum and the authors argue that, by
extension, the implication that direct democracy was a threat to the political status quo
due to use by those disaffected by the system is not supported. That is, in a manner
similar to members of the American Populist Party’s eschewing of direct democracy (in
contrast to the Populist Party’s enthusiasm for the mechanism) members of the
disaffected cohort are no more likely to turn to direct democracy, regardless of the endaround benefits of the very system with which they are disaffected.
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For example, Italy requires a 50% turnout threshold for the results to be valid.
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The role of direct democracy in a given state cannot be properly understood
without also considering the context of the institution relative to the participating state.
That is, institutional design can not only foster variant outcomes, but can also affect the
substantive aspect of the role of direct democracy itself. Institutional design refers to the
myriad possibilities available to nation states in terms of the legal regulation of direct
democracy: various quorum requirements, pre-regulated referendums versus ad hoc
referendums (the former takes place according to a pre-determined constitutionally or
otherwise legally prescribed norm, while the latter is at the discretion of a sector of
politics), advisory referendums versus binding referendums, the ability of the nation’s
judicial system to intervene, as well as more functional aspects, such as signature
thresholds and gathering periods.
For example, in terms of institutional design, Lithuanians face very stringent
requirements (roughly 11% of the electorate’s signatures are required), compared to
roughly two percent in Hungary and Slovenia. Like Italy, Lithuania also requires a
turnout quorum of 50% of the registered voters, while in Hungary that requirement is
25%, and Slovenes simply require a majority vote. Moreover, in each of these countries,
a period of 12-18 months is granted for proper consideration and debate of the issue.
Fourteen European Union member states establish either participation or approval
quorum for national referendums or initiatives (Aguiar - Conraria and Magalhaes 2008).
Clearly, the question becomes one of how quorum rule may affect the incentive to vote.
In developing a theory on this matter, Aguiar - Conraria and Magalhaes construct a
“prototypal rational-choice, decision theoretic model of voting” (2008: 5) that combines
elements of a pivotal-voter model (belief that voting will swing an election) with partial
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equilibrium notions. The application of this theory in a large quantitative dataset finds
several key points. First, under referendum systems that include only an approval quorum
or no quorum at all, voting for one of the options can only increase that options chance of
victory. However, when a participation quorum is introduced, the voter who seeks and
votes for the status quo may actually be helping to induce change by voting (and thus by
increasing the level of participation towards quorum requirements). Thus, the voter who
seeks the status quo may find that abstention is the best option. The authors conclude that
participation quorum systems display a bias towards lower voter turnout – and a count of
roughly 11%. Their cross-sectional design also yielded other findings: compulsory voting
and literacy both increase turnout levels; referendums are more demanding than general
elections where voters can rely on party cues and incumbency for predictors; and that
competitive referendum are more likely to receive higher turnout, as are ballots that are
short and do not induce fatigue.
The study of direct democracy in Europe depends upon the ability to classify
these differences appropriately. That is, to analyze empirically cross-national data, a
method of appropriate comparison must be developed. For example, an analysis of
referendums in Italy (where the people essentially have only the ability to “veto” laws,
and to do so, a 50% approval quorum must be reached) cannot be compared with
referendums in Latvia (where the process is used often, but as little as 2% of the
population may propose either a legislative or constitutional referendum). Though
variance is a key component of analysis, excessive variance precludes (or at the very
least, limits) meaningful research, especially in a cross-country comparison.
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The institutional context has proven a viable mechanism for other researchers as
well. Hug (2000) delves deeper into the Maastricht Treaty using the lens of institutional
construct, and finds that through an evaluation of referendum of 15 countries, the type
(e.g., binding, non-binding) had an independent effect on the outcome. Specifically,
because the consequences of the vote in a binding/non-binding referendum are different,
the voting differences should also be apparent. Hug argues that when a facultative
binding referendum has been offered, the vote-of-confidence effect is stronger,
essentially showing support for the government’s position. However, when mandatory
referendum votes take place, the governments cannot signal their intentions, and thus the
confidence vote aspect is muted.
The concept of “initiative culture” may also play a significant role in the process.
To what degree does direct democracy play a central role in the politics of a given
nations? That is, do the people understand the process, accept the process as a legitimate
method of governance, and seek out the process to achieve certain ends? Such acceptance
would likely be the result of repeated use; many countries, however, have only used the
process in consideration of universal decisions, such as acceptance of Maastricht.
As mentioned, however, culture includes more than turnout. Christin (2005)
consider notions of European Union support, and find that culture does indeed play a
significant role. In particular, levels of democratization play an important role in terms of
EU support: citizens of less democratic nations are more likely to believe that joining the
EU would strengthen democratic institutions, while those residing in more democratic
nations (such as Central Europe and the Baltics) are less likely to support accession
because of a perceived lack of need for such institutions.
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In a separate study, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2003) argue that the outcomes of
various EU accession referendums in Eastern Europe could be considered in light of
“elite unity” on the issue as a primary determinant and underlying public support as a
secondary determinant. Thus, rather than complex notions of democracy, culture for the
present authors was determined more by “popularity” (which is indeed a problematic
notion of culture; endogeneity is only the beginning of the problems here) but
nonetheless find that elite support in Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Lithuania resulted
in support, while Eurosceptic ideas were given support in the Czech Republic, Poland,
Estonia, and Latvia where elites were unsupportive.
Szczerbiak and Taggart also develop what they consider to be a “causal model”
that attempt to identify both results and turnout in a given referendum vote. It is worth
noting that the reliance upon culture is revealing. The model considers independent
variables that predict results to be (1) direction of cues from social elites; (2) public
support for the EU; (3) knowledge of the European issue; and (4) the credibility of elites.
The varying levels (considered on a continuum) affect the likelihood of a yes/no vote.
The authors also admittedly exclude the “credibility of European institutions” (Szczerbiak
2003: 17 and 22) because, they argue, such institutions only affect referendum results “at
the margins” but also because elites are already part of the institution, and thus, the
effects are difficult to parse out.
It should be noted that these findings are in opposition to those made earlier by
Hug (2000), who had found that the institutional context did in fact mediate the impact of
political actors (and partisanship cues). However, it should further be noted that Hug
considered three institutional factors: whether or not the initiative was binding, whether
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the referendum was constitutionally required, and which governmental coalition was in
power at the time of the vote. The importance of the finding (for my purposes) is this last
one, which simply adds to the methodological confusion because it could be considered a
cultural independent variable as well.
Initiative culture may have also played a part in Lithuanian and Estonian (and
Eastern Europe more generally) referendum voting patterns. Lust (2009) argues that the
2003 European Union membership vote found eight Eastern European participants whose
outcomes differed significantly from one another. The above cited states, however,
focused on their status rather than institutional contexts insofar as their relative economic
stations seemed to be the predictor: Lithuanians sought to overcome their economic
hardships by a vote to join the EU; at the same time, Estonians considered accession to
further reinforce their dependence on the West and prolong their economic hardship.
Although the author argues that these results were based on variant strategies of
economic reform, it seems clear that similarities in institutional constructs point to
outcome variance as a function of culture – or at least, political elites.
Political culture (and such influence on turnout and outcomes) can certainly play a
role in referendum politics within nondemocratic regimes as well . In 1958, Egypt held
two referendums, both with 98% turnout and 98% approval (the Founding of the United
Arab Republic and Nasser for president); Egyptians in 1965 repeated the Nasser vote by
the same margins, and the 1971 Constitution also passed with 98% of the vote, and 98%
of the turnout (C2D). In 1974, the Egyptian regime set sights on attracting foreign
investment with the “October Paper” – arguing to the populace that attracting foreign
investment would make up for domestic shortfall. Like the votes before it, the regime
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attracted nearly 100% approval, due in large part to electoral fraud orchestrated by the
Ministry of Interior (Moustafa). Presidential confirmations by referendum in 1976, 1981,
1987, and 1993 all had support above 95% (C2D). Interestingly, the 2011 constitutional
referendum, held after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, found only a third of the
electorate showing up to the polls and just 64% approved of the new Constitution – as
Ottaway (2013) argues, this newly approved Constitution will not put an end to the
transition period, but instead, focus the debate on the rights of the minorities, which are
lacking in the new Constitution.
Other nondemocratic regimes utilize the process and find similar results. Morocco
voters approved a 1970 constitutional referendum with a 99% approval rating (93%
turnout), pushed by King Hassan II, and again in 1972 after a failed coup with the same
results. Referendums in 1980 (moving the age of majority from 18 to 16 for royal
successor, and extending the mandate of parliament from four to six years) produced
similar results, as well as the 1992 referendum increasing parliamentary seats. As was the
case in Egypt, the 2011 Arab Spring resulted in new constitutional referendums in
Morocco, and although only 73% turned out, 98% voted to grant executive power to a
prime minister (e.g., the power to dissolve parliament) but also to leave military,
religious, and judicial power within the purview of the king 24.
The cases above certainly raise questions on widespread policy agreement. As
Altman (2011) notes, the 2002 Iraq referendum on the presidency of Saddam Hussein
(100% turnout and 100% approval) does not reconcile with the notion that Shia Muslims
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or the Kurdish population were properly represented. This is not surprising, since
dictatorships do not lose plebiscites. Altman (2011) finds of the 254 referendums that
occurred in nondemocratic regimes, only three resulted in losses (Uruguay in 1980, Chile
1988, and Zimbabwe in 2000).
Altman (2011) also considers the issue worldwide, and while his main concern is
not the institutional structure, this is an important element. Altman considers the degree
to which (or if) direct democracy serves to strengthen representative democracy. The
theoretical perspective that Altman employs starts from the foundation that the institution
of direct democracy is the mechanism that allows popular sovereignty to flourish within
contemporary representative democracies. For Altman, the focus of this research should
be on the degree to which the two institutions can coexist, rather than a focus on whether
or not they are mutually exclusive.
Altman’s research is certainly inclusive. The author builds a database of five
thousand observations over a twenty-five year period in “each and every country” in
which either a referenda or initiative occurred. The only limitation here is that the “event”
must have occurred at the national level, which of course leaves out many cases
(especially the U.S. case). The research then focuses on the relationship between direct
democracy and nondemocratic regimes (the findings here indicate that use is motivated
by the “maintenance of an illusion of an existing democratic process” and to further
legitimate the regime in both political as well as psychological elements towards the
populace). Interestingly, Altman here argues that, in the cases in which authoritarian
regimes accepted defeat via referendum, the cause was international leverage and
institutional design – an important element for the purposes of this dissertation.
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The remainder of Altman’s work (2011) focuses on the degree to which
accountability is present within the environment of direct democracy. That is, Altman
argues that the weak institutions are in fact assisted by countries (the focus is primarily
Latin America) that use direct democracy, insofar as the “rules of the game” are not as
easily (arbitrarily) altered. The single case study of Uruguay is also examined, and
Altman concludes that when the executive opposes the objective of the promoters of the
measure under consideration, the government in power is more likely to lose at the polls.
This is especially the case when economic issues are at stake, when the referendum seeks
to maintain the status quo, and when strong lobbies or unions are behind the referendum.
Thus, institutional design is clearly a relevant factor in determining referendum
usage. A superficial analysis suggests that easier access to the referendum device equals
increased referendums, and that the opposite would also be true. However, this analysis
does not fully examine the role of individuals working within the institution already
created. In so doing, a better understanding of the degree to which referendums are used
within systems that have easier access – and within those that have more difficult access
points – becomes clearer.
Campaigns, Parties, and Elite Cues
Western Europeans have been asked to consider accession to the European Union
more than 40 times since the 1970s (Butler and Ranney 1994). Certainly, constitutional
referendums (either those seeking voter approval for joining a larger organization, such
as the European Union, ratification of a treaty, or individual state level constitutional
change) differ from policy referendums in a significant way: the former changes the basic
institutional structure of government, while the latter focuses on the issue of
representative versus individual level decision-making. Galligan (2001) finds that the
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referendum is an appropriate means of decision when considering constitutional issues
insofar as it increases the legitimacy of the process; at the same time however, the
process itself is difficult – and properly so.
The literature related to accession referendums is dominated by discussion of
ruling-party support, insofar as the “required” aspects of such referendums preclude a
study of the politics surrounding the introduction of the question. The discussion in the
literature focuses on referendum outcomes not as reflections of the issue at hand, but
rather of voter affection or disaffection with the ruling party (and by extension, in most
cases, government). These take shape primarily in response to European treaties, such as
Maastricht or EU Constitution. Franklin, et al (1995) argue that the referendum
conducted in France and Denmark to ratify the Maastricht Treaty resulted not in true
voter preferences for European popularity as a whole, but rather, aggregation of voter
preferences towards the ruling party. The basis of their argument is that “partisan
attachments in parliamentary systems are inextricably entwined with government
popularity, so that the outcome of a referendum has to be seen in connection with the
position taken by the government” (105). Their findings suggest that lack of support by
party government in France resulted in a very narrow passage of the referendum, while
the same referendum failed in Denmark during a time of strong majority party opposition
– only to pass a year later when the disfavored party was no longer in power. The
consequence of this, of course, is that it questions the relevance of such referendum.
Given the various nature of referendum possibilities (i.e., binding, non-binding, and of
course, facultative) the very likelihood of a referendum appearing is dependent upon the
government assuming success; however, in the case of mandatory referendum, the
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outcomes may be more likely to reflect satisfaction with party government than with the
issue at hand.
More recently, Garry et al (2005) examined the issue with respect to Irish voting
on two EU treaties. The authors argue that the result differential in the two treaties
(actually, it was two elections on the same treaty – the Nice Treaty), is a function of
“second-order election” 25 factors, mainly because the first go-round resulted in a negative
vote, which was determined to be the result of low campaigning on the purpose of the
referendum by the voters; the second go-round, on the other hand, was accepted and
determined to be the result of the party vigorously campaigning the effects of the treaty
itself (i.e., put the focus on Europe as a whole). The Irish also initially rejected by
referendum the Treaty of Lisbon. As Kellerman (2008) argues, the approximately 1
million Irish voters (amounting to less than 1 percent of the bloc’s population of over 500
million) essentially held hostage the Treaty as a whole, insofar as Ireland was the only
member state to hold referendums on the Treaty. The stated objections ranged from
concerns over neutrality (certainly a concern, given Ireland’s neutrality), the loss of VAT
taxation benefits, and a fear of loss of influence in an enlarged EU; Kellerman (2006),
however, notes that the actual concern was over political disenchantment with political
elites who supported the Treaty. O’Brennan (2009) and later Quinlan (2009) support this
argument, finding that the two main reasons for the “no vote” for the Treaty were “an
enduring Irish attachment to an overwhelmingly exclusivist national identity” and also a
“lack of knowledge” on the part of the voters, which typifies the divide in elite vs.
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Second-order elections are those that are not perceived by voters or actors to be as important as national
or general elections, and thus can be considered as mechanisms for signaling support – or a lack of support
– for domestic political parties and government (Garry 2005: 204). Second-order effects are more likely in
non-binding referendums.
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popular political awareness. Yet, when asked again to approve the Treaty, Irish voters in
2009 did so by a 67% margin, and while the distrust of elites remained in place, De
Bruyn argues that fears of an economic recession changed the mind of many voters (one
in ten gave a “yes” vote on economic ground in 2008; one in four gave a “yes” vote on
economic grounds in 2009). Thus, Irish voters have had a mixed record on voting for
treaties: “yes” votes on the 1973 EC referendum, the Single European Act, the Maastrict
Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, but “no” on the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty,
both of which eventually became “yes” votes.
More generally, Glencross and Trechsel (2011) consider Flash-Eurobarometer
survey data to analyze empirically the second-order decision making by voters in Spain,
France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on the 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe (TEC). Spain and Luxembourg both approved, while the Dutch and French
both voted “no”. The authors find that in the case of the Dutch and the French, the
concern was not the constitution itself, but rather, a “generally pessimistic attitude about
the European Union” (12); similar pessimism was not found in Spain and Luxembourg.
Thus, voters are showing concern for aspects unrelated to the immediate issue at hand, in
both the negative and the positive sense (i.e, Spain and Luxembourg had a positive affect
towards integration (and not the constitution itself), and thus approved.
This study does lead one to wonder why a state would risk ratification failure in
the first place, if such a referendum were not mandatory. To understand this relationship,
Finke and Konig (2009) examine the strategic interaction between government,
opposition parties, and the electorate in 25 countries during the 2004 Constitutional
Treaty vote. The key finding is that treaty-friendly governments may seek to circumvent
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a “potentially treaty-sceptic parliamentary opposition by initiating a referendum” (358).
As such, the authors argue, the referendum becomes a mechanism of policy change rather
than yet another veto player as had been suggested by others (Hug and Tsebelis 2002).
Moreover, the government can expect moderate to high gains in a treaty reform vote
regardless of their desires.
In addition to institutional context, the role of parties is also important. A later
study focusing on the role of parties in the 2007 EU Constitution referendum found that
the party is indeed an intervening variable. Crum (2007) focuses on the asymmetry
between government and opposition parties: because government parties are constrained
to commit themselves to the “Yes” side, opposition parties can exercise a genuine choice,
which can constitute a “competitive model” or a “collusive model” depending on their
willingness to side with the government party. However, because the opposition party is
likely to suffer from intra-party dissent and defection, the choice may actually become a
liability. Crum finds that support for the EU Constitution is based on party identification
rather than simple opposition, and that center-left parties are more likely to support the
Constitutional Treaty. This however has implications in and of itself as center-left parties
are more likely to follow a yes-vote but followers are more likely to oppose the yes-vote
from the center-right groups. In either case, however, the effects of protest groups are
ineffective.
Hobolt (2006) evaluates the impact that parties have on voting behavior by
examining two Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty. She finds that political
parties have a considerable power to influence the way in which referendum choice is
perceived by voters; however individual preferences towards the EU are a stronger
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predictor of vote choice. Because defections are probable, Hobolt argues that parties have
more success in framing the proposal “as close to the ideal point of the median voter”
(641). That is, the evidence suggests that voter do in fact take cues from the parties that
they support, but that “issue preferences condition the extent to which parties can
persuade their own supporters to follow the party line” (642). Such framing occurs
through the media, and thus, the effects of the framing are also important measurements
of voting behavior.
Support for the idea that referendum campaigns have much in common with
regular election campaigns also comes from Jenssen and Listhaug (2001), who argue that
party cues play a central role in the opinion formation process. Utilizing national survey
data collected on voter attitudes to the 1994 European Union referendums, these scholars
find that parties (especially those with a majority in parliament) can influence public
opinion, especially through such techniques as resource control over the timing of the
referendum, the allocation of campaign resources, the role played by other ad hoc
organizations, and the implementation of the actual referendum results. Thus, parties are
successfully able to mobilize their traditional followers, which make referendum events
similar to regular election campaigns.
A consideration of how voters make their electoral decisions would not be
complete without a brief discussion of the role of the media. A review of the research in
this area finds a significant lacuna; Jenkins and Mendelsohn (2001), however, find that
coverage of referendums mirrors closely that of standard electoral campaigns. The
resulting (normative) implication from this is that the media does not serve to facilitate a
deliberative environment which leads to further understanding, but given the framing
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power of the media (and in the case of referendums, research suggests the framing was
focused on the procedural issues of the campaign rather than substantive issues) and
selective perception of individual voters, the result is similar to regular election
campaigns.
Thus, determining how individuals vote must consider multiple variables. Christin
et al (2002) consider the information costs that referendums have on voters, and in
particular, examines the heuristics and shortcuts that may be employed in deciding how
to vote. Given the unusually higher number of referendums in Switzerland, the authors
focus their attention here. Their research results in two main findings: first, that
systematically uninformed citizens vote more strongly against ballot measures if they
imply a change to the status quo, which align with the risk-averse theory of voter
behavior. The authors argue that the implication is that voters are more informed about
the current status quo than they are about the proposed change. Secondly, they find mixed
support for the notion that uninformed voters might mimic the behavior of well-informed
voters if they aware of the endorsement of a political actor. However, the authors argue
that their data are problematic insofar as operationalizing the informed/uninformed voter
is not all that easy; moreover, understanding the causal connection between cues
delivered by actors and those by parties are difficult to separate.
Hobolt (2006) considers this topic in a much more detailed manner by focusing
on three main questions: how voters behave, what the role of the political elite is, and
ultimately, whether or not referendums influence policy outcomes. In response to the first
question, Hobolt finds that salience is the key: when high, the voter relies on their own
attitudes rather than adopting the second-order approach discussed earlier. The role of the
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political elites is considered to be primarily responsive, in that they can interpret the
meaning of the referendum for voters, and they can also set the agenda once the decision
is taken. Finally, she argues that the indirect effects of the referendum may be the key, as
policy outcomes are closer to the median voter preferences in situations in which the I &
R is used. The author extends this research (Hobolt 2009), where she finds that issue
voting (as opposed to second-order voting) is prevalent in referendum on European
integration especially when voters are provided with sufficient information and clear
recommendations from political elites. This means a large prop of voters have the
capability of voting completely and responsibly on Euro issues given that adequate info is
available. Voter competence may be enhanced when political parties instigate serious and
open debate on issue of Euro integration and when the campaigns offer extensive info on
the issue. She also finds that detailed factual information is not necessary for voters to act
in a reasonable manner since political party cues can act as substitutes. Thus, she argues
that voters are smarter than they are often given credit for. Direct democracy may not
produce outcomes desired by politicians but they are nonetheless decisions based on
competent voting records.
If voters are indeed competent (this author does not take this notion to be proven),
then the question becomes one of the relevance and appropriateness of direct democracy
itself. Qvortrup (2002) examines this question in a comparative analysis, and argues that
referendums are indeed compatible with consensus government, and that they are
democratic institutions because they allow for equal participation of all groups and for
protection of minorities. He further argues that turnout decreases as referendum increase
(at least in Denmark and Sweden), and that higher socioeconomic demographics are
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overrepresented. For the most part, voters have high knowledge of individual
referendums, and that by extension; the referendum does not obstruct the representative
democracy process. However, the notion that such relative appropriateness can exclude
the notion that referendum voting on constitutional questions automatically leads to an
increase in deliberative public. Chambers (2001) finds what many before (Gerber 1999;
Smith, D and Tolbert 2004; Smith, Mark A 2002) have found with regard to direct
democracy: referendums may actually undermine deliberation. Chambers argues that this
is in large part due to the degree of majoritarianism that is inappropriate for this serious
of a question, and that referendums present the voter with the image of “inflexibility”
(2001: 233), which in turn lead disincentivise deliberation.
In addition the constitutional questions, political elites often use direct democracy
to further their own interests. Such examples draw from both democratic and
nondemocratic regimes; it is the nondemocratic regimes considered here first. Certainly,
the use of the referendum to legitimize or consolidate power is more common within
nondemocratic regimes, as the legitimization in such systems must be manipulated rather
than assumed. Early examples of nondemocratic regimes utilizing the institution of direct
democracy include the 1802 referendum triggered by Napoleon, and a successful one at
that: 99.7% voted for a lifetime appointment, as opposed to a 17-year term, as originally
proposed by the French Senate. In the 1930s, Nazi Germany held several plebiscites,
ranging from the legitimization of the withdraw from the League of Nations in October of
1933 to reaffirming support for Adolf Hitler in 1938. Certainly, legitimizing the
consolidation of power was Hitler’s main concern here: after an August 1934 law merged
the offices of the President and Chancellor (granting now sole power to Hitler), the law
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was offered to the people as a plebiscite, who overwhelmingly approved (Suksi 1993).
As successful as these votes were (90% approval ratings), the Nazi government would
lose some interest in the utilization of the plebiscite because the 90% approval rating left
some room for a dissenting vote – this, Schiller (2009) argues, was seen as a “failure”.
Thus, certain conclusions relevant to this study can be drawn from the literature
on campaigns, parties, and elite cues in referendum politics. First, political parties and
campaigns are relevant: the discussion in this section focused primarily on instances in
which the referendum was mandatory, and in this sense, parties may seek to capitalize on
the requirement for their own political ends (perhaps legitimizing or delegitimizing the
status quo). Secondly, insofar as legitimation is a key element of political efficacy, the
institution of direct democracy is compatible with representative democracy. Third, and
perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this study, are that political elites often use
direct democracy to further their own interests, in both democratic and nondemocratic
regimes.
Conclusions
The current literature on the institution of direct democracy considers several
significant factors of the process. In large part, the significant rise in the literature related
to direct democracy is correlated with the significant increases in the usage of the process
itself. Certainly, with the significant rise in the usage of the referendum, scholars sought
almost simultaneously to explain the usage. Nonetheless, three significant problems exist
with the current literature.
Like those who miss the forest for the trees, scholars did not fully consider the
wider context of direct democracy usage. Scholars have focused on the increased
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“demand” model, from the perspective of the educated voter seeking governmental
responsiveness (Dalton 1996); that political elites are acting as policy entrepreneurs in
co-opting the “populist” mechanism and using it for their own ends (Craig, et al: 2001);
that state-level usage increases later usage (Morel 2001); and that democratic revolutions
during the 1990s produced new constitutions that were legitimized through the
referendum (Kaufmann and Waters 2004). However, there is an underlying contextual
cause that must be considered in each of these cases: what was the political context in
which the introduction of direct democracy occurred in the first place? Several of the
cases discussed here illustrate that this is a key variable: the lack of “out-groups” in the
Soviet constitutions resulted in fewer referendums, as did the German constitutions;
critical junctures that included “out-groups” were the key variable for referendum
inclusion and outcomes in Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, Colombia and Paraguay.
Secondly, the literature does not fully consider the impact of the unintended
consequences that generally occur as a function of referendum usage, especially when
legitimizing leadership and/or policy. While the “populist paradox” (Gerber 1999)
records the ever-common co-opting of the initiative process by powerful elites rather than
by the populists for whom the mechanism was designed, other significant unintended
consequences routinely occur as well. This is a significant oversight insofar as the
important normative concern goes: if the intended purpose of the referendum is to seek
out and follow the “will of the people”, what are the implications that arise when such an
outcome is rarely met (or perhaps met, but with additional consequences)? Such
consequences certainly have implications for the efficacy of the institution. Once again,
an examination of the context in which the institution of direct democracy was first
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established could provide a “universal” basis for understanding the occurrences of
unintended consequences.
Finally, the literature considers several different avenues of institutional design
that affect the frequency of the usage. For example, Kaufman and Waters evaluate
multiple criteria (e.g., signature requirements, restrictions on topics that may be put on a
referendum, quorum or turnout restrictions, and the overall “culture” of a given political
environment. While useful individually, these studies do not provide a significant
contribution to the study of comparative politics, insofar as increased restrictions
obviously result in fewer initiatives or referendums (as do turnout and quorum
restrictions). The larger (and the far more important) question is to what degree the
context of the introduction plays a significant role in the way that the institutional
construct is now designed – and then scholars can determine the effect that institutional
design plays a role in direct democracy as a function of the original context and the
resulting path dependency.
The main focus of the remaining chapters is an examination of the context in
which the institution of direct democracy was originally introduced, and the degree to
which this context plays a larger role in the eventual outcomes, to wit, institutional
design, the role of individuals, and frequency of usage. This review has, to some degree,
“previewed” these topics by examining differences in constitutional formation and direct
democracy, institutional design, and the role of individuals in the process. However, the
remaining chapters apply the theoretical framework to two sets of matcher-pair studies:
Italy and France, and Uruguay and Venezuela.
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CHAPTER THREE
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN ITALY AND FRANCE
Introduction
The prior chapter considered the institution of direct democracy in a variety of
cases in an effort to focus on relevant variables: constitutional design, institutional
design, the role of out-groups, the role of parties, and the role of political elites. The
current chapter examines the institution of direct democracy in Italy and France with a
particular focus on the above variables, and with the overall goal of evaluating the extent
of referendum usage in a given political system follows, in large part, the theoretical
formula discussed in the first chapter: that the introduction of direct democracy in a
political system, and cast definitively in a constitution is a function of the participation of
out-groups (Condition 1, or C1); that the later usage of referendums is dependent upon
(1) historical institutional design (HI1) and (2) the role of political elites in the process
(P1), where (P1) are conditioned by (HI1) as well as by the tenets of the prospect
theory/cybernetic theory of decision making discussed above (PC1). The next chapter
will follow largely the same format and examine the cases of Uruguay and Venezuela.
The Introduction of Direct Democracy in Italy
The Italian Constitution of 1947 created a parliamentary regime in reaction to the
Fascist conception of strong executive leadership. Thus, the institution of direct
democracy largely originated in the Italian system as a function of anti-fascist fears;
certainly, the introduction of a multi-party system in the context of pluralism (or, hyperpluralism?) suggests that authoritarianism on any level was a major concern to the
originators. During the Constituent Assembly of 1947, Constantino Mortati argued for
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the inclusion of direct democracy, noting that it “permits the resolution of conflicts, gets a
sense of the people, and is able to live with a parliamentary regime” (Volcansek 1999). A
relatively close vote followed considerable debate and reworking of the original proposal;
nonetheless, the notion of pluralism was encapsulated in the offering. The effects of that
institutional origin are clear: certainly, the process allows for the resolution of conflicts;
the process does get a sense of the people; and in many cases, the process has either
forced politicians in Parliament to act prior to resolution of the referendum, or in others,
to be bound by their results. In still other cases, the referendum has proved disastrous to
party bases, and a catalyst to legitimacy for smaller parties. In a word, pluralism; in yet
another, anti-authoritarianism.
The provision for the referendum did not appear to be a central feature of the
Constitution; nor did it appear to be designed to find frequent use. Given the multiparty
representation in Parliament and the weak executive, an appeal by the people against
government (especially considering the abrogative nature of the referendum) did not
appear to be something that would be often needed. Indeed, Article 75 of the Italian
Constitution, which provided for the referendum, did not take full effect until 1970, when
“implementing” laws were enacted by the Christian Democrats – and then only because
the Christian Democrats changed their stance: what had once been an instrument that
could only weaken their power became, in 1970, the instrument through which the DC
sought repeal of legislation passed against their wishes: the ability to seek and be granted
a divorce. As a function of this, the DC (at the time an opposition group) sought,
alongside other “out-groups” (e.g., the Communist Party and smaller Catholic groups) to
use the referendums to support their policies. Nonetheless, their failure would result in a
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sense of a power loss of the authority of the two main parties – a pattern noticeably
repeated with later uses.
Institutional Design in Italy
With the exception of the Swiss, Italians utilize the institution of direct democracy
more frequently than any other European state. Additionally, the Italian arrangement is
the only system in Europe (again, with the exception of the Swiss) in which the people
can trigger the use of the referendum themselves – in all other systems, the process is topdown. The small sample size does not minimize the fact that referendums are more likely
to be more frequent when the people retain control over its usage.
Institutional design has an important role in the direct democracy process in Italy.
At the top of the institution within Italy is the “abrogative referendum” which derives its
power from the Italian Constitution. In particular, Article 75 26 states that a popular
referendum can be held to decide on the repeal (total or partial) of a law when requested
by either (1) 500,000 27 registered voters, or (2) five regional councils. This, of course,
precludes Italians from a fully “positive” role in proposing laws, as they are
constitutionally limited to negating either parts of laws or to the comprehensive redaction
of law. Indeed, not all matters are at the discretion of this limited power: tax laws, budget
laws, amnesties, pardons, and international treaty laws are “off the table”. Perhaps most
interestingly, however, is the stringent institutional design manifested in the requirement
of a 50% voter turnout quorum in order for the results to be legally binding. That is, a
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In addition to Article 75, Article 138 allows for 500,000 voters or one-fifth of the members of either
legislative chamber (or five regional councils) to demand a referendum on constitutional language and law,
unless the law in question has been passed under this provision. Article 132 allows the use of the
referendum on modifying borders of Italy. Neither has been used at the national level.
27
The current population of Italy is roughly fifty-nine million; thus, roughly 1% of the electorate is able to
initiate a popular vote on the complete or partial abrogation of a particular law (Kaufmann and Waters
2004). The signatures must be collected within a 90-day period.
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double majority is required: a majority of the valid votes cast, but also, a majority of
those eligible to vote (Kaufman and Waters 2004). Regardless of how the referendum
comes to the ballot (via the voters or the regional councils), the results are binding. It is
important to note that because of the nature of abrogative referendum Italy, a “yes” vote
actually favors repeal of a law, while a “no” vote favors retention 28.
In addition to the double majority requirement, other institutional designs
facilitate outcomes. In particular, the Constitutional Court 29 plays a significant role in the
process in Italy. After the signatures have been collected, the Court decides on the
admissibility of the request. Between 1970 and 1995, 75 requests were “promoted”, and
of these, only 46 passed muster with the Constitutional Court (Uleri 1996). Additionally,
Parliament may also intervene in the process in two ways: they may dissolve Parliament
to postpone a popular vote (this occurred in 1972, 1976, and 1987), and they can directly
change the laws to be in harmony with the promoters of the popular vote and thus prevent
the vote itself; this occurred eight times between 1970 and 1995 (Uleri 1996).
A study of the institution of direct democracy (in any setting) would not be
complete without a review of the role of the courts, and Italy is no exception. The
referendum process in Italy faces two courts: the Corte di Cassazione verifies the
signatures on petitions and forwards on the certification to the Constitutional Court,
which has a much larger role. The essential role of the Court here is to determine the
constitutionality of the question at hand, and beyond looking at the constitutional
restrictions (that the question not be an issue related to taxes, budgets, amnesties,
indulgences, or related to ratification of an international treat) the Court has strengthened
28

Indeed, the ballot reads “Do you desire the repeal of the law…?”
The Italian Constitutional Court is comprised of fifteen members: one-third each appointed by the
president, elected by Parliament, and elected by the lower courts.
29
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its role in the admission process. During a 1978 review of eight referendum proposals,
the Court expanded its role in the process by arguing four separate reasons why a
proposal would become inadmissible. First, a question may not contain multiple and
heterogeneous questions (in other words, all questions had to be reduced to a single,
unifying question). Secondly, the proposal could not involve or implicate any part of the
Constitution or a constitutional law (and more to the point, such questions were governed
by separate constitutional articles). Third, the proposal’s central intention could only be
attained by injuring the Constitution or other laws, the proposal would be deemed
inadmissible. Finally, the Court reaffirmed that the proposal could not consider any topics
already delineated by Article 75 of the Constitution (Volcansek 1999).
The Court thus plays a central role in referendum outcomes. Of the eight proposed
questions in 1978, the Court ruled four inadmissible; Parliament acted before the
questions reached the voters and the lower court ruled two of the remaining four moot
and thus inadmissible; in 1981, the Court held five of eleven questions inadmissible. In
addition to the gatekeeping aspect, Volcansek (1999) also offers evidence that the Court
operates with a degree of activism as well as a political slant. The author points out a
number of examples: overturning Radical Party submissions while allowing others of a
similar topic to proceed; allowing the “sliding scale” referendum to pass in spite of the
budget and tax implications; and allowing controversial referendums dealing with
electoral law (a constitutional issue) to pass.
Volcansek (1999) further argues that the role of the Court in the referendum
process can be considered as a four-stage process. First, the Court practiced considerable
self-restraint in the early stages, applying the literal words of Article 75 of the
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constitutional text. The Court, however, soon began to expand its discretion by adding
additional criteria, which (thirdly) allowed more elasticity in the interpretation process,
and gave the Court considerably more influence over the process. Finally, the Court once
again expanded its own role in the process in 1987, when the Court barred a referendum
that would alter how members of the Superior Council of Magistrature was chosen,
which was later used to bar any challenge to the electoral systems. In sum, the process
amounted to a considerable expansion of the Court’s original jurisprudence, and along
the way, allowed the Court to “deflect issues away from a popular vote and preserve
dominate elite values” (Volcansek 1999: 112). After the major political upheavals of the
early 1990s, however, the Court “recast its structural role” (113), and in so doing,
returned to a stricter jurisprudential basis, with the net effect being “adherence to a clear,
accurate and consistent legal policy” (113).
In practice, direct democracy in Italy is common. Second only to Switzerland within
European countries that have some form of direct democracy, Italy saw fifty-three
referendums appear on ballots 30 between 1970 and 2003 (C2D). Uleri (1996) finds that
five main phases can be identified within the last half-century of Italian direct
democracy: the first (1943-1948) coincides with the collapse of the Fascist regime
(indeed, in 1946, a referendum was held deciding whether to institute a republic or a
monarchy); the second (1948-1970) saw the implementation of the abrogative
referendum as a result of conflict between the Vatican and the Christian Democrats (DC)
on the issue of legal divorce; the third (1970-1981) saw the use of the referendums by
opposing Catholic groups and Radical (PR) groups (both groups were successful
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Of these fifty-three, 36 were affirmed, 17 denied; however 18 of the fifty-three were voided due to the
lack of a quorum.
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mobilizers); the fourth phase (1981-1992) resulted in use by myriad parties that had
developed (and who focused primarily on social issues, such as wage indexation and
cost-of-living issues); the fifth phase began in 1993 and have focused on governmental
procedure and electoral laws.
More recently, Uleri (2002) finds that the Italian process can also be divided into
three further stages, and from this, implications regarding the “non-voter” can be derived.
The first period lasts from 1970-1985, and is characterized as the “period of the NO
vote.” The second lasts from 1986 to 1993, and is given the moniker of the “YES vote”
period, and the third and final period, the non-vote period, lasted from 1993-2000. The
first phase is marked by a period in which the 50% quorum was reached in all cases, and
the electorate rejected the referendums put to it; in the second, the predictable opposite
occurred and in the non- vote period, 15 of the 27 issues accepted by the Constitutional
Court were void because of the lack of turnout. The reasoning, Uleri argues, is that the
opponents to referendum found that it had “become easier to canvass for abstention rather
than to get people to vote NO” (Uleri 2002: 867). Indeed, it appears that the institutional
structure of the Italian system has altered the traditional mobilization methods: in this
case, campaigns of de-mobilization took place. As a result, Uleri argues that “all voters
are equal, but in referendums, non-voters are more equal than voters.”
Uleri (1996) argues that the abrogative initiative has proved to be capable of
performing as a “veto function”, but also as a method capable of interfering with the
agenda setting process as well as a law-amendment process. Taken together, this actually
results in a decision-promoting methodology. Given that the objects of referendums are
the laws already in place, along with the idea that requests can be worded in such a way
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as to focus on complete annulment or partial annulment, the outcome often depends upon
the length of time that the law has been in effect, rather than the nature of the law itself:
long-standing laws that are targeted often result in intervention in the agenda setting
process, while laws recently approved that become targets tend to amount to a veto (Uleri
1996).
Institutional design affects outcome and usage in Italian referendum voting. To
what degree, then, has political culture affected outcomes? The cases presented here can
also point out the importance of “initiative culture” as a corollary to (effective)
institutional design. That is, such culture exists if the mechanism can be used “by civil
society groups such as unions, interest groups, social movements or alliances driven by
political entrepreneurs” (Schiller 2005 cited from Ewert 2007). Moreover, such initiative
culture exists if qualified actors can cooperate strategically with other political actors and
institutions, such as parliament, government and court. Finally, an initiative culture also
consists of a “pluralistic spectrum of parties, a liberal constitutional court, and a sense of
democratic fairness” (Ewert 2007).
Turnout is a prime indicator of culture, and Italian turnout is traditionally quite
high (generally upwards of 90% of eligible voters). Referendum voting, however, has
generally been lower than standard turnout rates (ranging from 57-87%). The difference
is what Italian scholars refer to as “additional abstentionism” (Parisi and Rossi 1978;
cited from Uleri 1996). Culturally, a north-south divide also exists; this has been the case
since the above-mentioned 1946 referendum to decide on a monarchy or republic: the
republican option dominated the north, while the monarch option dominated the south
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(Corbetta and Parisi 1994; cited from Uleri 1996). Political parties play the usual role of
interpretation (both politically and in terms of actual definitions).
Given turnout levels, frequency, and the perceived legitimacy of the referendum,
the Italian political culture can be assumed to include direct democracy. However, Uleri
(1996) argues that while the institution implies a progressive movement towards a
responsive democracy, the institutional design itself presents multiple problem areas. The
primary problem, however, appears to be in the power of the above-mentioned
Constitutional Court to “abuse” their gate-keeping power.
The Italian Party System
Perhaps no other country better exemplifies the concept of multipartism than Italy
in the 20th century. The complexities of the Italian party system are a significant variable
in the discussion of Italian referendums, and given that complexity, a section dedicated to
their workings seems appropriate. However, in each of the cases under examination in
this dissertation, the role of the political elites is discussed in detail; in the Italian system,
a discussion of political elites must first include the party system.
The modern Italian party system is a function of both historical lineage and
geographical realities, and scholars have contributed significantly to our understanding.
For example, Sartori offered a theory of “polarized pluralism”, arguing that because the
ideological center is occupied as a function of the large number of influential parties, the
extremes would be strengthened at the expense of the moderates (Sartori 1966; 1976).
Other scholars took a tempered view of the system. Farnetti also begins his analysis at the
ideological center, but offers a model of centripetal pluralism that focuses on the
continuous divisions within both the left and the right. In particular, Farnetti offered
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evidence that on a number of occasions, the left parties moved towards the center
throughout the 1950’s, 1960s, and 1970’s, and at the same time, documented the
tendency of the voters on the left to reward centrist movement.
In one sense chaotic, and in other orderly, party systems in Italy are like no other.
After World War II, the center-right Democrazia Cristiana (DC) dominated Italian
politics into the early 1990s. The nascent DC developed into a catch-all party that did not
reflect a simple left-right alignment. Indeed, the DC purposefully opened itself as a center
party, and in particular, a party open to “the collaboration of parties that refused to
cooperate” with the Communists (PCI) and Monarchists (MCI), and as a result, the DC
encapsulated both upper middle classes and lower middle classes, neither of whom would
wholly accept capitalism nor socialism (Farnetti 1980). The DC maintained this central
alignment primarily by representing multiple interests, and in large part, control of civil
society (Farnetti 1980: 8). Indeed, all prime ministers from 1945-1981 were from the DC;
all but three presidents were as well. Gilbert (1995) argues that the DC’s centrality was
ensured by the “absence of a credible opposition”, and as a function of this, retained
hegemony over the leading institutions of the state.
Nonetheless, excluded forces did exist: the PCI and the MSI. The Partito
Comunista Italiano participated for a short time post-war; once removed, however, the
PCI would not return but instead remain on the outside looking in. Gilbert (1995) argues
that the party remained a “monolithic organization” run on top-down principles. The
Movemento Sociale Italiano was also never fully accepted in the mainstream. The neofascist movement was founded by supporters of former dictator Mussolini, and was based
on anti-capitalist, anti-American principles. These ideas notwithstanding, the MSI

82

transgressed to more conservative levels (espoused by support of Italy’s membership in
NATO and the recognition of the legitimacy of the Italian Constitution) and in 1960 the
MSI enjoyed a brief governing role before being relegated to the sidelines once more as a
function of riots and bloodshed caused by their decision to hold their annual congress in
anti-fascist Genoa (Gilbert 1995).
In both cases, however, the DC played a role. Indeed, the 1960 MCI accession
occurred with the backing of the DC; in the 1970s, the PCI was considered an alternative
to the established party system (the DC) and the radical left, and garnered 34.4 percent of
the vote in 1976 (Gilbert 1995). In order to avoid governing with the MSI, the DC was
forced to open to the left, and while the administration would consist of DC ministers, the
PCI provided “external support” (Gilbert 1995).
Clearly, times change – and the rise of Benedetto Craxi and the PSI are a
testament to this. The Partito Socialista Italiano received just under 10 percent of the
vote in 1979, but the strategy employed by Craxi intended to move the party away from
its more traditional roots and towards the center – essentially moving “into” the system.
Also, as Pasquino (2008) argues, Craxi deliberately decided to challenge the PCI in an
effort to reduce their electoral support and to showcase their overall irrelevance in Italian
politics. In an effort to ensure a majority, the DC had to rely on four allies, creating a
period of pentapartito, one of whom would be the PSI. Interestingly, Craxi would
demand the prime minister’s job before pledging support, and would remain in this
position between 1983 and 1987. As Gilbert (1995) argues, Craxi’s stability was the first
sign of success; also, however were warming relations with then-President Reagan
(though the strategic politician always knows when enough is enough, as evidenced by
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Craxi’s independence during the Achille Lauro Signorella affair in October 1985), an
improving economy, and wide support for social policies.
The notion of “bargained pluralism” (Hine 1993) certainly appear here as well:
for all of the apparent stability, Gilbert (1995) argues that because Craxi was only able to
govern with the tacit support of the PCI, the reality was that Craxi’s allies were trying to
defeat him while his adversaries were trying to sustain him, and Craxi had little choice
but to stick to uncomfortable allies within the Christian Democrats. By 1987, significant
changes were once again underway, and the rise of the PSI here would be the start of a
longer trend.
Not surprisingly, the transformation process has not slowed since the early 1990s.
The development of Lega Nord fundamentally altered the system. The culminating
factors of growing dissatisfaction with the existing parties (proven primarily by the
“Clean Hands” investigation) as well as the revival of a territorial identity allowed the
Northern League to increase its share of the political agenda. In addition, the decline of
the Christian Democrats and the transformation of the PCI helped the fortunes of Lega
Nord (Pasquino 2008). While electorally popular in the North, Lega has been largely
unsuccessful elsewhere. More generally, Pasquino (2008) argues that three major
transformations occurred within this period. First: the disappearance of the historical
parties – especially the Liberals, Social Democrats, and Republicans. The primary
function of their disappearance was institutional: electoral law changes increased the
threshold for minority parties; charges of corruption, however, did not help their cause. A
secondary cause was the transformation of historical parties, and in particular, the decline
of the Christian Democrats, which can largely be attributed to the decline of the Italian
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Communist Party. In large part, the PCI wore the badge of the enemy for the DC, and
their decline took ammunition from the DC – primarily from the social sectors. The result
was first a loss of votes, and secondly, a breakdown into several fragments, many of
whom still claim DC heritage today. Pasquino argues that the third important
transformation was the development and success of Forza Italia. The importance lies in
the evolution of the party; created from scratch in short order, had become a dominant
force in Italian politics. Due in large part to Berlusconi’s leadership (and the assets he
brings), the author also argues that Berlusconi also appears to be the potential weakness,
insofar as the leadership is primarily unitary.
Pasquino’s (2008) overall argument is that Italian parties and the party system are
not sufficiently consolidated (142). Once again returning to Sartori’s explanation of
“polarized pluralism,” the author argues that the transformations discussed here represent
a shift from a right-centre-left conceptualization (and the ideological difference
separating them) to a new party competition modeled on “moderate pluralism”: one in
which centrist parties are less influential and are unable to dictate the type of coalition to
be constructed. The outcome, for Pasquino, is electoral competition; in the former, a
meaningful coalition between the center and right/left was impossible; in the latter, the
bipolar organization among two heterogeneous coalitions has made alternation a reality.
In short, the ideological distance between the two major coalitions has been reduced.
The effect of earlier intraparty divisions is clear: as Hine (1993) argues, “divisions
between different institutional arenas, and between different factional groups, ensure that
authority to make policy is rarely delegated to a cohesive leadership group in
government” (109). The net effect is a continuous cycle amongst parties, parliamentary
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groups, and individual faction leaders. More importantly however, is the basis for such
division.
On the formal side of the equation, Hine (1993) argues that the formal
organizational model parallels the tiers of Italian government: municipal, provincial,
regional, and national (111). In each instance, the composition matters – perhaps most
notably so at the national level, where the general gathering (the congress) is held, and
where the party leader is chosen; from this control of party organization resources are
marshaled.
Referendum Cases in Italy 31
On March 18, 1946, Prince Humbert announced the House of Savoy’s agreement
to allow a referendum to decide the fate of Italy’s monarchy. Such a case certainly
exemplifies the tenuous relationship between direct democracy (even direct democracy,
Italian style) and that of a representative or monarchical government. To what degree
should established leaders deposit their fortunes with the masses? In this case, Prince
Humbert declared that “…the free choice of the people, who we are sure will be inspired
by that which is best for the future of our country” 32In any case, the partisan attachments
were clear: as the New York Times reported 33, the royal family attempted to stay out of
the political debate as much as possible, while leftist parties generally opposed, while
center and right parties generally favored – and favored especially the notions that the
method of the referendum was the key point in settling the debate. The outcome, of
course, favored a transition to a republic – but the outcome also resulted in considerable
31
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violence, primarily between Monarchists and police forces in Pisa, Rome, and
Naples 34;certainly this vote was no exception to the regional differences that exist:
support for the republic was found primarily in the northern regions of Liguria, Piedmont
and Lombardy, while support for the monarchy was found primarily in the south. Reports
of the time indicate fears that the slim margin of victory would create an unstable
foundation for the new government, and also of an eventual split into two separate and
independent states. 35
In 1974, in accordance with the constitutional provision that the referendum be
used as an abrogative device, Italians were asked by Parliament to retain or repeal a
three-year old divorce prohibition36 statute. The law itself had been bitterly contested as it
worked its way through Parliament, and before the law was fully approved, Christian
Democrats, enjoying a long-standing majority in Parliament, revisited the idea of the
referendum for the first time since the 1946 constitutional referendum. Knowing that
provisions for specific law regarding the referendum had not been fully implemented,
Christian Democrats sought to expedite the process to use as a counterforce once the law
was passed (Mark 2006). In this sense, then, Christian Democrats believed that a minority
of the population favored the divorce law, and that a majority vote through the
referendum would right what was clearly wrong.
The divorce referendum process began on the day the divorce law was passed:
Professor Gabrio Lombardi (Professor of Roman Law at the Catholic University of
34
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The divorce law was introduced by Loris Fortuna, a member of the PCI, in 1965. Scholarship suggests
passage was a peculiar function of the times: the second Vatican Council sparked new debates over the
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the focus of the public. The law itself allowed divorce in limited situations, such as abandonment, a spouse
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Milan) collected 1,370, 134 signatures in short order (well above the required 500,000)
by utilizing the network associated with the Church (Mark 2006). The case brings out
multiple elements of the importance of institutions both formal and informal. For
example, reports suggest considerable confusion among voters over the question
wording: in other words, Italians who wished to outlaw the statute (and thus, divorce)
were expected to cast a “yes” vote, while those favoring divorce were expected to cast a
“no” ballot. In addition, conservative Roman Catholics and neo-fascists transformed the
referendum into an anti-communist crusade.
The DC argued vehemently against divorce (and thus, a “yes” vote on the
referendum, but once again the notion of bargained pluralism raised difficulty, as
coalition partners (Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republicans) were all in favor
alongside the PSI 37. Indeed, the very passage of the law broke a stranglehold of the
Church on Italian society; had the social and economic transformations that marked
postwar Italy not occurred, along with increased migration from the south to the north
and increased women on the workforce, it is unlikely the Chamber of Deputies would
have been successful (Mark 2006). Insofar as the 1974 referendum marked the first
experience since the 1946 referendum on the monarch, turnout was quite high: 88% of
the eligible voters produced a “no” vote by a 59-41% margin, retaining the ability to
divorce in spite of the wishes of the Catholic Church and the DC. Once again,
consequences for the leadership were clear: significant movement towards a leftist line
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The PSI had been instrumental in securing the original passage, especially through indirect tactics, such
as creating lobby groups (Lega Italiana per il divorzio). Public support was crucial to passage given the
entrenchment of the DC in Parliament and the role of the Catholic Church in Italian society. The law
eventually passed in a parliament (164-50 in the Senate, 319-286 in the Chamber of Deputies) that saw
Christian Democrats slightly outnumbered through coalition opposition.
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offered little consolation for Prime Minister Rumor (DC), and fights related to inflation,
laborers, housing, education, and public transportation would follow on the agenda. 38
Over the next few decades, Italians would return to the polls in an effort to answer
a dizzying array of questions. In 1978, the Radical Party found the support of the PSI
seeking repeal of police powers and engagement of the Italian police, but the issue was
rejected by Italian voters, who instead followed the positions of the all of the parties of
the “Constitutional Arch”; similar results occurred with the second question on the same
ballot, this one considering public financing of parliamentary parties. In 1981, the DC
and the Radical Party would offer two opposing abortion referendums: the DC asked
voters to abolish abortion (voters disagreed by a large margin, retaining abortion but with
limitations); the Radical Party asked voters to remove all limits on abortion (once again,
the voters rejected this idea, retaining limits on – but keeping the practice of - abortion).
These failures suggest that not only were Italians (or at least, the electorate) more secular
than either the DC or the Church had assumed, but that clearly they were also
considerably more liberal. Indeed, the very legislation that both referendums targeted was
itself placed on the books under the threat of referendum in 1978. Not surprisingly, the
hegemony of both the DC and the Church appeared fragile as a function of the outcome
(Bodagnor 1992).
Three more referendums made their way to the 1981 ballot: Radical Party
supported questions attempting to abolish life imprisonment (rejected by voters); outlaw
private guns (also rejected) and another attempt to curb police powers (rejected yet again
by voters). Voters again rejected a 1985 referendum that would have overturned Prime
38
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Minister Craxi’s legislation aimed at curbing inflation; the “sliding scale” referendum
(reducing the automatic growth of salaries of Italian workers at the same rate of inflation)
was confirmed with a 77% turnout. The main sponsor of this referendum was the
Communist Party, and when faced with what was essentially a “censure” measure, Craxi
offered to resign if the measure carried. With the negative outcome also comes a repeated
pattern: in an attempt to solidify legitimacy and power, the instigator of the referendum
ends up losing political capital rather than gaining; the failure also showed the growing
isolation of the Communist Party in Italian politics.
Though Italian voters had consistently rejected referendums, this outcome does
not suggest a general anti-government stance, especially considering the fact that most
referendums were supported by the Radical Party. In 1987, however, voters for the first
time approved a referendum, this time rejecting the use of nuclear power. While the
results were not surprising (considering the 1986 Chernobyl disaster), the Radical Party
also found success in abolishing the law that excluded civil responsibility of judges in the
event of judicial error as well as abolishing a law that excluded ministers from ordinary
prosecution. The referendums themselves were the subject of considerable infighting, and
editorials questioned the efficacy of the referendums, citing the fact that “virtually all
political parties are in agreement to change the laws, and Parliament would have to act in
any case”. 39
Social issues were not the only policies decided by referendum in Italy. In 1991,
more than 95% of the voters approved a referendum aimed at simplifying the voting
procedure in an effort to reduce corruption. By allowing voters to choose only one
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candidate per party (rather than four), and requiring voters to write the name of the
candidate (rather than a number, which could easily be changed), the influence of the
parties in election was reduced. 40
Spurred on by popular support, Mario Segni broke from the Christian Democrats
and formed Poplari per la Riforma (Populars for the Reform) and sought electoral
reform. In 1993, voters approved a referendum that would change the proportional
representation system that was often blamed for short-lived governments. The new voting
system incorporated first-past-the-post voting for 75% of the seats in the Senate. On the
same day, voters approved the abolishment of state based financing for political parties,
the redaction of the Ministry of State Industry, as well as the Ministries of Agriculture
and of Tourism and Performing Arts, as well as reduced responsibility for environmental
controls by the government. In addition, voters more narrowly approved restricting
criminal penalties on the personal use of drugs. The election came in the wake of
revelations of widespread corruption, and widespread approval seemed to indicate that
voters were willing to take responsibility (and action) where government would not 41; in
either case, the results once again showed considerable disapproval of the Christian
Democrats. Perhaps more importantly, was seemingly the determination (via the
referendum) to take power from the minority (better represented through proportional
representation systems) and give it to the majority (Amato 1996).
In 1995, voters were asked to decide a dozen issues by referendum – the most on
a single ballot to date. Center-left coalitions sought the permission of voters to dismantle
the media empire of Silvio Berlusconi, which they argued allowed him unequal access to
40
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voters. Voters here split their approval, and among the most controversial of them was
the decision to require Silvio Berlusconi to reduce his media holdings. Voters rejected the
idea that he should give up two of his three television networks and cut back the 65%
share of the television advertising market. Voters also allowed private shareholders to
take up a stake in the state broadcaster (RAI), and to reduce the legal powers of the
powerful trade-union federations, and also defeated a referendum designed to extend
shopping hours – all considered a victory for Berlusconi and his supporters 42
The initial motivation the Italians had for the referendum seemingly vanished
over the next 13 years. Between 1997 and 2010, 24 referendums were offered without
meeting the turnout quorum requirements. Though 90% of the voters approved additional
electoral law reforms related to reducing proportional representation, only 49% of the
voters turned out to cast ballots. The turnout levels worsened in 2000, when only 32% of
the electorate turned out to once again decide proportional representation reforms. In this
case, care was taken to remove deceased voters and nonresidents to make it easier to
reach the quorum, nonetheless, the voter fatigue seemed to be quite evident (Stanley
2000). Voters again could not cumulatively meet requirements in 2005 when asked to
decide four questions related to stem-cell research, artificial insemination procedures, and
invitro fertilization practices; nor could electoral law reform issues be considered in
2009.
Most recently, voters returned to the polls in June 2011, and in this instance
managed to reach the turnout requirements. Voters overwhelmingly rejected private
water suppliers, rejected a cost-plus system for profits on water delivery, rejected nuclear
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power once again, and rejected impediments to the appearance in a criminal court by the
President of the Council of Ministers (C2D).
Thus, where Parliament could not settle an issue, the referendum has – and the
implication of this is the legitimacy of the referendum in Italy. Though the first
referendum on divorce was supported by the DC and the Church, 27 of the next 33
referendums were supported by “out” groups (primarily the Radical Party) who moved
Italy towards secularization via the liberalization of divorce and abortion. As Bogdanor
(1993) notes, the Constitution of Italy was designed to ensure that a one-party
dictatorship could not be repeated. While the fear of Fascism lead to a system of
“bargained pluralism" and diffuse power arrangements, the electorate secured an
additional weapon in the use of the referendum. As parties utilized the referendum in
search of policy aggregation, the context of the original inclusion of the mechanism
repeatedly proved that unintended consequences were the norm, and perhaps more
importantly, that within the Italian system, the referendum secured by out-groups favored
out-groups. As the Italian political tradition continues to evolve, the referendum can be
considered both a cause of change, but also a consequence of change.
France
Constitutional framers in 1791 France had a significant dilemma (as many
constitutional framers do): on the one hand, the abolishing the arbitrary power of the
Bourbon monarch (while at the same time leaving the monarchy in place), but also
avoiding excessive democracy. Significant divides originating here between the “left”
(supporting limited powers of the monarchy) and the “right” 43 (supporting absolutism of
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The usage of the overly simplistic “left” and “right” is used here to recognize the French and their
introduction of the now ubiquitous terms.
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what would prove to be a short-lived monarchy) on major issues such as the relationship
between church and state, government intervention into the economy and society more
generally, and also on the power structure of the regime, would lead to continual regime
instability. Indeed, a dozen regimes have ruled France since 1789, and many of those
transitions were quite bloody. The drafters of the first Constitution introduced the indirect
and restricted vote, and this pattern would follow throughout the years to come (and
repeated within the third revolutionary Constitution as well as the Charters of 1814 and
1830 – the Bourbon and Orleanist monarchies).
However, the second (albeit brief) Constitution was a notable change. The
Jacobin Republic (1792-1794) focused on democratic outcomes, and originated the
institution of direct democracy in France. The support for the process came largely from
the Montagnards, who held majorities over the more moderate Girondins. As Morel
(1996) notes, the Girondins were given the opportunity to promote a constitutional text,
but that failure led the Montagnards to not only include direct universal suffrage, but also
the institution of direct democracy (including the initiative process for constitutional and
legislative matters). Indeed, the first French referendum would be held on the
Constitution44, ironically, a referendum 45 would also be used to legitimize the
replacement Constitution, designed by more moderate Thermidoriens.
Napoleon’s rise to power in 1800 produced (by referendum) the Constitution of
the Year 8 (the An VII), and in line with the consolidation of powers described the
document, the institution of direct democracy and the referendum more particularly was
mentioned only the context of the ratification of the document itself, and thus did not
44

Though supported by 99.1% of the electorate, only 25% of the electorate showed up to vote.
Turnout for this referendum decreased over the 1793 version: 18% of the population approved the vote
with a 95% majority; scholars have argued it may have been as low as 13.7% (Morel 1996).
45
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appear available for future use. The 1800 referendum in this case, along with the
reaffirmation of Napoleon as consul for life in 1802 both received more than 99%
approval (though low turnout numbers of 43% and 51%, the lack of information, and a
lack of a secret ballot bring legitimacy into question here). Certainly, such referendums
were aimed at legitimizing the power of the individual leader, rather than the earlier
constitutions (which, it should be noted, had passed through elected representatives;
Napoleon’s power had already been captured). These referendums, along with the 1815
referendum restoring a modified imperial constitution and the 1852 referendum, in which
voters were asked to approve the continuation of authority of Louis-Napoleon as
Emperor, left later constitutional framers with the impression that the referendum in and
of itself was anti-democratic. Indeed, populist movements at the beginnings of the Third
Republic (1870) as well as Monarchists both agreed that devices associated with
Bonapartism could not be associated with the new Constitution (Morel 1996), and no
such language existed (nor was the referendum used here for its approval). In its place
was the dependence on the sovereignty of parliament – and this historical development
would have consequences on its future usage.
After the liberation of France and the replacement of the Vichy government in
1944, the question of the referendum once again arose, and General Charles de Gaulle,
head of the provisional government, decided to ask the nation two questions: whether to
officially end the Third Republic (96.4% approved), and whether the provisional
government in place should be limited to drawing up a new constitution, which would
then be offered for a referendum vote (66% approved this question). This second
question, garnering only two-thirds approval, was in large part a reflection of Charles de
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Gaulle, who opposed the referendum process as a whole, and at the same time favored a
strong presidential regime. Indeed, de Gaulle advocated a “no” vote on the subsequent
drafts of the constitution, and the first constitutional project was rejected by the voters
53% to 47%; a compromise draft created between the left and Christian Democrats that
moderated earlier positions passed later that year with 53% approving in October of
1946. Morel (1996) argues that the small majority, coupled with a 35% turnout, did not
fully legitimize the Fourth Republic, and that this legitimacy would never fully be
realized. The Fourth Republic would indeed be marked by instability and ineffectiveness;
Clarendon finds (2003) multiparty coalitions that could not remain united led to
instability within Parliament. In addition, ministerial instability also manifested during
this time, with 24 different governments between 1946 and 1958. Nonetheless, the
referendum in and of itself was re-legitimized, and the 1946 Constitution included
provisions for its use, though limited to situations in which a parliamentary majority
could not be reached. Ultimately, these three instances (the 1945 referendum to authorize
a new constitution, and two 1946 referendums confirming the Constitution) would be the
only uses in the Fourth Republic.
The Algerian crisis provided a critical juncture with which de Gaulle found a
number of opportunities. Though retired, de Gaulle believed that the crisis required his
attention; that a show of force was needed:
“In short, the prospect was one of chaos, culminating in civil war…unless
a national authority, outside and above both the political regime of the
moment as well as the movement which was preparing to overthrow it,
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could immediately rally opinion, take over power, and restore the state” (de
Gaulle 1971: 18).
De Gaulle sought to replace the extant Constitution via the referendum process,
and the people of France approved overwhelmingly in 1958, both in metropolitan France
and in the territories 46. Certainly, de Gaulle viewed the vote as a mandate – that the
people were frustrated with the longevity of government instability, caused in large part
by fractionalized parties.
Certainly, de Gaulle was not a strong believer in the parliamentary process, nor of
political parties more generally. De Gaulle’s motivation for a stronger executive can
clearly be seen as a context of the times, rather than as a dictatorial bent; France had to
recover from significant wartime losses, and could only do so as a united entity. As
Morrisey argues (2002), de Gaulle sought a republican constitution that provided for the
national interest over the factional interest 47; a strong counterbalance of a dedicated
executive would mitigate the passions of political parties and factions. Clarendon (2003)
furthers the point, arguing that de Gaulle’s agenda during the…Fifth Republic can be
characterized as an effort to strengthen the executive and devolve power away from the
legislative institutions of the state” (24). Indeed, in a radio broadcast in the 1946
campaign, the “infernal cycle” – thirteen constitutions in 150 years – “imprints on public
life a character of discontinuity, agitation, improvisation, which has been disastrous” (de
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A “no” vote by territories would have indicated a vote for independence (though this would not apply to
Algeria, which was considered a “department”). Only Guinea voted for secession.
47
De Gaulle, in his memoirs, argues that “while I was convinced sovereignty belongs to the people,
provided they express themselves directly and as a whole, I refused to accept that it could be parceled out
among the different interests represented by the parties…I considered it necessary for government to derive
not from parliament, in other words parties, but, over and above them, from a leader directly mandated by
the nation as a whole…and empowered to act..” (De Gaulle 1971: 6).
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Gaulle 1971). De Gaulle’s focus 48 was twofold: to have a stronger, continuous
constitutions built on a strong executive (it was here that the people had recourse should
parliamentary government fail once again), but that such a constitution should be
supported by a referendum vote.
The longstanding reality (and when not a reality, a likelihood) of a lack of a
parliamentary majority gave de Gaulle in particular the opportunity to push for a more
powerful executive. The 1958 Constitution included the power of the president to seek
the approval of the people without going through Parliament, and moreover, Article 11
also restricts usage to during parliamentary sessions or on the “joint proposal of the two
assemblies,” but also to “draft laws” initiated by the government, rather than actual laws.
This provision significantly alters the nature of the referendums submitted in two main
ways: first, it allows significant discretion on what the president may call for in terms of
referendums (De Gaulle, Pompideau, and Mitterrand all saw no resistance to their
referendum proposals); but secondly, it allows the referendum to become a vehicle
through which the president can overcome parliamentary opposition (Morel 1996).

48

Such a focus meant sacrifice: in January 1946, De Gaulle resigned his presidency in exasperation after
quarrels with the parties largely over national defense; the interregnum resulted in “tripartisme” wherein
three parties ruled via coalition and ultimately could not find a majority among themselves. De Gaulle
would return briefly to politics in 1947 to a responsive electorate dissatisfied with the gridlock between
Socialists (SFIO), Communists, and the Christian Democrats (MRP), but would not fully control France
until 1958.
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Institutional Design in France
The referendum process in France is governed by Article 11 49 (legislative
referendums) and Article 89 (constitutional referendums). Article 89 stipulates that the
power belongs to both the President of the Republic but also the Prime Minister and
Parliament. A proposed amendment must pass both houses of Parliament before being
submitted to the people via a referendum; however, the referendum process itself may be
avoided if three-fifths of majority of Parliament votes approve, and there is agreement
with the president.
Article 11 grants the power directly to the president to submit proposals to the
people, and there have been significant debates over the constitutionality of using Article
11 rather than Article 89. Article 11 stipulates that referendums were limited to questions
concerning treaties and the “organization of public authorities”, but for de Gaulle the key
was the ability of the president to bypass unrepresentative parties: as Knapp and Wright
(2006) argue, it served several political purposes: to establish a direct line of
communication between the president and people, to reinforce unity of the governmental
coalition, and to divide the political opposition.
The politics of referendum democracy in France precludes clear outcome-oriented
conclusions. That is, the degree to which the final vote reflects the wishes of the people
has been clouded in the context of the vote itself (especially so in the early part of French
history), but also in the persuasive abilities of the campaign itself. Certainly, the issues
themselves have been complex, which has led to lower turnout levels (Morel 1996) and
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Article 3.1 of the current Constitution stipulates that “National sovereignty belongs to the people, who
exercise it through their representatives and by means of referendum”. Also, Article 72-1 (revised 2003) of
the Constitution grants power to local governments to submit all draft acts or decisions within their powers.
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certainly making elite manipulation easier. While the French use of the referendum can
be most notably viewed in the context of authority reinforcement (whether it be
democratic, in the case of de Gaulle, or “less” democratic, in the case of Napoleon), later
French leaders avoided the same path: Pompidou certainly was a first-hand witness to the
political “suicide” committed by de Gaulle in 1969 via the referendum device; d’ Estaing,
Mitterand and Chirac would also not make use of the same process (though each served
for a considerable period of time) to the same extent, and when doing so, they were not
entirely enthusiastic about the process. Certainly, direct election by the people mitigates
the need for a legitimizing referendum, but at the same time, the revival of parties in the
1980s and 1990s (Morel 1996) also caused the decline in the use of the referendums in
France.
A discussion of the “culture” of referendum politics in a system in which the
referendum is rare is difficult, to say the least. It is not axiomatic that simply because the
referendum does not exist, a culture associated with it does not either; perhaps to
overcome this problem; the politics of decentralization may serve as a proxy to the
participatory nature of French citizens. Though often viewed as a model of a unitary
state, especially after the French Revolution, two phases of French politics focused on
decentralization efforts: the Decentralization Act of 1982-83, which granted further
responsibilities to local and territorial governments, and the Decentralization Act II
(2003-2004). Each act sought to transfer functions such as waterway management,
education, labor issues, and finance to lower levels of government (Cole 2008), and
perhaps for the purposes of this study, also allowed for subnational referendums to take
place in each of the twenty-seven regions in France (Kaufmann and Waters 2004).
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Referendum Cases in France 50
Three early referendums would not only set the “tone” for later referendum usage,
but would also reinforce the idea that the referendum was a weapon best utilized by the
president and not Parliament. The Constitution itself was ratified by referendum in 1958
by an 85% margin with a 79% turnout, and all subsequent referendums have been held
under Article 11. The first two, dealing with the Algerian self-determination crisis, were a
first “test” of the new powers granted to the president under Article 11. As Kaufmann and
Waters (2003) argue, French presidents “use the referendum in a very controlled way and
only if they feel safe about the outcome”; certainly, such a lesson was learned from
Charles de Gaulle in the 1961 and 1962 referendums.
The 1961 referendum asked voters if they would accept the right of Algerian selfdetermination and the organization of public powers in Algeria until self-determination
(passed with 75% approving). In this vote, the weakness of the French Parliament was
evident; though some opposition was evident, no effective coalition could be formed and
de Gaulle was successful at marshaling public opinion away from parties through his
charismatic appeals (Clarendon 2003). De Gaulle made a personal appeal to the French
two days before the referendum, asking the voters to ignore the intermediaries and inform
instead de Gaulle directly what was in their “hearts and minds” (De Gaulle 1971).
Through preparation (using the 1958 Constitution to weaken the power of parliament) but
also skill (personal appeals to his pet policy), de Gaulle was able to shape public opinion
and also to transform that shift into a political victory.
The 1962 referendum not only asked voters to approve Algerian independence,
but also whether de Gaulle should be granted full power to implement these agreements –
50

See Appendix B for a complete list of direct democracy cases in France.
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certainly, the president sought a mandate that could not be undermined by parliament –
but, de Gaulle was also concerned about reelection, insofar as the Algerian crisis (now
essentially solved) was the motivator of his initial election (Morel 1996). Once again, de
Gaulle turned his attention directly to the public, and in so doing, garnered 90% approval.
However, there is some question on whether the referendum was legally needed in the
first place – public opinion as well as parliament was now on the side of de Gaulle.
Clarendon (2003) argues that it “seems as if this referendum vote was necessary from de
Gaulle’s perspective in order to satisfy his personal need to be regularly legitimized by
the public’s vote (31). Such an action suggests that referendum politics clearly extends
beyond the particular policy at hand.
The 1962 reforms of the 1958 Constitution were centered on the direct election of
the president, but the new process was in large part following the trend toward
diminishing the role of parliament as a whole. In response to the concern over his
reelection chances, as well as the possibility that there would be an attempt to reestablish
a parliamentary regime (Morel 1996), de Gaulle and the UNR party put forth the
referendum to the people, who supported the idea with a 62% approval rating. This
process was the subject of considerable debate – all other parties opposed the idea, and
questions of constitutionality were raised: should de Gaulle utilize Article 89, which
required the approval of parliament?
A common trait among successful presidents is the power to persuade, and de
Gaulle utilized his persuasive power effectively. In a speech to the people regarding his
intention for the direct election referendum, de Gaulle argued that:
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“the institutions in force for nearly four years have replaced the chronic
confusion and perpetual crisis which bedeviled the action of the State by
continuity, stability, efficacy, and balance in the powers of
government…no one doubts that our country would soon be plunged into
the depths of disaster if, unhappily, we were to abandon it once more to
the sterile and contemptible games of yesterday” (De Gaulle 1971).
For de Gaulle, the use of Article 11 to circumvent parliament via a direct vote of
the people was in and of itself a show of no confidence of party politics. For his part, de
Gaulle saw not only his presidency as crucial to the stability of France, but future
presidencies: “For me there was no doubt that once I was gone, unless my successors
enjoyed a unique mandate…the parties intended to find ways and means of reverting to
the previous system (De Gaulle 1971: 313). Indeed, de Gaulle’s insistence that Article 11
was the clear avenue, rather than the parliament-based Article 89 led to a debate between
the power of the parties and parliament more generally, and the powers of the French
President. De Gaulle forcefully argued that the language of Article 11 allowed him to
submit such a referendum directly to the people insofar as dealt it “organizing the public
authorities”; that Article 89 was useful when public authorities deemed it “useful” to use
parliamentary channels (De Gaulle 1971: 314). Importantly, De Gaulle further argues that
“if there was an Article 11, it was because…I had wanted it [the Constitution] to include
just such an article, in that place, with that meaning and scope (De Gaulle 1971: 315). De
Gaulle had met with party leaders, the Minister of Justice (who was in charge of drawing
up the Constitution), as well as Ministers of State, and they had all agreed on this point;
de Gaulle thus found their “shameless ignorance of the principles” as evidence that

103

parties were unable to effectively govern. The French President would ultimately cast the
referendum as a vote of confidence for his own tenure: “It is your answer…which will
tell me if I can and if I must pursue my task in the service of France” (De Gaulle 1971:
320). The voters heard the message, and in spite of considerable media attention
advocating a “no” vote, 77% of French voters turned out on October 28, 1962 with 62%
of them approving the referendum. Parliamentary elections held just two weeks later
would also show public support for de Gaulle and his party.
General de Gaulle utilized the referendum to serve his own ends, and did so by
arguing that such a mechanism was fundamentally democratic – it invoked the civic
participation lacking in the Fourth Republic – but (and along similar lines) it would also
help to reveal the true wishes of the populace, rather than factional parties. As Butler and
Ranney (1978) argue, de Gaulle also intended to bring about a “catharsis” – in other
words, to help move the public mindset from the “chaos and confusion” of the Fourth
Republic to the modernized Fifth Republic. In addition, basing the power of the regime
on that of the people rather than parliament, and at the same time increasing the power
and legitimacy of the presidency (as well as de Gaulle’s own power) were clear
objectives (Butler and Ranney 1978:145). Scholar Francois Goguel has argued that the
political climate associated with the Algerian self-determination crisis was overall quite
negative; there was fear of a civil war, with centrists, left-wing and extreme right-wing all
opposing de Gaulle’s policies. Thus, the 1961 referendum can be especially seen as a
calculated attempt to re-center political power; the dual 1962 referendums reaffirmed this
motion and further undermined his opposition.
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Clarendon (2003) argues that the calculated move by de Gaulle in 1962 sought
three main goals: first, the power of Parliament would be significantly reduced, while at
the same time, the power of the presidency would be significantly increased; secondly,
that de Gaulle could meet his goal of seeking public approval for both his policies as well
as his personal leadership; and finally, that the public would support the process insofar
as they were being asked to decide. Certainly, these goals were met, and de Gaulle’s
desires for a strong executive alongside a weaker Parliament were realized.
De Gaulle would not turn to the referendum again until April 1969. The proposal
aimed to devolve the power of the Senate into a simple consultative body with a
significantly limited role in actual governance (and to also remove them from direct
election). At the same time, the proposal focused on regional reforms, and in particular,
would change the electoral process of regional councils to one of appointment. Indeed,
the referendum sought to weaken the power of both of de Gaulle’s contemporary political
enemies, as these had both served as the center of Gaullist opposition (Clarendon 2003).
After being elected in a 1965 election that proved de Gaulle was politically weakened (a
second-round vote was required), 1967 parliamentary elections nearly cost Gaullists the
majority they had retained. At the same time, student and labor protests in 1968 quickly
gained ground, and de Gaulle and his ministers seemed out of touch and unwilling to
address the growing discontent. Nonetheless, the Gaullist block, with the help of Georges
Pompidou, fared well in June 1968 parliamentary elections, winning 354 of the 487 seats
in Parliament (Knapp and Wright 2006).
Even with the success of his party, de Gaulle pressed on with what were seen as
unpopular referendum proposals. Indeed, the proposal that would eventually reach voters
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in 1969 had been borne out of earlier proposals that had died before garnering a vote due
to unpopularity: in May 1968, de Gaulle proposed that the head of state should be given
authority to change “outdated and rigid structures” (Berstein 1993). De Gaulle’s need to
reaffirm his mandate, even with significant parliamentary victories, was further based on
his desire to further weaken the Senate, and while de Gaulle had earlier enjoyed
tremendous public support, the French were suspicious of these proposals insofar as they
were viewed as a tactic to weaken or eliminate his own political enemies 51 (Clarendon
2003).
De Gaulle once again appealed to the public for referendum support – going so
far, in fact, to hinge his presidency upon the outcome of the referendum vote.
Resignation, he told the people, was the cost of a “no” vote. Such a policy had worked in
the past, however, referendum politics are not predicated on the past, but on the context
of the times; executives, in other words, can certainly underestimate the chance of losing
a vote. Significant economic challenges alongside social unrest in the late 1960s gave
Pompidou (removed by de Gaulle in 1968) the opportunity to bolster his own support
among the public. More importantly, perhaps, his indication that he would be willing to
serve as president allowed Gaullists in Parliament as well as the electorate more generally
to support Pompidou while at the same time voting no on the proposed referendum.
Though close, de Gaulle lost the referendum vote with only a 48% approval rating, and
de Gaulle kept his promised threat to the people: on April 28, 1969, Charles de Gaulle
resigned the presidency.
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The reforms sought by de Gaulle also included provisions reordering the line of succession: removing the
president of the Senate from next-in-line and placing the prime minister in this position. At De Gaulle’s age
(79), succession would certainly have been a concern.
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The post-hoc view of the 1969 referendum characterized de Gaulle as committing
political suicide, insofar as de Gaulle tied his fortunes to a sinking ship. Later presidents
would not be so quick to push for a referendum vote; however, occasional referendums
were put to voters. In 1972, voters were asked to consider a largely non-French related
issue: the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK to the European Economic
Community. Held under Article 11, President Pompidou did find an issue that was sure to
find a significant victory (Morel 1996), and French voters approved with a 67% majority
on 60% turnout.
The French also considered a 1988 referendum on retaining New Caledonia as
part of the French Republic (80% approved, with a low turnout out 36%), and once again,
scholars find that the lack of controversy led to relative certainty about the outcome. The
New Caledonia referendum, carried out by Francois Mitterand, did help to legitimize the
policy itself, but the vote was not wrapped in the personal assurances by the president as
de Gaulle had done.
The 1992 vote on the Maastricht Treaty was – like many constitutional
referendums – as much a vote on the Mitterand government as it was on the Treaty itself.
While the question of using Article 11 or Article 89 was revisited, Mitterand ultimately
decided that Article 11 was the most appropriate venue, insofar as the Maastricht Treaty
impacted French institution. Mitterand was not originally concerned about the vote
(public opinion suggested two-thirds of the electorate approved), but significant
campaigning on the part of the National Front, the Communists, and part of the RPR
(center-right) brought the certainty into question. Indeed, Mitterand explicitly announced
in 1992 that he would not resign if a “no” vote was recorded (Knapp and Wright 2006) –
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and such a move would certainly disassociate the referendum from the Napoleonic nature
of the French referendums – but does not suggest that constitutional referendum votes
can be disassociated with second-order voting: ultimately, voters approved the Treaty –
but with a bare 50.8%.
In 2000, President Chirac submitted a referendum via Article 89 (rather than
Article 11) asking voters to approve to approve five-year presidential term. The vote on
le quinquennat was pushed by Parliament in an effort to reduce the likelihood of
cohabitation 52 by reducing presidential terms and to make the elections of the legislature
immediately succeed the presidential election. Chirac (not surprisingly) remained
lukewarm about the prospect of a referendum cutting his term, but ultimately showed
some support 53. Ultimately, a record low turnout of just 30% voted by a 73% margin to
approve the plan.
The last referendum to occur in the French political system occurred in 2005,
when voters were asked to decide whether France should ratify the proposed Constitution
of the European Union. At the time, the European Constitution required ratification by 25
EU members, and Spain had (two months prior) become the first country to approve the
treaty; others had had approved it with a parliamentary votes. Analysis of the process
suggest that Chirac sought the momentum of the Spanish “yes” vote, and sought to hold a
quick vote, but that he was also aware of the ability of the French electorate to deliver a
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Cohabitation occurs when a president of one party must select a prime minister of another party due to a
lack of majority-party control by the president. The outcome from this is a dual-executive, with a president
of one party and a prime minister controlling parliament as leader of another party.
53

“France names Referendum Date”. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4317819.stm
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protest (second-order) vote against unpopular economic reforms. 54 Turnout increased
from the 30% in 2000 to 70% in 2005, and 55% of those voted “no.” Interestingly, Chirac
viewed the vote as an easy victory (BBC), but Brouard and Tiberj (2005) report that
Chirac may have underestimated popular opinion towards the EU. Quantitative analysis
suggests that a second-order vote related to political distrust was an irrelevant variable in
the voter decision, but that the left and right wings of the electorate split their reasoning:
on the left, dissatisfaction with social issues, but on the right, the nationalist threat was
the main determinant (Brouard and Tiberj 2005).
Conclusions
This dissertation is an examination of institutions and individuals working in
concert with the overarching goal of showing that the introduction of direct democracy
into a given political system is a function of the participation of out-groups in the original
process, and that later usage of referendums is dependent upon (1) historical institutional
design (HI1) and (2) the role of political elites in the process (P1), where (P1) are
conditioned by (HI1) as well as by the tenets of prospect theory/cybernetic theory of
decision making discussed in the first chapter (PC1).
The theoretical perspective discussed earlier in this work focused on two main
hypotheses: first, the historical context in which direct democracy was introduced is
crucial to its later usage; that institutionalism holds explanatory power in terms of how it
constrains the choices of individuals and actors who must work within them at some
point in the future (generally as a function of the critical juncture in which it was
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created). Secondly, and in consideration of those individuals, the choices they make are
guided not by ranked preferences, but rather by the loss/gain analysis offered by prospect
theory, but within the bounds of institutional arrangements.
In the Italian case, the introduction of direct democracy was clearly a function of
former out-groups: the focus on anti-fascism resulted in a multi-party system, and the
context in which the institution of direct democracy was created within the Italian system
suggests that fears of fascism were evident. The success of the Christian Democratic
Party that emerged after the fall of fascism, and who would find victory in the first
elections held under the new Constitution in 1948, was based on inclusivity rather than
exclusivity. The concept of pluralism that informed the creation of the Constitution rested
on this inclusivity in the institution of direct democracy. The Christian Democrats,
Socialist, Liberals and Communist Parties constituted the Constituent Assembly charged
with crafting the Constitution, and not surprisingly, the document contained a mixture of
Catholic, Marxist, and Liberal doctrines (Kogan 1983). In so crafting, both the Christian
Democrats and Communist Parties succeeded in some areas and gave in on others. Over
the course of the drafting period, the executive emerged with more power, primarily
through executive decree law but also through the ability of the president of the Republic
to return any bill of which he disapproves. Such power is still quite limited, however; if
the bill is again approved by the chambers, promulgation must follow, in addition, while
the president carries the ability to dissolve parliament, such power is restricted in the last
six months of office. In this area, the Christian Democrats (certainly thinking about their
probable future majority) were successful, while the Communist Party registered defeat.
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The inclusion of direct democracy in the 1947 Italian Constitution thus satisfies the first
condition of the theoretical approach utilized here (C1) insofar as the out-groups involved
did not eschew the institution of direct democracy. Table 3.1 summarizes these findings.

Table 3.1: Impact of Key Variables on Direct Democracy Outcomes in Italy
Key Variable

Outcome

Out-group presence at
constitutional formation

Strong parliamentary system created in reaction to fascist
regime

Institutional Design

Role of Political Elites

Top-down referendums
Citizen-led initiatives with low signature requirements
Low signature requirements
50% quorum requirement
Often seeking larger gains while working in a domain of
loss

The route to direct democracy in the case of the French was certainly much
different. Though the referendum had been used sparingly throughout France’s history,
de Gaulle introduced the referendum not as a function of out-group participation, nor as a
function of anti-fascist fears, or even authoritarian fears. As has been shown earlier in this
chapter, de Gaulle utilized the referendum to legitimize his original power by asking the
people to dissolve the Third Republic and create the Fourth Republic and a new
constitution. De Gaulle began consolidating power early in his tenure via the referendum;
his starting point was that multiparty systems impeded a strong and unified France. For
de Gaulle, the referendum in large part was a method by which legitimation of what was
considered the “best policy” (regardless of parliamentary concerns) occurred; de Gaulle
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was quite adept at forcing the hand of Parliament here in relation to referendum usage –
and the primary motivator was the threat of his resignation (Walker 2003). This, of
course, conflates personal legitimacy with that of the state and as such the function is a
redistribution of power using the instrumental variable of direct democracy. In the end,
however, this process would end up resulting in that which he threatened so many times –
resignation.
Importantly, however, the introduction makes the difference: for the Italians, the fear
of the governmental overreach centered on singularity was problematic; for the French,
the multiparty system created squabbling, indecisiveness, and eventually the adaption of
problematic policies. Thus, in the case of the former, the plebiscite is welcomed; in the
latter, the use is restricted. For the Italians, the multiparty system has proved at once
chaotic and oddly stable; direct democracy has helped foster both of these mentalities via
the usage by Parliament, voters, and parties both in and out of power. Thus, the systems
matter; individuals may start the institutions on their path but the institutions themselves
conduct the outcome. In this sense, path dependency – considered an inherent problem
with historical institutionalism – is thus not an instrumental variable, but rather, a simple
indicator of the institution itself, as discussed earlier in this work.
Thus, on (C1), Italy meets the condition, as does France. As has been shown,
however, direct democracy has been much more common in Italy than in France, and
further study will determine if the intervening variable here is simply the context of the
introduction, or if other variables play a role.
Differences in institutional design may also affect usage. In Italy, direct
democracy is quite common, and qualification requirements are relatively easy: a popular
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referendum can be held to repeal a law when requested by 500,000 voters or five regional
councils. Though some topics are not debatable via the referendum, access to the ballot is
relatively easy. The difficulty in Italian referendum politics lies in achieving the outcome:
the double-majority (50% approval along with 50% voter turnout) often affects outcomes.
Further, the Constitutional Court does play a “gate-keeper” role in the admittance of
referendum questions to the people, but the requirements outlined by the Court are not
overly burdensome. Thus, access to the referendum ballot is relatively straightforward in
the Italian system.
Institutional design in France, however, is much more stringent. First, no
mechanism exists for the populace to trigger a referendum. Secondly, Article 89 requires
amendments to be passed by both houses of parliament before being submitted to the
people and the referendum itself can be bypassed if three-fifths of Parliament and the
President agree. Though Article 11 also allows the President to submit a referendum
directly to the people, assuming such a question deals with “the general organization of
the state”, the reality that it is “the President, not the people or their representatives who
has the right to initiate referendums” (Kaufmann and Waters 2004:62) in France.
Clearly, institutional design shapes future usage. As discussed earlier, however, such
a variable should not be easily dismissed because of its simplicity: insofar as
institutionalism holds explanatory power in terms of how it constrains the choices of
individuals and actors who must work within them at some point in the future, the role of
institutions cannot be underestimated vis-a-vis the role of individuals. Thus, in the cases
of Italy and France, HI1 is shown to be a relevant variable in determining later usage.
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The role of individuals, does, however, play a central feature in referendum politics.
As discussed earlier, the theoretical foundation of this dissertation expects to find that the
choices that individuals make are an explanatory factor in usage, but such choices are
constrained by the historical institutional design (HI1), as well as by the prospect
theory/cybernetic theory discussed earlier (PC1).
Throughout the early years of the Italian Constitution, the Christian Democrats
viewed the device as an instrument that could only weaken their power. Nonetheless, the
Christian Democrats were unable to garner their every wish. For example, Christian
Democrats, seeking greater regional autonomy, found their position marginalized by a
Liberal-Communist alliance 55 that reduced the powers of the regions listed in the original
draft of the Constitution (exclusive, concurrent, and complementary) in several areas of
public service. In addition to a reduction in the number of regions from twenty-two to
nineteen, the central government was granted increased dissolution powers – national
security was added as a basis for dissolution.
In this sense, the role of political elites (P1) were conditioned by the historical
institutional design (HI1) but were certainly working within the confines of the prospect
theory/cybernetic theory earlier discussed (PC1): as the dominant party facing positive
prospects, Christian Democrats became risk-averse, seeking the smaller, “sure” gains
over actions which may have brought them larger gains (certainly, utilizing the
referendum to legitimate their own policies was an option, and an option not taken). By
the same logic, the conceptual framework posited by cybernetic theory suggests that
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Nor were alliances stable. A Liberal-Christian Democrat alliance sought and succeeded in guaranteeing
absolute equality of powers of a bicameral legislature – an uncommon system in post-war constitutions.
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within the confines of cognitive theory, value separation exists in a systematic manner:
the focus is on logical operation. The cybernetic theory of decision making also suggests
(in a manner similar to “bounded rationality”) that the “decision-maker is like a
servomechanism and has the ability to determine their systems-level output in accordance
with set standards and input variation among those standards: “the cybernetic thesis then
is that the decision mechanisms screen out information which the established set of
responses are not programmed to accept” (Steinbruner 57). Such a device explains the
lack of referendum usage in this sense much more efficiently than the rational choice
paradigm, which suggests that individual acts autonomously and exogenously to the
political process, most likely through following utility maximizing tenets. Certainly, such
an approach does not focus enough attention to the institutions that constrain individuals.
Further, the increased usage of the referendum in Italy began with an unlikely
“veto player” – the Christian Democrats became the minority party. Once again focusing
now on (HI1) as well as (PC1), successful mobilization occurs by out-groups: Christian
Democrats, the Radical Party, and opposition Catholic groups. Once Christian Democrats
(now facing a loss scenario as a minority party interested in retaining the status-quo on
divorce policy in Italy) utilized the referendum device in 1974, other elites focused on the
device as hyper-pluralism became the norm in the late 1970s through the present day,
reducing the power of the political elites (as a function of new institutionalism, and
associated veto players). Institutional design also plays a significant role in increased
usage in Italy: while a double-majority requirement is in place, only 500,000 voters (out
of a voting-age population of 47 million in 2012) are needed to request a referendum.
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Since the referendum device is a top-down approach in France (Kaufmann and
Waters 2004), the focus of political elites here is the president. Further, since the majority
of referendums occurred during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, particular attention
will be focused here. The historical institutional design (HI1) seems to play a lesser role
here: for de Gaulle, the referendum was always (technically) available; in a prima facie
analysis, this suggests that usage would be increased, rather than decreased. Moreover,
insofar as this dissertation suggests that institutions are more of an explanatory factor
than individuals (political elites included), the case of de Gaulle seems to be an outlier.
However, the theoretical foundations discussed earlier suggest that individuals working
within the confines of institutions best explains usage. Though de Gaulle had the
referendum device available to him, the prospect theory/cybernetic theory of decision
making discussed earlier (PC1) best explains usage in the French case. That is, de Gaulle
clearly saw the role of parties as secondary to that of the presidency, and further, that
parties would impede governance of the state, as described earlier. Moreover, de Gaulle –
at least until his last referendum offering in 1969 – was viewed as a popular leader. In
that sense, de Gaulle was not facing a loss scenario, and as prospect theory dictates, had
no reason to “gamble” unnecessarily. The outcome of the referendum vote was, by all
accounts, a foregone conclusion. In addition, as the cybernetic theory outlines, the
decision-maker has set standards (rather than preference-based rankings of utilitarian
values), and for de Gaulle in 1958, 1961, and 1962, the standards included (as described
above) legitimizing the power of the presidency over the factionalism of parties, insofar
as de Gaulle intended to bring a paradigm-shifting belief to the people that the “chaos and
confusion of the Fourth Republic” (Butler and Ranney 1978) was inferior to the
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modernity of the Fifth Republic. As de Gaulle’s popularity waned in the late 1960s, and
at the same time, Gaullists lost seats in Parliament, de Gaulle sought another referendum
relegitimizing his power, and in this sense, both prospect theory serves well as an
explanatory mechanism: though unpopular, the gamble that had worked in the past
(though under different circumstances; certainly the 1969 referendum was much more of
a gamble than the earlier events) and facing the loss scenario, the standards of the “servomechanism” (i.e., what had worked in the past) seemed an appropriate path. In each case,
however, de Gaulle was forced to operate within the institution created, and that
institution was created largely as a function of the critical juncture described earlier.
These findings are presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Impact of Key Variables on Direct Democracy Outcomes in France
Key Variable

Outcome

Out-group presence at
constitutional formation

Semi-presidential system created in reaction to weak parties

Institutional Design

Top-down approach (president can submit directly to the
people, or submit to Parliament)
No quorum requirements

Role of Political Elites

Often seeking smaller gains while operating in a domain of
gain

The 1988 referendum on New Caledonia can be once again viewed within the
context of (PC1), insofar as Mitterand was quite sure of its passage and achieved the
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legitimization without a gamble, but the 1992 Maastricht Treaty referendum must be
more closely considered. In this case, Mitterand foresaw (belatedly) some difficulty with
getting the referendum that he supported passed (as a function of significant minor party
campaigning), and explicitly protected his own political position by disassociating
himself from the outcome: should a “no” vote be recorded, he would not resign, and
instead stay in power. The 2000 referendum had such a low turnout (30%) that any
analysis would be suspect (there was no campaign to keep voters away from the polls);
and the 2005 referendum certainly had unintended consequences for Chirac. However, in
both the 1992 case and the 2005 case, the same elements exist: political elites operating
within the domain of protecting the slight gains they have, rather than seeking a larger
return when facing a loss scenario, and in the more general sense, operating within the
elements of the cybernetic theory of decision-making (PC1) as described above.
This chapter has examined Italy and France with the assumption that out-group
participation in the constitutional formation was more likely to produce referendum
institutions within a political system. This hypothesis is confirmed in Italy, as well as in
France. Secondly, the chapter examines the overall usage of direct democracy, in terms
of frequency – and finds that in both the cases of Italy and France, usage is a function not
of individuals (even political elites) seeking utilitarian gains through rational choice, but
rather of institutional design (the initiating process is easily attainable and often used in
Italy; difficult and rarely used in France), and a positive initiative culture (as defined
above as a system in which qualified actors can cooperate strategically with other actions
and institutions; more present in Italy than France, as discussed above). To the degree to
which individuals have a role in the process, that role is severely limited by the
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institutional design, and of course, by the relative loss/gain scenario faced by those
seeking to utilize the referendum. Indeed, as is shown above, the majority party (in both
the parliamentarian-based Italy and the semi-presidential-based France) rarely uses the
device (and working within the confines of institutional design but also a non-loss
scenario), while the minority parties and coalitions strongly favor the device (also
working within the confines of institutional design, but facing a loss scenario, and thus
seeking a bigger “gamble”). These findings are presented in table 3.3 below.

Table 3.3: Impact of Key Variables on Outcomes in Italy and France
Key Variable

Italy

France

Out-group presence at
constitutional formation

Direct: Strong parliamentary
system created in reaction to
fascist regime

Direct: Semi-presidential
system created in reaction to
weak parties

Institutional Design

Top-down referendums
Citizen-led initiatives with low
signature requirements
Low signature requirements
50% quorum requirement

Top-down approach (president
can submit directly to the
people, or submit to Parliament)
No quorum requirements

Role of Political Elites

Often seeking smaller gains
while operating in a domain of
gain

Often seeking smaller gains
while operating in a domain of
gain

Frequency

High

Low

As suggested by the theoretical foundations discussed earlier in this work, historical
institutionalism holds explanatory power in explaining why institutions are “sticky”; that
is, why they often constrain the choices of individuals and actors who must work within
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them at some point in the future. Institutions are designed by individuals, but once
designed, institutions facilitate particular outcomes based on the original design;
institutions constrain and refract politicians (though they are never the sole basis for the
outcome); moreover, the outcomes can be examined primarily as a function of the origins
of the institutions. Taken together, the cases of Italy and France show that historical
institutionalism is relevant as an explanatory mechanism insofar as both cases show the
dominance of institutions over individuals.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN URUGUAY AND VENEZUELA
Introduction
The preceding chapter considered direct democracy in the context of two
European states; the current chapter follows the same format with an examination of
Uruguay and Venezuela in the Latin American context. Clearly, the two systems
discussed here are in many ways unrelated to the European cases; however, the purpose
here is to discover the importance of relevant variables on referendum outcomes: the role
of “out-groups”, the role of parties, and the role of political elites. I begin with an
examination of the context in which direct democracy was first introduced into both
systems, and proceed with an analysis of institutional design, and the more general
examination of the role of parties and political elites. I conclude by examining these two
cases within the context of the theoretical formulae discussed in the opening chapter: to
what degree does C1 (the participation of “out-groups”, or minority influences) have
upon the introduction of direct democracy into a system; also, to what degree later usage
is dependent upon HI1 (historical institutional design) and P1 (political elites in the
process), where P1 are condition by (HI1) as well as by the tenets of the prospect
theory/cybernetic theory of decision making (PC1).
The Introduction of Direct Democracy in Uruguay
As the preceding chapters have shown, referendum politics generally begin in an
era of independence-seeking on behalf of an individual, a group, or even the ruling elite.
The case of Uruguay is no different. Though most Latin American countries achieved
their independence by the 1820s, the legacy of authoritarianism as a function of Spanish
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and Portuguese colonialism still remained well into the twenty-first century. The decline
of the Spanish Empire in the 1800s as well as the rise of European industrialization in the
1880s resulted in many Latin American countries producing primary goods for
exportation; at the same time, however, political participation was limited – indeed,
questions of “who” should participate – and to what degree they should participate – were
common (Smith, P 2005). Though the consolidation of the modern nation-state began to
occur in the 1900s, the focus on economic development led to commercial elites centered
on foreign investment and economic integration (Vanden and Prevost 2006).
Uruguayan politics in the early twentieth century inherited a legacy of
compromise and inclusivity that began in the late 1800s with what was described by early
practitioners as coparticipation: two traditional parties sharing the responsibility of
governance. The more conservative Blanco and liberal leaning Colorado began as
opposing warring factions - identified through colored hatbands - in the 1830s, but would
eventually find an uneasy peace into the Pacto de la Cruz (1897) that would attempt to
guarantee political stability through a guarantee of Blanco control of six departments in
northern Uruguay (Weinstein 1988). The uneasiness of the peace would be tested by José
Batlle y Ordóñez, who would lead Uruguay from 1903-1907 and again from 1911-1915.
Indeed, eight months of civil war would follow Batlle’s initial presidency, and with the
Colorado victory, Batlle sought to deprive the Blancos of the territorial control while at
the same time promising to respect Blanco’s position as a minority party in the legislature
(Ameringer 2009).
Batlle’s legacy on Uruguayan politics should not be underestimated. Scholars
(Ameringer 2009; Weinstein 1988) note the radical change envisioned by Batlle not as
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Marxist in orientation, though the change could be considered socialist in nature. While
Batlle recognized inequality across classes, he disagreed that state destruction was a
foregone conclusion, and instead argued that the state intervention was needed in an
effort to equitably distribute the resources and public goods within society. Thus, Batlle’s
focus became that of increased regulatory legislation as well as providing services
directly from the executive branch, such as state monopolies on insurance, public works
programs, secondary schools, and indeed, an initial reduction in the income tax on public
officials, followed by an end to the income tax on the entire population (Alisky
1969). The focus on the people was not limited to collective goods: Batlle argued that
the referendum was “an essential tool for insuring citizen participation, given the limits to
direct participation imposed by the size and complexity of modern society” (Weinstein
1988). Batlle worked intensely on drafting the new Constitution, and his draft included an
article that allowed one-fifth of the registered voters to require a plebiscite, which would
revoke approved laws within 60 days of passage (Vanger 2010).
Among the many reforms Batlle introduced was the Colegiado, or nine-member
council of ministers to replace the singular presidency in Uruguay. Each member would
be separately elected, and would be responsible for a specific executive function in an
effort to combine democracy with a strong interventionist state. The idea for the
collegiate executive was largely the result of an extended vacation that José Batlle y
Ordóñez took to Europe during the interregnum of his Uruguayan administrations (19031907; 1911-1915). Influenced by the workings of the French and particularly the Swiss,
Batlle called for the induction of a collegiate executive upon his return. As Fitzgibbons
(1966:144) argues, Batlle would have discarded the presidency entirely. The idea,
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however, met with fierce resistance both from outside the Colorado Party (the Blancos
began arming themselves, perceiving the plan to be a power-grab) and from within the
Party (fears of division and indecision and a possible dictatorship). Altman (2008) argues
that “the collegiate executive was a political mechanism through which Batlle sought to
maintain dominance of the Colorado Party (489), insofar as gaining a majority would
require winning five of the nine seats.
Altman (2008) examines the systems of Uruguay and Switzerland, noting that
both were oddly similar in terms of institutional arrangements, yet the institution of direct
democracy did not take hold in Uruguay in the same fashion that it did in
Switzerland. Along with direct democracy, the author also considers the collegiate
executive, noting that with the case of the Swiss, the population was quite heterogeneous
and the collegiate executive and the institution of direct democracy were designed to
create a sort of political safety net for political minorities. However, the institutions
developed in the Uruguayan case with a different context: “in Uruguay the multi-person
executive was implemented within one of the most homogenous contemporary western
societies as…a way to block the opposition from increasing its political power” (484).
Mechanisms of direct democracy were, Altman argues “bargaining chips among political
elites” (484) such that their “broadening” was only the result of an executive who sought
to quell dissatisfaction while ultimately increasing their unitary power.
The historical context of the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy into
Uruguay is instructive. Altman (2008) argues that the “European influence” on Batlle is
not sufficient in this case, mainly because the influence itself is not all that influential
(many European countries did not adopt the Swiss model, etc). Rather, Altman argues
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that the introduction, while championed by Batlle as “a measure in defense of freedom
and against caprices of the state and public officials”, there were also “significant shortterm partisan and political interests towards advancing with direct democracy” (499). In
particular, Batlle found that such mechanisms were ingenious towards his overall goal of
the collegiate executive, such that it could work as an end-around a possibly adversarial
legislature.
The case presented by Altman (2008) also fleshes out how unintended
consequences are an integral part of the institutionalist perspective. Altman argues that
while a collegiate executive ostensibly “disperses authority, diminishes capacity for
decisive action, and profound change in a timely fashion”, the problem is that
mechanisms of direct democracy do essentially the same thing: immobilize through
additional veto points. While the Swiss could afford (literally) such stagnation, the
Uruguayan population simply could not. Certainly, Altman utilizes the benefits of eightplus years of hindsight, but ultimately, the assertion proves correct.
For the purposes of this study, the compromise that allowed the Constitution to go
forward is the key focus. Included in the Constitution, at Batlle’s request, was the request
for a plebiscite and a referendum on legislation, though no such mechanism would
actually be introduced. Months of debate culminated in the “Committee of Eight” who
were primarily concerned about the responsibilities of the president and of the National
Council, and in particular, which of these entities would control the ministry of finance;
in any case, the inclusion of the popular referendum would not make it through the
multiple changes made by the Committee (Vanger 2010). The compromise itself was
based on the political realities: because a Constituent Assembly, with a anti-collegial
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majority, was the only method to reform the Constitution, Batlle and the pro-collegial
General Assembly were forced to negotiate in an effort to avoid paralysis (Altman 2008).
Scholarship on the 1934 Constitution is lacking, and scholarship related to the
reasoning of the introduction of direct democracy is seemingly non-existent. Thus, a brief
discussion of the overall sense of the context in which the Constitution was created will
serve as a proxy for the overall discussion of the introduction of direct democracy into
the 1934 Uruguayan Constitution.
In 1933, Colorado president Gabriel Terra dissolved parliament with the support
of the Blancos, and was in large part seen as a reaction of the upper classes whose
economic fortunes were dwindling in the post-World War I era (Weinstein 1991). Such
fortunes had depended largely on livestock production and exportation, which had been
the focus of the Uruguayan economy since the late 1800s. The Uruguayan economy
centered on the meeting world demands for beef, leather, and wool as technological
advances made such exports feasible. Dependence on foreign markets hit Uruguay
especially hard during the Great Depression, as Uruguay’s export earnings fell by 40%
between 1930 and 1932, and in response Uruguay sought diversification towards
industrial production (import-substitution industrialization) which in turn led to questions
about the degree to which such industries would be state-led, and, for the Colorados and
Blancos, the degree to which they could dispense public-sector jobs (Mcfeeters 1990).
A strong supporter of a new Constitution, Terra sought widespread support by
arguing that the old constitution was serving the wrong interests, and the institutions
supported in the new constitution included a singular head of government and head of
state in the presidency and at the same time strengthening the two-party system in an
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effort to reduce fractionalization issues. More generally, Weinstein (1975) argues that the
intellectual ideas for the new constitution were the foundation for corporatist 56 ideas,
though none of these would actually make it into the new document in full (though hints
of the ideas flow through; for example, the provision of Article 52 which cast work for
the community as a “duty” and offered preference to its citizens in this regard). The new
constitution included provisions that allowed the state direct control over imports and
exports, laws amending the penal code to include crimes against the state, and reduced
the freedoms of the press. For the purposes of this study, the importance lies in the fact
that the 1967 Constitution, from which several referendums were produced, retained
much of the language regarding the process of direct democracy.
Institutional Design
Article 284 of the 1934 Constitution introduced the institution of direct
democracy by allowing the people to call for reformation of the Constitution in whole or
in part with the signatures of 20% of the electorate, which would require the presence of
the reform alternatives in the next regular election. In such a case, the General Assembly
can formulate alternative measures to be submitted to a popular vote alongside the
original initiative. In addition, two-fifths of the General Assembly may propose revisions
to the president, which must then appear on the next ballot. Passage of the measure
requires a simple majority vote; no threshold restrictions exist. However, if two-thirds of
56

Weinstein argues that the intellectual model (for Terra) was based on prolific leaders of the time: Getúlio
Dornelles Vargas in Brazil; Mussolini in Italy, and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera in Spain. Such ideas refer
generally to “state corporatism” as defined by Schmitter (1974:105) as “…associated with political systems
in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent
or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities
are ideologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on
class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed.” Ultimately, the constitutional convention did not
accept “corporative projects” because “democratic ideals are profoundly rooted in the mass of
citizens….perhaps someday a happy formula will emerge which permits the conciliation of democracy with
the indubitable advantages of a firm organization of labor by the state” (Weinstein 1974:71).
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the General Assembly accepts either of the submitted referendum proposals, the vote of
the people is no longer needed.
Uruguay has undergone several constitutional transformations, but the institution
of direct democracy has remained. The 1942 Constitution addressed the issue of direct
democracy as well, and introduced two major changes from the 1934 Constitution. First,
the required percentage of signatories to the initiated petition was lowered to 10%, and at
the same time, a minimum threshold came into effect: 35% of the electorate must cast a
vote for the results to be valid. The 1951 Constitution affirmed both of these
requirements without change. The 1967 constitution made further instruments of direct
democracy available: 25% of the electorate may initiate referendums on new proposals,
or may seek the revocation of an existing law, so long as the referendum is called within
one year of the act’s promulgation 57.
Thus, Uruguayans have access to direct democracy, and they have used the
process extensively, compared to other parts of Latin America. Between 1900 and 1967,
voters decided 13 referendums (seven by initiative, with voters approving three of these);
one counter-proposal by the General Assembly (accepted by voters) and five mandatory
referendums (voters approved all five). Since 1967, an additional five referendums have
come to the ballot: one mandatory referendum, and four optional referendums.
Comparatively, only Ecuador eclipses Uruguay in terms of referendum usage, which has
taken 53 referendums to voters since 1900 (though, all but two of those have been
conducted since the late 1990s) making Uruguay a much more “experienced” user of
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This mechanism does not apply to laws dealing with taxes or legislation that falls within the “exclusive
initiative” of the executive power.
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direct democracy. Venezuela is next on the list with nine, four fewer than Uruguay, and
the remaining Latin American countries have only a handful of referendums among them.
Turnout 58 for referendums in Uruguay is consistently quite high; though threshold
requirements are in place for parts of the referendum mechanisms, voters clearly have no
trouble believing that their vote makes a difference. Consistently above 80% and
sometimes reaching 90%, the importance of participatory democracy is not lost on
Uruguayans. Considering the culture of direct democracy includes not only examination
of turnout levels, but also the method by which support is found among the electorate.
While no data exist on citizen attitudes towards the initiative 59, a discussion of how
voters decide may cast light on the culture of direct democracy in Uruguay.
As Altman (2012) argues, Uruguayans rely primarily on party loyalties when
voting on popular initiatives. Through extensive quantitative analysis, Altman finds that
other variables, such as inflation, unemployment rates, and per-capita income rates
(together, economic indicators) are not statistically significant indicators of vote
preference. Measures related to individual salaries and salary changes over time also have
no impact (using OLS regression). However, a measure developed to rate loyalties to
political parties has an almost one-to-one relationship between voting for an initiative and
voting for the party that supports the initiative. Altman further evaluates the indirect
influence of economic conditions on outcomes through path analysis and finds that of
unemployment levels, changes in unemployment levels, salaries, and levels of salary
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Turnout levels will be discussed in more details in later sections.

59

This claim is supported by my own research (conducted for this dissertation) as well as Altman (2012:
187).
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change, only levels of salary change had a direct influence on outcomes, suggesting that
better economic conditions favor support for the party loyalty measure.
In a separate study, Altman (2008) finds that legislator perceptions of direct
democracy are quite positive, even in an environment where the power of mobilized
citizens can undermine the power of elected officials (that is, legislate from the bottomup). His quantitative analysis find that more than half of the representatives interviewed
believed that the institution of direct democracy strengthens representative democracy as
a whole, and at the same time, 70% of the representatives consider the presence of the
referendum device a suitable reason to attempt broad consensus within parties. However,
such findings are not universal: 70% oppose the idea that all issues can be considered by
initiative or referendum, and at the same time, a majority question the ability of the
electorate to properly consider the importance of such questions. Finally, Altman argues
that the institution of direct democracy – the availability of mechanisms of citizeninitiated referendums, along with the threat of referendums fosters consensus, which in
turn fosters a sense of legitimacy.
Referendum Cases in Uruguay 60
Uruguayan voters would not see a referendum in place until 1934, when they
were once again asked to approve a new Constitution. Economic problems plagued
Uruguay in the early 1930s, and Colorado President Gabriel Terra sought to consolidate
power in 1933 by preventing both the legislature and the National Council from meeting.
The relatively peaceful coup found support when Terra promoted cooperation among
conservative Colorados as well as Blancos, and quickly cut nonessential spending
programs, reduced the salaries of government employees, and focused on improving
60

See Appendix C for a complete list of direct democracy cases in Uruguay.
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trade relations (Alisky 1969). A second Constitutional Assembly would restore the
traditional singular executive (and thus, abolishing the National Council) while at the
same time creating a Senate that would equally allocate seats among Colorados and
Blancos. Containing elements of political consolidation as well as compromise, the
Constitution also allowed for the people to call for a constitutional initiative with a 20%
vote (Parliament would be able to submit a counter-proposal). The Constitution was
supported with 95% of the vote, and went into effect in 1934.
In 1938, voters were asked to approve changes to the Constitution, and the
practices involved would be the subject of several future referendums: the recognition of
the “lema” system of factions within political parties. The amendment passed with 93%
approval. Overall, however, the 1934 Constitution would last only until 1942, when the
Colorado Party won significant majorities in both houses of Parliament. The perceived
mandate brought political cover for President Alfredo Baldomir, who, with support of the
two traditional parties, staged a 1941 coup. The redrafting of the Constitution reinstituted
coparticipation and the integration of political parties, and included provisions for direct
democracy: constitutional initiative requirements were reduced from twenty percent to
ten percent of the population, and the General Assembly was still allowed to submit
counter proposals. Constitutional amendments would also require ratification by the
people via the referendum, as well as approval by a Constitutional Council. The new
Constitution would also limit presidential terms to a single term, as well as a Senate
elected by proportional representation, and finally, would abolish the lema system
(Pendle 1963).
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By 1946, descendants of Battle had won the presidency, and would attempt to
revisit the idea of Colegiado by offering the voters a chance to decide via referendum. In
November of 1946, voters were asked to bring back Colegiado as well as separate
municipal and national election dates, and to allow government initiatives to be approved
by two-fifths of the members of the Chamber of Deputies. At the same time, the leftleaning Civic Union offered voters the chance to hold referendums on constitutional
changes assuming ten percent of the population signed a petition, and to allow for the
separate election of the President and Vice-President. Neither of the proposals was
successful, though the Blanco leader once again sought to retain a share of governance
and supported the younger Batlle’s call for a 1951 constitutional convention that would
successfully create a nine-member executive. In this instance, six of the seats would go
the majority while the remaining would go the second largest party (thus ensuring
representation by either Colorados or Blancos). The new Constitution would revisit and
accept the lema system, and at the same time provide a bicameral General Assembly
elected by proportional representation. Finally, the ability of the people to utilize the
initiative was retained: petitions for amendments could be submitted with 10% of
registered voters, and the General Assembly could still submit counter-petitions (C2D).
The effect of the Colegiado has received considerable debate in the literature;
Pendle (1963: 39) argues that “one result of the constitutional reform has been a slowing
down in governmental processes.” Altman (2008) largely agrees, finding that the
unusually slow economy that plagued the normally profitable Uruguay was in part due to
“efficiency yielding to banal political bickering” (497). Altman also interviewed Jorge
Batlle about the mechanism, who argued that “the Colegiado works fine when economic
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affairs run by themselves without problems. But in cases facing gross economic
problems, the Colegiado stops working because it has within its framework political
adversaries who, naturally, want to predominate” (497).
The economic boom years of the 1950s would not last the decade, and as
Weinstein (1988) argues, the Colegiado was largely responsible for the economic
decline. Voters responded in 1958 by putting Blancos in power for the first time in
ninety-three years, and at the same time, voters rejected a Colorado-supported
referendum that would reinstate the presidential system, abolish the lema system, and
separate presidential and parliamentary elections. Voters also rejected a similar initiative
supported by Civic Union that would also have introduced a presidential system (C2D).
The 1960s saw continued economic decline for Uruguay, with annual inflation
reaching well into the ninety percent range and GDP growing at less than 1% (Alisky
1969), and constitutional reform was once again on the minds of voters generally, and in
particular, the Colegiado, as politicians focused on the gridlock caused by the system and
its inability to respond adequately to growing economic problems (Alisky 1969). The
Colorados returned to power after discontent with two Blanco governments under the
Colegiado, and with the support of the General Assembly, a bipartisan project for
constitutional reform convened (Altman 2008). Nonetheless, when voters were once
again asked to remove the Colegiado in favor of the presidential system in 1962, voters
defeated the measure, 83-17%, largely on the basis of populist Colorado Luis Batlle
Berres. Weinstein (1988) finds that support for a return to a presidential system was less
likely among lower classes.
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With the status-quo in place and economic fortunes still in decline, voters were
once again asked to consider multiple constitutional reforms in 1966. A series of four
“colorful” referendums were placed before voters: the “orange” referendum was put
forward by the General Assembly as a counter-proposal to three popular initiatives, and
would re-introduce the presidential system, ban the President and Vice-President from
seeking immediate reelection, allow the President to dissolve the General Assembly, and
extend parliamentary terms from four to five years. The “grey” initiative, supported by a
faction of the Blancos, planned for a president who could be reelected, could dissolve the
General Assembly and “restrict personal freedoms”. The Colorado Party supported the
“pink” initiative that reintroduced a presidential system, but limited presidents to a single
term, and allow the President to dissolve the General Assembly. Finally, the “yellow”
initiative reintroduced the presidential system, banned the President from seeking
immediate reelection, dissolved the lema system, and set pensions to 85% of employees’
final salary. The Colorado Party ultimately abandoned the pink initiative and supported
the yellow, but the General Assembly-supported orange garnered 65% of the vote, with
the grey winning only 15% and the yellow 7%. The period described here suggests that
referendum politics in Uruguay were not focused on substantive issues 61. For the better
part of thirty-five years, the main issues finding attention in direct democracy dealt with
the creation of - and abolishment of - the Colegiado system, as well as the lema system.
However, the rise of the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros) in the late
1960s resulted in the rise of violence between Uruguayan leadership and Tupamaros,
with the end result being a significant decline of civil liberties in the early 1970s, and, in
61

This is not to suggest that direct democracy should only be used for substantive measures. In a
comparative context, as I describe in future sections, Venezuelans focused on considerably more
substantive issues via the referendum.
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June of 1973, President Bordaberry, with military backing, launched a dictatorship by
closing Parliament and empowering police and military to take “whatever measures
necessary” to ensure normal public service (Weinstein 1988). Certainly, the effect of the
often violent dictatorship on Uruguay and its politics should not be ignored here, but the
1980 referendum on the Constitution drafted by the military seems the more appropriate
focus for the purposes of this work.
The roots of the 1980 referendum stretched back to the 1973 military coup in
more ways than one. First, the military government amended the Constitution in 1976 to
include the National Security Council (COSENA) that was granted both legislative and
executive powers enabling it to declare different kinds of national emergencies, one of
which would permit the restrictions of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties
(Weinstein 1988). Secondly, the military government announced (in August of 1977) that
a referendum on a new constitution would take place in 1980. The draft constitution
suggested a transition to a limited democracy: the COSENA would be supreme to
Parliament, individual rights could be restricted in times of conflict, and, beginning in
1986, parties would be allowed one candidate each. Third, (though not directly related to
the 1973 Uruguayan coup) was the larger context: Chile, in 1978, approved a military
rule by a large margin in a referendum, suggesting such a move was likely to succeed.
The basis for support from party leaders was primarily in the end-game rather than in the
status-quo: it was a step towards constitutional democracy (Ameringer 2009).
Nonetheless, Uruguayan voters defeated the proposal by a 57-43 percent margin (with
87% turnout levels), and while the outcome produced a period of uncertainty, Uruguay
slowly returned to democracy, installing a civilian government in March of 1985.
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Referendum politics were not completely excluded from the dictatorship of 19731985. In 1989, opponents of President Sanguinetti’s plan to ensure amnesty for military
offenses during the dictatorship collected enough signatures to force a referendum.
Support for the amnesty law both in the interior and in Montevideo, however, held up,
and the referendum to repeal the legislation failed. Sanguinetti argued that upholding the
amnesty law would help ease the transition to civilian rule (Bennett 1989), though
scholars agree that had the referendum succeeded, it is far from definite that prosecutions
would have actually taken place (Weinstein 1988, Oxford 1989). Interestingly, this issue
was revisited in 2009, when a popular initiative was mounted to abolish the law on the
waiver of criminal prosecution. The push for the initiative was led primarily by the
governing Frente Amplio, and while the initiative failed (though, just barely, with 48%
voting to repeal the law), the Uruguayan Supreme Court found (in a limited fashion) that
the law was unconstitutional.
Also in 1989, supporters of pension reform sought to amend the Constitution to
include a specific measure that stated that the pensions have to follow the national salary
index (C2D). It should be noted that the attempt to amend the Constitution, like many of
the referendums discussed here, is primarily a function of the inability of Uruguayans to
utilize the referendum to affect budget and taxation issues. In this case, the National
Organization of Pensioners (ONAJPU), with the support of Frente Amplio as well as the
labor organizations (PIT-CNT) enjoyed wide support of the electorate insofar as the topic
of the referendum affected many citizens. The Partido Colorado did not support the
initiative, and President Sanguinetti himself was the target of strong campaigning, as
supporters argued that he had failed to adequately adjust pensions in an effort to reduce
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fiscal deficit (Altman 2008: 7). Given the high levels of support from the electorate, the
measure passed easily (85%).
In 1992, voters had the opportunity to decide whether recent legislativelyapproved privatization of state enterprise would remain in place. When Luis Alberto
Lacalle of the Blanco Party ascended to the presidency in 1989, he sought economic
reforms primarily in the area of deregulation; the legislature passed law n. 16.211 (Ley de
Empreasas Publicas) which allowed for the privatization of state-led enterprises with his
support. The 1992 referendum, thus, was the first instance in which opposition leaders
(initially supported by ANTEL, the National Telecommunication Company) managed to
accumulate 25% of the electorate to force an abrogative referendum. Altman (2008: 6)
argues that this referendum was “well-noticed in Latin America because it was one of the
very first democratic responses that sought to halt the (then) fashionable Washington
Consensus” and the high turnout (83%) and subsequent approval (thus, repealing the
law) was supported by 67% of the voters. The referendum enjoyed considerable support
from both Frente Amplio and two groups of the traditional parties (Altman 2008:8).
In 1994, the pension issue was revisited by popular initiative, and voters once
again responded by preventing pension cuts that the legislature had earlier passed. At the
same time, the question of reserving 27% of the state budget for education (an initiative
supported by the Teachers Union) failed. Also in 1994, the General Assembly put a
referendum in front of voters that would have split the vote for president, parliament, and
governors. Although opinion polls showed support for the referendum in the area of 80%,
the referendum was ultimately defeated by 68% of voters (C2D). However, general
election results in 1994 may have spurred electoral reform: the three main parties split the
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vote (32,31,30), and two of the parties (Frente Amplio and Blancos) argued that the
electoral system was to blame, while Colorados argued that ticket-splitting caused the
split (Qvotrup 1996). Thus, all three parties mounted support for another referendum to
be held in 1996. The amendment would alter the electoral system in Uruguay, which
utilized a “double simultaneous vote”, which called for a primary and a general election
to be held at the same time, and parties could field several candidates for each office. At
the same time, voters could not split their tickets, and voters were required to choose
candidates for president, the legislature, and local offices from the same party. The 1996
amendment would have allowed ticket-splitting, and at the same time, separated national
and municipal elections. At the same time, changes to the presidential election format
were proposed: each party would select one candidate through internal elections, and in
the general election, the winning candidate would need to receive 40% of the vote, or
face a run-off election. For the two main parties, the idea was to block the minor party
(Frente Amplio) from winning the presidency. However, as Qvotrup (1996) finds, each of
the parties feared the plebiscite, insofar as the people had - in prior elections - opted for
policies that parliamentarians did not support, and the resulting loss in legitimacy that
accompanied the defeat was not enticing. Thus, the parties sought compromise in an
effort to achieve broader appeal: parties would select a single candidate through internal
elections; in the general election both a 40% vote share and a 10-point lead over the
closest opponent were required; municipals would enjoy greater autonomy; and
presidential and local elections would be held at different times, thereby allowing people
to “split the ticket” (Qvotrup 1996).
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The compromise would not last through the campaign, however. A split within
the Frente Amplio Party resulted in initial broad support for reform, but initial supporter
and former presidential candidate Tabare Vazquez (of Frente Amplio) would eventually
shift his position and become an opponent of reform. The switch was largely pragmatic reform, he believed, would hurt his own election chances. By attracting support from
radical factions of the Frente Amplio as well as moderate left through opposition to
reform he believed his future electoral chances improved (Qvotrup 1996). Such a
calculation certainly did not hurt his successful presidential election in 2005. In the end,
voters opted for reform, but by the slimmest of all Uruguayan referendums: 50.4%.
Studies find that voting patterns in this election mirrored the 1989 election, where there
was 90% correlation between a “yes” vote and support for Blancos or Colorados;
moreover, the “yes” vote was more common in areas where the lowest unemployment
rates occurred (Qvotrup 1996).
Just as important as the referendums that do occur may also be the referendums
that do not occur. In 2002, Uruguayan legislators approved law 17.296 which would have
allowed the cellular telephone company ANTEL S.A. to be held in partially private hands
– 40%. As with the 1992 referendum, unions pushed for abrogative referendum, and were
able to gather the required 25% of the electorate’s signatures which were presented to the
electoral commission. At the same time, public opinion polls showed considerable
support for revocation, and the government sent a bill to Congress withdrawing the
articles supporting privatization. The referendum was never held, and ANTEL remains
100% publicly-owned (Altman 2008).
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In March of 2003, the Uruguayan legislature passed a law that would privatize the
water supply. Clearly not learning from the 1992 issue of privatization, in which the
government was handed a defeat by voters, the legislature faced a similar result: as
Altman (2008) finds, the causal configuration was identical: state-owned water company
workers, along with – once again – PIT-CNT collected the requisite signatures, and with
the support of the Broad Front coalition and half of the Blanco factions, voters rescinded
the law with 65% approving.
Finally, in 2009, the Uruguayan legislature launched an initiative with 2/5 of the
Congress supporting the idea that citizens living abroad should have the right to vote by
mail. Supported by the governing Frente Amplio party, the measure failed, with only
37% approving (C2D). Widespread support for this measure was limited, as the measure
was indirectly related to the other referendum held at the same time (discussed earlier in
this chapter) that revisited the law on abolishing the waiver on amnesty – anywhere from
ten to twelve percent of the Uruguayan population migrated for either economic or
political reasons. 62
Venezuela
The institutional design of direct democracy discussed here will be limited to the
1999 Constitution and beyond. Obviously, Venezuela has a long political history, and
that history is important to understanding the current context of direct democracy in
Venezuela. However, with the exception of a single referendum vote in 1957 (the
legitimacy of which is discussed below), all cases of direct democracy have occurred
after the introduction of the 1999 Constitution. Thus, this section discusses the
introduction of the mechanism of direct democracy as a function of the 1999
62
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Constitution. Nonetheless, the creation of the constitution must be considered as a
function of the context in the time in which it was created (rather than post-hoc
justifications), and thus, a look back at Venezuelan political history is necessary.
Certainly, the Venezuelan political arena can be described as evolving in cycles:
as Lombardi (2003) has noted, the “cyclical nature of this process reflects a set of
limitations on the range of alternatives available to the country and its leaders” (1). A
constant, however, through the years has been the focus on economic viability as a
function of exports - the production of cacao and coffee in the nineteenth century, and
later petroleum. As Lombardi (2003), the fluctuation in world prices of such commodities
leads to a cyclical nature, where Venezuelan politicians prioritize revenue with an eye
towards state stability first and improving society second, though such exogenous forces
may not always lead to optimum choices. Ellner (2003) argues that the period of 1958 631998 can be characterized as a “near-perfect” democracy, for several reasons: first, a twoparty system 64 with minimal ideological differentiation existed and alternated in power 65
; secondly, that political leaders were committed to democracy and avoid
ultranationalistic rhetoric; third, that political leadership was mature enough to form
interparty agreements; fourth, that the parties held a predominantly middle-class
leadership (rather than oligarchic leadership); fifth, that an emphasis on party discipline
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In 1958, The Pact of Punto Fijo recognized the acceptance of the three main parties, and committed the
parties to ensuring the “stability of the nascent regime” and respecting election results (Lissidini 2006).
64
The two major parties are the social democratic Accion Democratica (AD) and the Christian Comte de
Organización Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI). Hellinger (2003:29) notes that the pact was not
entirely exclusionary: the Communist Party was a considerable force in party politics at the time, but was
not included in the pact.
65
Sartori (1976) argues that political stability is greater when two major parties lacking in ideological
differences effectively operate.

141

within AD and COPEI existed 66 ; sixth, that the political system was open enough to
provide attractive opportunities for smaller parties; and finally, that parties were highly
institutionalized (rather than simply a vehicle for ambitious politicians). Hellinger (2003:
27) argues that such stability rested upon a “material basis” - a distribution of
international oil rents through a system of clientelism; and Lissidini (2008) agrees,
arguing that conflicts were resolved by consensus with actors who benefitted from oil
reserves to maintain and nurture the system, but at the same time, the presidential regime
played a key role in the establishment of a stable democracy.
The stability that characterized the Venezuelan political system, however, was
based on a clientelism that was inherently flawed; oil prices (and, rents) dropped in the
late 1980s, and significant economic troubles followed. The election of Carlos Andres
Perez in February 1989 brought the paquete - a negotiated structural-adjustment
agreement with the IMF; soon after, the Caracazo uprising reflected anger among
citizens over increased transport fares (the increased fares themselves a result of
increased fuel hikes) and resulted in an official death toll of 287, though reports suggests
the number to actually be between 1,000 and 1,500 (Hellinger 2003). Protests continued
as Perez deregulated the banking industry, privatized the national telephone company,
and opened the oil industry to private capital (Lissindi 2006). The uprising continued
with the attempted coup led by Hugo Chávez, and while the coup itself failed, Maya
(2003) argues that the process itself was a political victory for Chávez when his television
appearance accepting responsibility for the defeat stirred hope among supporters who
rallied behind his “por ora” phrasing: for now.
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The author notes that this is in large part of a function of Romulo Betancourt’s desire for avoiding
internal conflict (Ellner 2003:9)
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Maya (2003) argues that the period from the attempted coup to the successful
presidential election of Hugo Chávez in 1998 was marked by political actors attempting
in vain to find stability. The stability that was COPEI and AD 67 faltered; the Causa R
(Radical Cause) rose in the early 1990s only to falter in the late 1990s (Hellinger 2003).
Along the way, the movement founded by Chávez, the Movimiento Bolivariano
Revolucionario 200 (MBR), based on traditional values of populist caudillism, began to
move towards finding electoral victories, rather than purposefully avoiding the process 68
(Hellinger 2003). Chávez’s eventual party, the Movimiento Quinta República was
converted from the MBR, and Chávez would win the presidency in 1998, defeating AD
candidate Salas Romer, in large part due to Chávez’ support during his campaign for a
new constitution.
The 1999 Constitution produced a number of significant changes. As Alvarez
(2003) argues, the process of decentralization was the focus in the early 1990s and this
process allowed the political elite to formulate its own agenda (147); and under the
Chávez presidency, the party-based representative democracy was transformed. The
transformations were focused on the sources of decision-making power, and while
Chávez established parliamentary pacts with minority parties in the style of the Punto
Fijo 69 period, the new Constitution did not put as much emphasis on party-based
functions, but rather, the emphasis was on allowing civil society the ability to directly
67

Between 1974 and 1993, AD and COPEI together controlled no less than 80 percent of the seats in the
National Assembly (Hellinger 2003:33)/
68

Chavez admits this tactic in interviews with scholar Marta Harnecker: “Until 1996 we had chosen not to
participate in the elections. Really, we were calling for abstention as the tactical element in a strategy to
force a constitutional assembly, which was always our plan” (2005: 45).
69
This should not be viewed as a measure of Chávez’s support for the pact: as Hellinger (2011:28) argues,
President Chávez “often dismisses the Punto Fijo era entirely as just another episode in a pageant of
oligarchic regimes that made up the “Fourth Republic” over nearly the entire history of Venezuela since
independence”

143

participate. While the 1961 Constitution encouraged the formation of political parties
(Hellinger 2003), the 1998 Constitution reduced party influence in the naming of top
public officials to the judicial branch and instead replaced this process with the
participation of civil society (Alvarez 2003). As discussed below, Venezuela also
introduced multiple avenues for direct democracy, including the citizen initiated
referendum devices as well as the ability to recall all popularly elected officials and
judgeships. Alvarez (2003) argues that the system of referendums enacted in this
Constitution serves a dual purpose: first, to force those who govern to respect the popular
will, and at the same time to provide a possible “escape” from situations of extreme
crisis. Second, the objective was to allow for the possibility for recall, but to not make
easy enough that political retaliation would be the ultimate use of the mechanism. More
generally, the very idea that citizens held supremacy over the branches, insofar as they
theoretically could call for a new constituent assembly at any time represented a new era
of, at the minimum, the possibility of direct participation. At the same time, however, the
new Constitution significantly increased the powers of the president, both through direct
powers granted, as well as through the provisional powers he could request from the
National Assembly to allow him to legislate by decree on all matters for up to a year
(Alvarez 2003).
A significant focus of this study is the degree to which “out-groups” are included
in the constitutional drafting process. Though scholarship on this instance is limited,
Lissidini (2008) notes that the Polo Patriotico (an alliance of parties supporting the
president) utilized successful strategies and were able to secure a majority of the 24 seats
that made up the constituent assembly, and thus, they played a significant role in the
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drafting process. The process was not closed to outsiders; as Lissidini notes, the ANC
invited “citizens and organized groups to present proposal, opened a popular service
office, and set up a website to receive numerous public inputs” (Lissidini 2008: 16) and
thus, discussions about the process were quite numerous. Canon (2009) also finds that
while the 1999 Constitution was drafted by a group dominated by members of Chávez’s
party, many would ultimately move to the opposition in later years. Garcia-Guadilla
(2003) argues that “social organizations” succeeded in persuading the ANC to include a
high percentage of their proposals in the constitutional text, though the author notes that
the basis for the success was in large part due to the fact that the demands formed part of
the “Bolivarian Project” of Chávez (186).
Canache (2012) argues that the 1999 Constitution was intended to increase
participatory70 democracy at the expense of liberal 71 democracy, insofar as Chávez
viewed participatory democracy as an alternative model to the liberal idea. In particular,
the members of the Constituent Assembly sought to avoid existing problems with
traditional check-and-balance formulae with the institutionalization of the people’s
participation at the grassroots level. In addition to the institution of direct democracy,
Chávez would promote models of participatory elements in the form of cooperatives,
socialist enterprises, and communal councils (Canache 2012) over the next several years.
In an interview with scholar Marta Harnecker, Chávez himself argued that the
constitutional assembly created telephone lines for citizen input, and that “his” majority
70

Article 62 of the constitution protects the right of all citizens to “freely participate in political affairs,
directly or through elected representatives.”
71
In this sense, the term “liberal democracy” refers to the idea of a “representative government in which
rule by the people is understood as the rule of the majority, as expressed through free and fair elections”,
along with constitutional limitations on power, and protections for both freedoms and rights. Participatory
democracy involves increased participation on the part of the citizen through increased elections, increased
range of political offices, and methods of direct democracy - all of which coexist with a representative
democracy (Canache 2012).
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did listen to constituent opinions. Moreover, Chávez concedes the fact that the process
was completed hastily, but argues, “sometimes it is necessary to sacrifice some important
things for the sake of expediency, and at the time it was urgently necessary to transform
the political map, to be able to continue moving the revolutionary project forward”
(Harnecker 2005:50).
Brewer-Carías’s (2010) examination finds that the process through which
members were elected to the Constituent Assembly ultimately affected the group
dynamics. The referendum approving the constituent assembly allowed for a 131member assembly, with 104 members to be elected in 24 regional constituencies that
corresponded to political subdivisions; 24 members to be elected by national vote, and
three members representing indigenous peoples. Members were elected individually but
appeared on a list which Chávez supported in personal visits to each voting district. As a
direct result, all of the president’s supported candidates were elected except one (for a
total of 123); thus, the author concludes that the Constituent Assembly was “totally
controlled by the newly established government party and the president’s followers, to
the exclusion of all traditional political parties” (56).
Ultimately, the text “finally approved by the constituents included virtually all
elements of the draft that Chávez had given at the original meeting” (Lissidini 2008: 22).
Chávez, Lissidini argues, insisted that the “reform of the constitution was the only way
out of the chaos” (Lissidini 2008:23). The Chávez-led majority was pushed into drafting
the new constitution quickly, and did so by appointing twenty commissions to deal with
the essential subject matters, which they did in just a few short weeks, and importantly
for the purposes of this study, “each commission acted alone and in isolation, consulting
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only briefly with groups the commission considered appropriate” (Brewer-Carías 2010:
61).
The top-down approach included significant allowances for citizen-initiated direct
democracy, but such top-down inclusion in the case of Venezuela does not necessarily
suggest that out-groups were not present at the formation of the 1999 Constitution. The
Assembly was itself a function of the campaign promises of Chávez, who, along with his
key constituencies of the rural and urban poor, had long been excluded from participation
and benefits from the Punto Fijo system. The Punto Fijo system was based on
agreements between Acción Democrática and COPEI, which would ultimately fail as a
function of a loss of legitimacy. This loss was based, as Canon (2009) argues, on the
failure to consolidate gains on the economic level (and especially an economy able to
withstand the oil shocks of the 1980s); the political level (which would ultimately prove
too rigid to respond to economic and social emergencies of the 1980s); and on the
sociocultural level (in that material rewards and motivations could not be afforded
because of a lack of material resources, but also because of communicational difficulties
among different cultures. The loss would eventually allow the populist Chávez to base his
support among the “popular sectors, and parts of the middle sectors, which had felt
themselves excluded from the economic, social, political and cultural life of the country”
(Canon 2009:48). As the Assembly formed primarily with Chávez supporters, the
inclusion of previously excluded “out-groups” is identified in the Venezuelan case.
Institutional Design
Among Latin American countries, Venezuela is one of the few that allow citizeninitiated referendums (along with Uruguay and Colombia), and is the only Latin
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American system to provide for the possible revocation of presidential power as well as
the only system to allow the president promote a referendum to repeal laws (Lissidini
2008).
Article 70 of the Venezuelan Constitution protects the “participation and
involvement of people in the exercise of their sovereignty”, and Article 71 allows for
consultative referendums at both the national and subnational levels, and is reserved for
issues of “national transcendence”. Such a referendum can be triggered at the national
level by the president, by a resolution of the National Assembly with a majority vote, or
by the people with a petition signed by 10% of all registered voters. At the subnational
level, such consultative referendums can be convened by municipal councils, legislative
councils, or state legislative councils with a two-thirds vote, or by petition of 10% of the
voters registered in the specific jurisdiction.
Article 72 of the new Constitution affords citizens the opportunity to recall all
popularly elected offices and judgeships that are in the second half of their electoral
periods. Such an action requires 20% of the voters to petition, and requires turnout of
25% or more, as well as the requirement that the vote share for removal is equal to or
greater than the vote share that initially elected the official 72. The Constitution stipulates
that if the revocation occurs during the first four years (in the case of the president)
elections must be called to complete the term; if in the last two years, the executive vice
president assumes the position of the term (Article 233). In the case of officials in the
National Assembly, representatives cannot seek reelection in the subsequent term (Article
198) but is silent on this matter related to other public officials.
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This makes officials who were elected with high degrees of abstention more likely targets, of course.
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Article 73 provides for the referendum process to be used in approving draft
statutes of the National Assembly, provided two-thirds agree to refer the statute. The
Constitution establishes a 25% turnout threshold but a simple majority to approve the
statute. The president also has the ability to call a binding referendum when treaties or
agreements that “compromise national sovereignty or transfer powers to bodies
supranational organs” 73; if two-thirds of the Assembly agrees or 15% of the people
petition, such a referendum vote may also be forced.
Article 74 allows for the abrogation of existing statutes with the exception of
those dealing with budgetary, tax, public debt, amnesty, and human rights laws, and can
be initiated with by petition of ten percent of the voters or by the president. This
provision also allows for decrees issued by the president to be subjected to a abrogative
referendum (though, in this case, it can only be achieved by popular initiative, and
requires only five percent of registered voters). Article 74 requires that abrogative
referendums require a turnout level of not less than 40%.
In addition, the Constitution provides other allowances for direct participation. In
particular, Article 204.7 allows for the introduction of draft legislation (related especially
to “organic” 74 )law with just 0.1% of the voters. Article 211 of the Constitution informs
the National Assembly to submit draft legislation to public consultation and to also ask
the opinion of citizens and organized society. Article 347 allows for the populace to
convene a new constituent assembly for the purposes of “transforming the state”, in
effect, to draft a new Constitution.
73

In this instance, 25% of the electorate must also cast a vote.
As defined in the Venezuelan Constitution, “organic laws are those designed as such by this Constitution,
those enacted to organize public powers or developing constitutional rights, and those which serve as a
normative framework for other laws” (Article 203).
74
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Certainly, the institution of direct democracy is given significant attention in the
Venezuelan Constitution, especially insofar as it contains provisions for both a top-down
and bottom-up approach. Nonetheless, the extensive availability of the mechanism has
not translated to excessive use: Venezuelans have, since 1999, voted on nine referendums
(C2D).
Direct Democracy Cases in Venezuela 75
Venezuela’s first experience with direct democracy came in 1957, when 87% of
voters 76 approved General Marcos Perez Jimenez governance 77 as President without
being directly elected as well as his ability to appoint all national and local
representatives. Venezuelans would not be given another opportunity to take matters into
their own hands until 1999, when they were asked two questions in April and another in
December. The April questions were presidential plebiscites asking the people if they
wished to see a Constituent Assembly formed, and of the voters who did cast a ballot
(only 37% of the electorate), 92.3% of them agreed. The plebiscite itself was a function
of promises made by Chávez when elected in December of the prior year, and carried out
on the day of his inauguration. Turnout increased on the day voters were to approve the
new Constitution, though heavy storms may have impacted the overall numbers: only
44% of the electorate showed up, and the new constitution was approved with 72% of the
voters in agreement.
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See Appendix D for a complete list of direct democracy cases in Venezuela.
The total turnout percentage is unknown.
77
Though impartial observers were not in place for this election, the vote was hardly democratic; indeed,
the legitimacy of the vote could be questioned by (1) the fact that his initial rule was instigated via military
junta; secondly, that within a month of the election, a popular uprising drove him from power (O’Grady
2007).
76
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The low turnout cannot be completely explained by storms, however. The new
constitution was a drastic change from the earlier versions. Though popularly elected, the
new provisions were far from democratic 78: in addition to changing the name of the
country, the new constitution prohibited public financing of political parties, eliminated
the bicameral congress in favor of a unicameral National Assembly 79 (which could
dissolved at Chávez’s discretion), military promotions became the direct responsibility of
Chávez, rather than that of the National Assembly, and removed the power of the
Supreme Court to suspend or impeach the president. In addition, presidential terms
increased to six years, and allows for immediate reelection. Economically, the new
constitution further downsized the role of the private sector, increased state guarantees,
and increased housing, healthcare and retirement pensions to all 80. Significant changes
may certainly have affected the average voter’s ability to fully understand the new
document (and as discussed earlier in this work, the rapid development of the document
may have led to lower levels of comprehension); Tierney (2003) argues that polling data
showed less than two percent of the population had read the document they would vote
on, and in large part, the new constitution was a change from the “old ways”, as voters
seemed to put the general feeling.
In 2000, the Venezuelan National Assembly conducted a consultative referendum
in an effort to gauge public approval of a plan to suspend trade union leadership for six
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The degree to which the document was intended to be democratic - from Chávez’s perspective - is
debatable. Nonetheless, the preamble to the new constitution states that the Bolivarian Republic will be
“democratic, participatory, elective, decentralized, alternative, responsible and pluralist, with revocable
mandates.”
79
The ANC argued that a bicameral legislature is inherently bureaucratic, costly, and inefficient (Oxford
1999)
80
Venezuela: Constitutional questions. 1999. Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/192434571?accountid=3611
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months. Once again, voter turnout was quite low (just 23.5% - though the referendum
was held at the same time as local elections), and voters approved the measure with 70%
margin. Viewed largely as a measure to continue his power consolidation, Chávez asked
voters to agree with his proposal that would transform union leadership accountability
from parties, as it had been for decades, and towards the union personnel, who would
elect their own leaders. Chávez argued that the prior system was largely undemocratic,
and corrupt, insofar as their leadership remained entrenched for decades at a time, and
that financial resources were being used for personal gain. Organized labor, on the other
hand, called for an abstention, arguing that Chávez was simply attempting to gain control
of the unions and align them with the MVR. 81 The relationship between the main trade
union confederation (CTV) was quite tense: they - along with the main business
association 82 had led campaigns to remove Chávez from office, and would continue to
lead a series of work stoppages - including the “indefinite” strike in April 2002, which
resulted in a brief coup d’etat (Canon 2009). Results suggest that both entities may have
had some success: though the measure passed, rewarding Chávez, the abstention rate
suggests that organized labor was able to get the message out as well.
In 2004, voters increased their turnout numbers and voted “no” for the first time
when a recall vote on President Chávez was held. Article 72 of the 1999 Constitution
provides for the possibility of the people to dismiss all elected officials once half of their
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VENEZUELA: Reform approved amid abstention (2000). \Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd. Retrieved
from://search.proquest.com/docview/192434571?accountid=3611
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The tension was underscored by the fact that the unions associated with CTV had been allied with AD
(or, as Canon (133) argues, “dominated by AD”) , and Chávez’s movement had displaced AD (as well as
COPEI) which in turn undermined the traditional benefits union leaders received.
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term has passed (and assuming 20% of the voters sign a petition to begin the
proceedings), but requires a 25% turnout of the qualified electorate. In this case, 70% of
the people turned out to vote, and 60% of them voted “no”, keeping Chávez in office.
The recall vote was preceded by a brief coup led by Pedro Carmona in 2002, during
which Carmona abolished the 1999 Constitution and all public powers, only to face
spontaneous demonstrations insisting on Chávez’s return; as well as sixty-three day strike
in the oil sector which lead to significant economic problems in 2003 83 (Canon 2009).
Thus, the recall vote can be considered in the context of extreme political
polarization, and such polarization is often difficult to mitigate. McCoy (2006) argues
that several reasons why the institutional context in which the vote took place was unable
to mediate the levels of distrust within the highly polarized society. First, the
politicization of the CNE84 - and as a consequence, the lack of transparency - resulted in
a lack of confidence in electoral outcomes 85. Secondly, political divisions within the
Supreme Court also prevented the institution from becoming an independent arbiter
(though, in other systems, close elections requiring the intervention of the Courts were
widely accepted). Third, public and private media fueled suspicions and “painted their
own realities and thus the moderating influence of the media was ineffective. Finally,
there were limited possibilities in terms of third-party mediators and arbiters who may
have helped provide additional checks on the process in an effort to legitimize the
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The recall election was also supported by the US, with support from the National Endowment for
Democracy (Harnecker 2005:191).
84
Prior to the election, the CNE threatened to limit the number of observers as well as access to voting sites
and the technical aspects of the vote (The Economist [London]. 2 September 2004. Jennifer McCoy. "What
Really Happened in Venezuela?")
85
International monitors, including the Carter Center and the Organization of American States (OAS)
declared the voting process in the recall election as “fair and accurate” and “legitimate” (Carter Center,
2004).Felten, Ruben and Stubblefield support the conclusions after statistical analysis of voting data.
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outcome 86. Thus, McCoy argues (2006:78) that ultimate outcome from the recall vote
was continued polarization, and at the same time, demoralized opposition leaders who
questioned the outcome of the 2004 recall election would not mobilize as well and as a
result, opposition leaders would lose elections for governors and mayors in 2004,
municipal councils in 2005, and the national legislature in 2005. Certainly, Chávez
claimed significant support for his policies as a function of the vote share 87. Shortly after
the vote, the government focused on consolidating power within the Supreme Court and
also was able to pass legislation strengthening their ability to penalize political dissent
and sanction private media outlets (McCoy 2006).
In 2007, Chávez sought to amend the 1999 Constitution in an effort to “complete
a transition to a socialist republic and implement his socialist agenda” (C2D). In total, 69
proposals were grouped in two blocks, with Block A consisting of 46 items proposed by
Chávez and the National Assembly; and Block B consisting of 23 items proposed by the
National Assembly. Among the proposals in Block A were a socialist economic system,
moving the Central Bank to government control, reducing the voting age from 18 to 16,
reducing the maximum workday to six hours (and provisions for better working
conditions), as well as a right to education. In addition, the referendum called for
increasing the petition rates for recall election from 20% to 30% and increase turnout
requirements from 25% to 40%, while at the same time requiring that the final vote in
favor of a recall be greater than the number of votes that elected the official in the first
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For example, the Catholic Church is often called upon to mediate disputes. In this case, the author notes
that such a possibility did not exist because the conflict involved many societal sectors (70).
87
Sheridan, Mary Beth. 2004 "Chavez Defeats Recall Attempt" http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A4208-2004Aug16.html. See also Forero, Juan. 2004.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/17/international/americas/17venezuela.html
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place 88 (Brewer-Carías 2010: 287). Turnout for this referendum was once again low
(56%), and a very close vote ensued: 50.6% of the electorate voted no on Block A, while
51% voted no on Block B, and Chávez was handed his first defeat.
The 2007 referendum vote can be explained in a variety of ways. Certainly, the
44% abstention rate suggests that many voters simply stayed home – perhaps because
they did not understand the multitude of questions, the ideas associated with “twenty-first
century socialism”, or perhaps they did not accept the referendum as wholly necessary
because many provisions could have been handled legislatively (Ali 2007; Lander 2007).
Each of these reasons suggest that the ideals of participatory democracy that such
referendums were designed to produce were in fact not met; and more to the point, the
spirit of populism was not perceived by voters. Canon (2009) argues that while Chávez
accepted the defeat, he continued to blame the media as well as a US conspiracy against
the Venezuelan government. Additionally, Chávez blamed the people themselves;
arguing that they were “insufficiently revolutionary” (65).
However, voters may have been “lashing out” to some degree against Chávez.
Buckman (2012) argues that three main factors contributed to the defeat: first, many
Venezuelans held resentment towards the suspension of privately-owned RCTV, which
had been shuttered in May of 2007 when Chávez announced that its license would not be
renewed 89. Secondly, crime rates in Venezuela were at all-time highs; Venezuela had the
second-highest murder rates in the world in 2006. Finally, public perception regarding the
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Indeed, all referendum devices included new proposed provisions increasing turnout thresholds or
approval thresholds, including the provision allowing citizens to convene a new constituent assembly for
the purposes of drafting a new constitution, which would increase from 15 to 30%.
89
Chávez was not a fan of RCTV, who he blamed for helping to orchestrate the 2002 coup and more
generally for the station’s opposition against him (Buckman 2012: 375).
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distribution of oil profits was negative; excessive poverty still existed despite new social
programs.
More generally, Brewer-Carías (2010) argues that the 2007 referendum was a
failed attempt to consolidate a centralized state through constitutional approval. The
author argues that the referendum ultimately failed insofar as the design was to eliminate
the vertical distribution of powers system, eliminate representative democracy, local
political autonomy, change the way that Venezuela interacted on the international level
(with particular attention to economic integration across Latin America), reinforce and
increase executive powers 90, as well as reducing the separation of powers between the
legislative and executive branches 91.
Venezuelans last voted in a referendum in 2009, in which they approved the
request by Chávez to remove any term limits on all departmental offices: governors,
representatives of the single states, local governors, deputies of the national assembly,
and the president. Certainly, the simplicity of the question involved seemed to reflect a
willingness on the part of Chávez to learn from his mistakes, and to some degree, Chávez
was reacting to representative elections held in November of 2008, where chavistas were
successful but not in a dominating fashion: the 53% of the 10.2 million votes cast
represented a decline from the 63% approval Chávez recorded in the recall election. The
push for the referendum came just days after the electoral victory, and Chávez sought to
rectify his earlier referendum campaign mistakes - this time by mobilizing PDVSA 92 and
90

This was especially apparent in the clauses dealing with the extension of the president’s term and
unlimited reelection capabilities, the appointment of a vice-president by the president, and the power of the
president to lead the military.
91
For example, legislators could accept executive branch positions without losing legislative tenure, and
could return to the legislature once the appointment ended.
92
PDVSA is the state-owned oil and natural gas company. Buckman (2012) argues that Chávez made it
clear that their jobs depended on a favorable outcome.
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the state-owned telephone company in what Buckman (2012: 380) calls a campaign of
“Orwellian proportions.” Canon (2009) also finds that the government ran a smooth
campaign, and the overall result showed the difference. Interestingly, the original
proposal only included the president; however, protests by the national assembly resulted
in amendments for the other offices (C2D). Voters approved the plan, 55-44%, and
turnout rose to 70%.
Significant debates occur regarding the motivation for Chávez’s referendums.
Maxwell Cameron argues that Chávez’s government instituted a “slow motion
constitutional coup” by terminating Venezuela’s Congress through a referendum of
“dubious legality” and through ensuring elections in which his party would dominate,
which would thus ensure the writing of a constitution befitting his ideals. However, as
Canon (2009) argues, the referendum was permitted by a pre-Chávez Supreme Court, and
at the same time, Chávez had an electoral mandate, and was pursuing avenues suggested
during his campaign. Along these lines, Canon argues that while the Constituent
Assembly (ANC) was indeed dominated by the Chávez-led Patriotic Pole (PP), the group
was actually quite broad; indeed, the 2007 failure could, as Canon argues, be seen as
simply voter attachment to the 1999 Constitution, which was viewed as a “fair and
balanced document” (164).
However, the above debate does not fully capture the nuances of the institution of
direct democracy. In a study directed towards determining how Venezuelans
conceptualize democracy, Canache (2012) finds that few Venezuelans have embraced the
notion of participatory democracy, and instead rely on traditional notions of liberal
democracy (as discussed earlier). Indeed, a substantial majority of Venezuelans surveyed
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point out that democracy - to them - depends on civil liberties as well as economic
freedom. Few Venezuelans, the author found, define democracy in participatory terms,
even after Hugo Chávez had been in office for ten years. When compared to 13 other
Latin American nations as part of the AmericasBarometer survey, Venezuelans espoused
the definition of democracy along liberal lines more commonly than any other nation
surveyed (108). Thus, for Venezuelans, the idea of increased participation, especially via
the institution of direct democracy, was not fully embraced. The author concluded that
“little evidence has emerged in this study to suggest that Hugo Chávez’s actions have
caused Venezuelans to rethink the meaning of democracy and to embrace participatory
conceptualizations...if anything, Chávez’s supporters tend to slightly less favorable
toward democratic governance than are his opponents” (114).
That is not to say that Venezuelans do not fully appreciate the role of voting.
Latinobarometro data suggest that 74% of Venezuelans agree that “the way you vote can
change the way things will be in the future”, the highest of all Latin American countries
surveyed with the exception of Uruguay (84%) 93. In addition, Venezuelans recognize that
“open and fair elections” are among the most important characteristics of a democracy
(35.7%); this response overshadows the importance of competitive parties (8%) 94,
freedom of speech (14%), and equal treatment for all by the courts (11%). Venezuelans,
however, are not uniformly convinced that the elections are fair: when asked in 2007,
only 58% agreed that elections are “clean”. 95
The definition of participatory democracy as labeled here suggests that direct
democracy is a defining feature: without participation in direct democracy, Canache
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http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATAnalizeQuestion.jsp (A504402)
http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATAnalizeQuestion.jsp (A104)
95
http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATAnalizeQuestion.jsp (A504501)
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suggests, then the focus must be on liberal democratic values. This is not axiomatic.
Indeed, participatory democracy can also succeed when governments are established at
local or municipal levels through political decentralization. Indeed, “participatory
democracy cannot be mistaken for direct democracy” (Brewer-Carías 2010: 188). Thus,
the elusive participatory democracy in Venezuela in the 2000s may be a function of
Canache’s (2012) argument, but also of the centralization process that Chávez pursued
after taking office in 1999. Though the new constitution calls for decentralization, and
thus, the importance of such a concept is recognized, Brewer-Carías argues the
“decentralized federation mentioned in Article 4 of the Constitution is no more than void
words, with the power of the state organized in an even more centralized way” 96 (2012:
190). Such an arrangement resonated with the people as well: 15% report having “a lot”
of confidence in local governments (and 26% report having “none”), while 36% have “a
lot” of confidence in the government as a whole, and only 16% report having “no
confidence”. 97
Conclusions
Direct democracy across Latin America is a rare event. Certainly, in many
systems, simply maintaining democracy at all is a challenge. Nonetheless, the two
examples of systems that utilize direct democracy discussed here present a number of
possible conclusions.
First, the requirement that out-groups be a part of the drafting of the constitutions
finds limited support. In the Uruguayan sense, the support came primarily from Batlle,
96

For example, while the Constitution calls for - and organizes - communal councils, they function without
elected representatives; these, along with the citizen referendum process found in Article 70 have the
purpose of replacing “local governments in their constitutional task of being the basic instance for political
participation” (Brewer-Carías 2010: 191).
97
http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATAnalizeQuestion.jsp (A60201H and A60201G)
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though the mechanism was not fully introduced in his lifetime, and would not fully be
introduced until the 1934 Constitution. Thus, the introduction of the mechanism of direct
democracy in Uruguay is largely the function of majority-led inclusion, rather than outgroup participation. Further complicating the analysis is the degree to which the legacy of
Batlle may have influenced the introduction of the mechanism. Indeed, further
complicating the analysis is the multiple constitutions in which direct democracy is
included. The most recent Constitution – from 1967 and amended in 1997 – included
provisions, but those provisions were also included in prior versions. As Barczak (2001)
notes, Uruguay thus becomes a “special case” when considering the introduction of the
institution of direct democracy as a function of out-group participation insofar as the
prior extant constitution accounted for the inclusion, making it neither in-group nor outgroup, per se.
Venezuela, on the other hand, presents a much clearer distinction. The 1999
Constitution clearly introduced mechanisms of direct democracy, and to find support for
out-group participation, one must only look as far as Chávez, who was on the “outside
looking in” for quite some time, as evidenced by his thoughts (and actions) on taking
over the presidency of Venezuela. The previously excluded out-group in the Venezuelan
case was responsible for the introduction of direct democracy into the 1999 Constitution.
Thus, support is found in the Venezuelan case for C1, but not for the Uruguayan case,
where the results do not disprove the hypothesis, but do not prove it, either.
The theoretical approach discussed in the first chapter also put considerable
emphasis on the role of institutional design and the effect of the design on outcomes.
Interestingly, the model suggested in this dissertation would support the notion that
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Venezuela, given the relative ease of access to the referendum device, would see more
instances than Uruguay, which has fewer alternatives and more restrictions. Further
complicating the analysis is the differences in available time: Uruguay has had the
referendum option since 1934; Venezuela since 1999. Within those timeframes, nine
referendums have taken place in Venezuela, and eighteen in Uruguay, suggesting that
Venezuela has had more referendum votes when adjusted for the time variances 98. Thus,
institutional design does seem to play a role here; however, it should be noted that while
the citizen-initiated referendum is available to both systems, Uruguay is the clear leader
here, with 13 of the 18 referendums being initiated from below, while in Venezuela, only
the referendum concerning the recall of Chávez was initiated from below.
The role of political elites in the process is certainly more complicated. The
influence of Batlle can be felt throughout Uruguayan institutions, but the lack of the
individual in referendum politics complicates the analysis. Nonetheless, the general sense
of referendum politics in the Uruguayan sense can best be captured by the discussion of
“veto points” as discussed earlier. In most cases (13 of 18), the citizen-initiated
referendum acted as a check on the power of the majority; the majority of cases here
describe contexts in which the minority out-groups were able to successfully utilize the
instrument of direct democracy to counter the wishes of political elites. Voters responded
to political concerns via the referendum, with decisions on the lema system as well as the
Colegiado; they also responded to economic concerns via the referendum as well – most
notably when the concern was privatization of state-run industries or decreases in statemandated economic benefits. The institution of direct democracy was also frequently
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Though such math is admittedly problematic, Venezuelans face .62 referendums per year on average;
Uruguayans face .22 referendums per year, on average.
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used to either block or abrogate neoliberal economic reform measures, such as
privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, and reductions in government spending.
Indeed, they have also responded to social issues via the referendum, most notably with
decisions related to amnesty laws. The ability of unions to mobilize support in the face
of losses suggest the possible victories they found in the referendum was worth the risk;
at the same time, the choices they (repeatedly) made suggest the structure of the
institution in which they operate were key factors in the decision to utilize the referendum
process. This in turn suggests that the cybernetic theory of decision-making, along with
prospect theory, better explains the process than does that of rational choice, which
would suggest simply that individuals were able to make choices without formal
constraints placed on them from above, and that utility-maximizing processes explain
preferences. Clearly, supporters of the Uruguayan referendum system, as viewed from the
bottom-up approach as most commonly used, were constrained by the historical
institutional design, and motivated by the prospect of significant loss. As such, they were
not interested in smaller gains; they were instead interested in altering the status quo by
reversing the legislatively-approved policy.
In each of the multiple cases discussed in this chapter, the political elites seeking
refuge through the referendum device did so to seek larger gains when faced with the
prospect of loss, and to protect smaller gains when not facing the same prospect; more
importantly, however, the structure of the institution dictated the values through which
they viewed the range of possibilities – such ranges were not simply those which seemed
most suitable to the individual actor. As a function of this, historical institutionalism is
useful in explaining why institutions are created in the first place, and the historical
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context is crucial to understanding the outcome. The “critical junctures” that resulted in
the various constitutions are (as discussed in the first chapter) descriptive and not causal;
the institutions themselves predict the outcomes. The range of actors described here are
all constrained by the institution created before them, and they changes they make are a
function not of the rational choices they make, but rather of the context in which the
institution itself was created (and indeed, in the Uruguayan case, compromise came to be
not always as a function of actual referendum usage, but because of the possibility of the
referendum). Thus, in the complicated cases that are Uruguayan referendums, I argue that
the role of political elites (P1) in the process is crucial to understanding later usage, and
that (P1) in this case are condition by historical institutional design (HI1) as well as
tenets of prospect theory/cybernetic theory of decision-making (PC1). These findings are
summarized in Table 4.1

Table 4.1: Impact of Key Variables on Direct Democracy Outcomes in Uruguay
Key Variable

Outcome

Out-group presence at
constitutional formation

Indirect: Recent constitutions included mechanisms of
direct democracy carried over from earlier constitutions

Institutional Design

Role of Political Elites

Citizen-based initiative and referendums
Moderate signature requirements (25%)
Parliament-based referendums

Often seeking larger gains while working in a domain of
loss

The Venezuelan case is less complicated by the very fact that there are fewer
referendum examples. Nonetheless, the simplicity does not equal simple conclusions.
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Indeed, the Venezuelan case is a fascinating case in which the ideas of direct democracy
are clearly supported constitutionally – the letter of the law – but the spirit of the
constitution (and later changes to it) suggest that direct democracy is not as supported as
it first appears. In the 2000 consultative referendum, Chávez picked a small fight with
organized labor over their leadership practices, and having the majority on his side,
sought small gains (as prospect theory suggests) and was working within the confines of
the institution created. Certainly, the ideas laid out in prospect theory/cybernetic theory
also help to explain the rationale behind the decision to seek the 2004 recall vote against
Chávez (facing a prospect of loss, groups sought large gains. A summary of findings
from the Venezuelan case is presented in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2: Impact of Key Variables on Direct Democracy Outcomes in Venezuela
Key Variable

Outcome

Out-group presence at
constitutional formation

Indirect: Recent constitutions included mechanisms of
direct democracy carried over from earlier constitutions

Institutional Design

Role of Political Elites

Citizen-based initiative and referendums
Moderate signature requirements (25%)
Parliament-based referendums

Often seeking larger gains while working in a domain of
loss

The 2007 unsuccessful referendum vote, however, is the outlier. The theoretical
approach outlined here does support the notion that Chávez would be working within the
confines of the historical institutional design in seeking changes to the status quo. The
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approach does not, however, explain why Chávez, not facing a domain of loss 99, would
seek to enact massive changes to the status-quo. Though Venezuela was suffering from
crime issues as well as economic concerns (as discussed), neither suggest that Chávez
was operating within the domain of possible loss. The remaining element to consider here
is the cybernetic theory of decision-making, which suggests that the inputs the decisionmaker receives may change, but the reaction is based on the standards of the individual as
well as the structure of the institution in which the decision-maker operates. To broadly
consider the context, the standards of the individual idea reflects Chávez’s notion of
“twenty-first century socialism”, and the structure of the institution allowed him the
opportunity to proceed via the referendum.
However, if this fully explained the process, from start to finish, it would not
similarly explain the 2000 referendum nor the 2009 referendum. In the latter case,
Chávez was once again not facing a loss scenario, having won a majority in the recent
elections, and chose to pare down the referendums and focus on the campaign as a whole
-- and did so successfully. Thus, I argue here that the theoretical application applies with
the exception of the 2007 referendum held by Chávez, insofar as the historical
institutional design (HI1) and the tenets of prospect theory/cybernetic theory (PC1)
condition the political elites (P1). However, the importance of the theoretical approach
may also be better appreciated when one remembers that Chávez, in this outlier case of
the 2007 referendums, was unsuccessful. Clearly, the purpose of this theoretical approach
is not to gauge the degree of (or likelihood of success) but, the cases discussed thus far
suggest that the prospect theory/cybernetic theory – when followed – is more likely to
99

To the degree that economics plays a role; oil prices (the main source of governmental revenue in
Venezuela) were at record highs ($88.28 a barrel on Election Day, and would eventually climb to
$140/barrel in 2008).
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lead to success. Table 4.3 summarizes key findings related to both Uruguay and
Venezuela.

Table 4.3: Impact of Key Variables on Outcomes in Uruguay and Venezuela
Key Variable

Uruguay

Venezuela

Out-group presence at
constitutional formation

Indirect: Recent constitutions
included mechanisms of direct
democracy carried over from
earlier constitutions

Direct: Chavez-led reforms

Citizen-based initiative and
referendum

Citizen-based initiative and
referendums

Institutional Design

Moderate signature
requirements (25%)
Moderate quorum
requirements (35%)

Low signature requirements
(10-20%)
Parliament-based referendums
with majority vote
President-initiated
referendums
Municipal-level referendums

Parliament-based referendums
Recall referendum
Moderate quorum
requirements (20%)

Role of Political Elites

Often seeking larger gains
while working in a domain of
loss

Often seeking smaller gains
while operating in a domain of
gain

Frequency

High

Low
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
As discussed in the opening chapter of this dissertation, the overall purpose of this
study is to examine broadly the role of individuals working within institutions, and more
particularly, the influence of institutions on individuals. In so doing, the opening chapter
discussed the prominent role that general scholarship has placed on individuals in the
political arena, and that this role is at the general expense of the influence of institutions.
That is, rational choice theory focuses on the choices individuals make to maximize
utility under institutional constraints. Nonetheless, the independent role of institutions in
shaping political outcomes cannot be overlooked, and this dissertation seeks to focus
scholarship on where it is best suited: institutions. This concluding chapter identifies the
importance of institutions by examining referendum politics across the four case studies
examined in this dissertation, and at the same time, applies broadly the theoretical
foundations discussed in the opening chapter.
Discussion
The main propositions in this study are that political outcomes are a function of
institutional design, and further, that while political elites play a role in the eventual
outcomes, that role is limited by institutional design on the one hand, and a combination
of the factors associated with cybernetic theory/prospect theory on the other. The
application of these presumptions to the case studies presented in this dissertation seems
an odd set at first glance: politically, the four cases are quite different. Italy is centered on
party-based governance with a relatively weak executive (insofar as the legitimacy of the
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executive branch is based on the confidence of parliament), while France is a semipresidential system with relatively weak (though certainly not inchoate) party system.
Uruguay can be described as a presidential system with two dominant parties operating
throughout recent history (though this has evolved over the past decade), and Venezuela
also exists as a presidential system, but with (in relation to the power of the presidency)
weaker party system. However, the significant variation among these cases facilitates a
better examination of the causal variables discussed in the opening chapter, and in
particular, their influence on referendum outcomes.
To what degree do “out-groups” influence the introduction of direct democracy
mechanisms into a given system? In the Italian case, a complete re-working of the 1948
Constitution suggests that groups who were previously excluded from the political
process were included. Provisions for the mechanisms were included, though clearly the
focus was on a multiparty system in response to predominant anti-fascist fears. Indeed,
the institution of direct democracy lay dormant until the majority party (in this case,
Christian Democrats) believed it may become necessary to legitimize their desired
policies through the device - twenty-two years later. In so doing, the Christian Democrats
were ultimately unsuccessful, finding the unintended consequences of their actions to be
less than favorable, and at the same time, offering the “gun behind the door” to other
groups, who for the next several years (as the minority party) would also continue to fail
via the referendum device. Ultimately, however, the late start that the Italians had with
direct democracy did not preclude later usage, as the Italians utilize the referendum more
than any other European country except for the Swiss (who, it seems, are in a league all
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of their own 100). Certainly, the context of the introduction helps to (though does not fully)
explain the later usage: consistent with the anti-fascist fears, participatory democracy was
the preferred route (though initially, the party-based system was the favored method).
The lack of a strong executive that has greater control over referendum usage precludes
limited use.
In France, a long history of “top-down referendums” referendum availability led
to the removal of the device in the 1870s, only to be reintroduced with the Fourth
Republic in 1946 after compromises between de Gaulle and Christian Democrats. Insofar
as de Gaulle (and future presidents) had considerably more control over when (and in
what subject area) a referendum could be called, frequency as a function of the context in
which the mechanism was first introduced can also be considered a causal variable.
Indeed, de Gaulle’s stated purpose for the device (as discussed earlier) was to keep a line
of communication open between the president and the people; this line, however, is
unidirectional. De Gaulle, like other leaders, sought the referendum to legitimize his
initial power, his policies, and, trusting the device perhaps a bit too far, ended his own
political career as a function of the referendum.
Interestingly, the Uruguayan case presents two interesting anomalies: first, that
the referendum device was sought by the dominant force in politics at the time but was
not introduced as a function of compromise; secondly, that Constitution of 1967 in large
part retained the language regarding direct democracy from the earlier 1934 Constitution,
which itself was derived as a function of general revolt: while President Terra dissolved
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From 1848-2013, the Swiss have utilized the referendum device 589 times (C2D) at the federal level,
with “thousands more occurring at the cantonal level, hundreds of thousands at the municipal level”
(Kaufman and Waters 2004:118). By comparison, the closest user of direct democracy in Europe is Italy,
conducting 72 votes on referendums in the same period.
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Parliament with the support of the Blancos, the new Constitution was generally
considered to be a function of majority interests. Thus, retaining the language (regardless
of the position of out-groups related to the 1967 Constitution) suggests that Uruguayan
“out-groups” were not the primary basis for the inclusion of direct democracy.
Nonetheless, Uruguayans utilize direct democracy more commonly than other Latin
American systems. Importantly for the purposes of this study, then, is the discovery made
by this examination: out-group participation is more likely to result in the introduction of
direct democracy into a given state, but it is not absolutely necessary.
Finally, in the Venezuelan case, Chávez could certainly be considered
“previously excluded interests” – or, “out-groups” – and as the constitutional design
admits, the institution of direct democracy exists. The core constituency supporting
Chávez was a previously excluded out-group, and was represented quite heavily in the
Assembly that drafted the Constitution, which ultimately included expansive options for
direct democracy. Thus, the case of Venezuela fits the expectation of the theoretical
approach outlined here regarding C1. Like de Gaulle, Chávez did not view multiple
political parties as a path to political efficiency, though ultimately for different
ideological reasons. Chávez also viewed the institution of direct democracy as a line of
communication to the people, and while Chávez argued for the lines of communication to
be bidirectional, the reality has been (to this point) that the line of communication has
remained unidirectional (with the exception of the 2004 recall vote). Scholars may get a
better frame of reference as we look to Venezuela in the post- Chávez era (though,
Chávez’s Vice-President, Nicolas Maduro has taken the reins, which suggests minor
changes to the status-quo). The cases presented here are too few to suggest that a lack of
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multiple parties is a causal variable affecting referendum outcomes; however, insofar as
the both of the actors here actively focused on reducing the role of parties in the system,
and both cases show fewer referendums, a possible connection can certainly be
considered.
Thus, support for the notion that institutions of direct democracy require “outgroup” inclusion for the introduction into a particular constitution is supported but not
evident in each case. More generally, the idea that the power of the people to choose –
and the institution of direct democracy itself – was clearly a concern for all cases: for the
Italians, a method to collectively resolve differences; for the French, this was viewed as a
concern¸ rather than a problem to solve. De Gaulle, arguing from the position that parties
were more destructive than constructive, sought to limit the institution of direct
democracy as much as possible. Again, concern on the part of Gabriel Terra (also about
the role of parties) led to the introduction of direct democracy in Uruguay, and in
Venezuela, Chávez sought to weaken the power of minority parties at the expense of
executive power, and at the same time, introduced the institution of direct democracy,
ostensibly to give the “veto” to the power of the people. Thus, the Italians - seeking
greater party inclusion - are the eventual outlier, and it should be noted, also utilize the
referendum process considerably more frequently than any of the other cases discussed
here. In all cases, however, the importance of historical institutionalism is evident:
“policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is being
initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into
the future” (Peters 1999).
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As discussed in the opening chapter, accounting for change within historical
institutionalism is generally thought of in terms of punctuated equilibria (Krasner 1984);
this study, however, argues that new institutionalism is compatible with historical
institutionalism. In this sense, then, this study seeks to avoid the independent/dependent
variable confusion often associated with institutionalism and that same time explain
change: as Thelen and Steinmo (1992), argue, institutional dynamism can appropriately
explain change, of which there are four sources: first, broad changes in the
socioeconomic or political context can produce a situation in which previously latent
institutions suddenly become salient, with implications for political outcomes; secondly,
changes in socioeconomic or political balance of power can produce a situation in which
old institutions are put in service of different ends, as new actors come into play who
pursue their new goals through existing institutions; third, exogenous changes can
produce a shift in the goals or strategies being pursued within existing institutions:
changes in outcomes as old actors adopt new goals within the old institutions; and finally,
political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in the institutions
themselves.
Thus, the institutions discussed (the institution of direct democracy) are thus
mediated by the broader political context (in line with the theoretical approaches of
Thelen and Steinmo). Christian Democrats in Italy sought to utilize the referendum after
keeping it dormant for decades is in line with the idea that broad changes in the political
context produces a situation where previously latent institutions became salient (in this
case, the broader change could be conceived of as the threat to long-standing societal
values). Later usage by minority parties (as discussed here) could certainly be
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characterized as a function of exogenous changes that produce a shift in goals or
strategies being pursued within existing institutions. De Gaulle’s acceptance of the
institution (and later reluctance to use) could be characterized in much the same way (and
of course, could also be explained by exogenous changes that produce a shift in the goals
or strategies). The Venezuelan case also fits within the broader theoretical outlines
presented here, insofar as the changes in the socioeconomic or political balance of
power 101 produces a situation in which old institutions are put is service of different ends
– clearly, Chavez understood the institution of direct democracy, and its effect on the
participatory aspect of his version of democracy.
Institutional Design
Taken on its own, institutional design is a significant explanatory factor in the
overall usage of direct democracy. Italy has the most expansive opportunities for direct
democracy (both from the bottom-up and top-down), as well as relatively low petition
requirements (500,000 registered voters). The only significant roadblock in the Italian
system of direct democracy is the quorum requirement 102 (the 50% requirement exceeds
all other countries) but this affects outcomes, not usage. It is not surprising then, that
Italians utilize direct democracy more so than the other three cases considered here. At
the same time, Uruguayan voters also have the ability to petition for referendums, though
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Though the “political balance of power” referenced here is apparent, the socioeconomic conditions play
a significant role here as well: between 1990 and 1997, Venezuelans saw dramatic decreases in per capita
income as well as increases in income inequalities, unemployment, and poverty rates; certainly, falling oil
prices (especially in 1986 and 1988) left Venezuela vulnerable to internal strife and open to later neoliberal
restructuring programs. Such policies “sparked off the greatest public disorders seen in modern Venezuelan
history”, known as the caracazo - the first of many disturbances, and the basis of the coup attempt by
Chávez. As Canon (2009:37) argues, these events “cleared the way for the emergence of Chavez as a
political force in the country”.
102
Italians may only repeal existing laws – they may not propose new laws. Certainly, this could be viewed
as a “roadblock” as well, however, the absence of citizen-initiated proposals precludes speculation and
calculation.
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twenty-five percent of the electorate must agree 103. Uruguayans utilize this opportunity
extensively, though not as commonly as Italians. Though Venezuelans also have the
ability to initiate referendums, with signature requirements ranging from ten to twentyfive percent, they have utilized this opportunity only once since 1999. Of the four cases
presented here, only France does not allow citizen-initiated referendums, and it comes as
little surprise that usage in France lags 104 behind the other three cases in terms of
frequency. However, institutional design is not in and of itself a singular predictor of
outcomes: if it were, the expectation is that Venezuelans would utilize citizen-initiatives
more frequently than they have (even considering the shorter time frame) in comparison
to both Uruguayans and Italians. Thus, institutional design cannot be isolated as the
single causal variable accounting for usage or non-usage in systems that allow citizeninitiatives.
The Role of Political Elites
Though this is a study of the importance of institutions, the role and influence of
individuals must be fully considered. This dissertation argues that referendum usage is
influenced by individuals (political elites) but such individuals are constrained by
historical institutional design as well as the tenets of prospect theory/cybernetic theory of
decision-making. The Italian divorce referendum in 1974 finds each of these concepts at
work: when the ruling Christian Democrats were unable to stop the passage of the
divorce law through Parliament, they turned to the last remaining institution: the
referendum. Lying dormant since the inception of the Constitution in 1946, the DC were
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Uruguayans may propose new laws or seek the repeal of existing laws; in the latter case, the referendum
seeking repeal must occur within one year of passage of the original legislation.
104
Usage in this sense is limited to the referendums utilized under the most recent Constitution (in each
case).
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able to bring about its usage in what they saw as an effort to unite the wishes of the
majority of Italian voters, under the standards set by the Church. Certainly operating
within the domain of loss, the referendum choice sought greater rewards 105.
The majority of referendum usage in Italy after the divorce referendum saw the
Radical Party at work (and occasionally the Communist Party) throughout the 1970s and
the early 1980s. Though the minor parties here succeeded in weakening the political
hegemony that was the DC, they were ultimately unsuccessful at attempting to abolish
life imprisonment, outlawing private guns, curbing police powers, and reducing salaries
in an effort to combat inflation. Viewed from the prospective of the initiator, such
instances suggest the historical institutional design is a major factor. But perhaps more
importantly, concern brought up in the first chapter is exemplified here: what happens
when neither “loss” nor “gain” properly frames the scenario? In such case, the theoretical
approach argued that the cybernetic theory may best explain the decision-making
process: certainly, the systems-level output could be argued to be in accordance with the
set standards of the referendum initiators; they were seeking no other gains than those
sought (such instances were not designed to test the strength of the ruling party).
The major reforms sought by the 1993 referendums in Italy suggest that
unintended consequences are a threat: seeking to expand on recent gains (the 1991
referendum efforts to reduce corruption via voting methods), Mario Segni formed the
Populars for the Reform movement, and sought additional gains via electoral reform.
Interestingly, though, the reforms resulted in the reduction of the minority influence in
Parliament, which would later cost Segni the very power he sought. Nonetheless, the role
105

It should be noted that Weyland argues that elites in a dire situation will be more likely to risk a
proposition that has a “lower expected value”; the degree to which the DC perceived this option as having a
“lower expected value” is unclear.
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of historical institutional design as well as that of political elites working within the
constraints imposed upon them is once again reflected here. As discussed in chapter
three, the role of political elites is important, and as suggested by the theoretical
foundations outlined in this dissertation, individuals are in large part constrained by the
institutions in which they operate, but also by the tenets of the decision-making tenets of
prospect theory/cybernetic theory.
The Uruguayan case is in many ways similar to the Italian case. Though the
context in which the mechanism of direct democracy was first introduced does not fully
fit with the expectations discussed in this dissertation, its usage by out-groups fits the
general pattern. Many of the referendum cases in Uruguay were a function of out-groups
seeking fundamental change through established institutions. Like the Italians,
Uruguayans groups that utilized the referendums were working within a sort of “bounded
rationality”, and primarily interested in altering the status-quo by seeking significant
gains via the referendum device.
Though referendum cases in France are far fewer, the theoretical approach
discussed here explains the process in an informative manner. De Gaulle viewed the
referendum device as a method through which he could seek the approval of the populace
directly; this, essentially, was a method to silence parties rather than seek their collective
approval. The use of the referendum by de Gaulle in each of the cases presented in
chapter three also suggest that the historical context creates a limitation on usage, but that
individual usage is dependent upon the individual: in de Gaulle’s case, the choice was
based in large part on his desire to legitimate the power of the presidency (and the
executive institution more generally – and more longitudinally) over the factionalism of
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parties. As was shown in chapter three, prospect theory is highly instructive towards
understanding de Gaulle’s motivations.
As suggested earlier in this chapter, the Venezuelan case is in many ways similar
to the French case, insofar as historical institutional design played a significant role in
future outcomes. In both cases, outcomes were fewer; though interestingly, a remaining
question must still be addressed: if Venezuelans had the opportunity for citizen-initiated
referendums (where France did not) what accounts for the lack of use (from the “bottomup”) in Venezuela? Citizen-initiated referendum usage is high in Italy and Uruguay, but
low in Venezuela, yet all three systems have the device available to them. Though the
data presented in this dissertation are not designed to answer this question (and thus, this
question should be addressed by future studies), some speculation is possible: first,
Venezuelans have only had the option of referendum available to them for thirteen years,
while Uruguayans have had the option available since the 1930s. Perhaps it is simply a
matter of time: the Italians did not use the device available to them for decades after its
introduction. Secondly, differences in party systems exist between three systems: a much
stronger party system, to be exact. Many of the referendum cases discussed here are
instances in which parties are seeking to legitimate preferences through voter approval;
fewer (and weaker) parties suggest the outcome as a function of party cleavages would
also reduce. Finally, (and certainly an object for future study) is the role of Chávez as a
unitary leader. In other words, to what degree did Chávez “co-opt” the ideas of the
populace and instead turn the ideas from “bottom-up” to “top-down”? While scholarly
research does suggest that “Chávezismo” is centered on apparent rather than actual
democratic procedures, research does not suggest that Chávez in some fashion worked to
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avoid a “bottom-up” approach from developing. Thus, a question remains for future
study. These conclusions are summarized in Table 5 below.
Limitations of Study and Suggestions for Future Research
Though the theoretical framework developed here has considerable explanatory
power (likely a function of its breadth), significant limitations exist both within this work
and within the literature more generally, and such limitation could be addressed in future
work. I begin with an overview of the lacunae present in the literature, and then address
the shortcomings within this study, and offer some possible avenues for future research.
The depth of (or more specifically, the lack thereof) research in this area is on one
level disconcerting, but on another level inviting, insofar as this subfield deserves and
(unlike many other subfields) can handle additional research into the causes and
outcomes of measures of direct democracy. The most glaring problem with the literature
is the quality of research. First and foremost, few studies properly define the range of
measures of direct democracy available. With Latin America, as within Europe,
significant differences exist within referendum politics: they may be initiated by the
executive, by the legislature, or by the people; they may be facultative, obligatory, or
consultative; they may focus on general social policy or on governmental policy;
differences in turnout requirements for different countries exist before the measure can be
considered binding; and in still other countries, the likelihood that the measure will
actually be carried out is in question. Each of these factors makes a difference in
research; as such, a definitive index should be designed such that these factors are
considered. A ranking could be based on the availability, type, usage, frequency, and
compliance with outcomes.
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Table 5: Impact of Key Variables on Direct Democracy Outcomes across Cases
Key Variable

Out-group
presence at
constitutional
formation

Governance

Institutional
Design

Italy

France

Uruguay

Venezuela

Direct: Strong
parliamentary
system created in
reaction to fascist
regime

Direct: Semipresidential system
created in reaction
to weak parties

Indirect: Recent
constitutions
included
mechanisms of
direct democracy
carried over from
earlier constitutions

Direct: Chavezled reforms

Parliamentary
(strong multiparty)

Semi-presidential
system (weak
multi-party)

Presidential system
(strong multi-party,
though long
dominated by two
parties)

Presidential
system (weak
multi-party)

Top-down
referendums
Citizen-led
initiatives with low
signature
requirements
Low signature
requirements
50% quorum
requirement

Top-down
approach
(president can
submit directly to
the people, or
submit to
Parliament)
No quorum
requirements

Citizen-based
initiative and
referendums

President,
Parliament, and
Citizen-based
initiative and
referendum

Moderate signature
requirements (25%)

Low signature
requirements (1020%)

Moderate quorum
requirements (35%)

Recall
referendum

Parliament-based
referendums

Moderate
quorum
requirements
(20%)
Often seeking
smaller gains
while operating
in a domain of
gain

Role of Political
Elites

Often seeking
smaller gains while
operating in a
domain of gain

Often seeking
smaller gains
while operating in
a domain of gain

Often seeking larger
gains while working
in a domain of loss

Frequency

High

Low

High

Low

Support for
Hypotheses

Yes

Yes

Inconclusive

Yes
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The depth of (or more specifically, the lack thereof) research in this area is on one
level disconcerting, but on another level inviting, insofar as this subfield deserves and
(unlike many other subfields) can handle additional research into the causes and
outcomes of measures of direct democracy. The most glaring problem with the literature
is the quality of research. First and foremost, few studies properly define the range of
measures of direct democracy available. With Latin America, as within Europe,
significant differences exist within referendum politics: they may be initiated by the
executive, by the legislature, or by the people; they may be facultative, obligatory, or
consultative; they may focus on general social policy or on governmental policy;
differences in turnout requirements for different countries exist before the measure can be
considered binding; and in still other countries, the likelihood that the measure will
actually be carried out is in question. Each of these factors makes a difference in
research; as such, a definitive index should be designed such that these factors are
considered. A ranking could be based on the availability, type, usage, frequency, and
compliance with outcomes.
Moreover, the research designs themselves are often problematic. As discussed
throughout the literature review in this dissertation, very few works related to direct
democracy consider the context in which the institution was first introduced. Such an
examination is critical. Within the context of direct democracy, research is primarily
focused on the theoretical side (the degree to which direct democracy is compatible or
incompatible with representative democracy) or the outcomes side (the effects of actors,
campaigns, or actions of voters). Both of these are important questions, but without the
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larger theoretical approach that considers the limitations of those actors as a function of
historical design, each of these questions lacks structural support.
This particular work focused largely on theory-building and its application to the
cases. Such an effort in theory building naturally raises questions. First, the theoretical
approach designed here applies quite well to the cases discussed. Such an approach,
however, to have elements of validity and reliability, should be expanded to other cases.
Secondly, the theoretical approach described here is quite broad, leading to concerns over
falsifiability. While it can be argued that falsifiability is present (insofar as the context of
the times in which the institution is designed “suggests” its future usage, and the opposite
is not the case), significantly more cases should be examined as well.
Though the cases presented did support the explanatory power of the model, a
much more detailed case study is in order in an effort to determine the extent of the
explanatory power. Such a study could also focus on the seemingly inherent tension
between the level of democracy and the institution of direct democracy. That is, the
uniqueness of Latin America, when compared to other regions of the world where
democracy is widely used (e.g., the United States and Europe) is that there are, still today,
varying levels of consolidated democracy, both in terms of substance but also in terms of
longevity. The rub here, of course, is the populism (or, neopopulism) aspect of the
equation: to what degree do populist revolts that result in leadership further result in the
use of direct democracy? Insofar as direct democracy itself has long been considered a
tool of populist movements and ideology, one would expect such a measure to be used.
However, the role of populism must be further explored; the left-right continuum does
not exclude populism. On the other side of this equation, are measures of direct
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democracy more likely to be used in consolidated democracies, and if so, for what
purpose, and on what basis? Such a study would require an in-depth case study of various
regimes within Latin America, but would be fruitful insofar as the framework applied
here discredits the notion that individuals (in a rational choice/microfoundational
perspective) are largely responsible for political outcomes, instead favoring institutions
and the constraints they present to actors.
The present theoretical application could be expanded in an effort to evaluate
questions more commonly associated with referendum politics. Though certainly not
inclusive, the cases discussed in the literature review of this dissertation help to support
the argument. In cases across Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America, the
recurring feature was that the context in which the constitution was created has
implications for later usage; just as importantly was the finding political elites were
constrained those institutions and were limited in the options they could pursue.
Nonetheless, further questions remain. For example, to what degree are referendums,
especially complicated referendums in areas of low-educated voters, simply a vote of
confidence of the party in power? Moreover, to what degree do the party systems control
the use of direct democracy measures and influence outcomes? Are they more or less
likely to occur in presidential systems? Are they more likely to occur in areas where
“democracy” is considered to be more consolidated? What about the relationship between
perceived party efficacy and direct democracy? If the legislature is unable to facilitate the
decisions before them, does that make direct democracy more attractive? In other words,
what is the relationship between the deliverance of collective goods via the traditional
institutions versus the referendum? The other institution that receives limited attention in
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the literature are the courts: do executives in either presidential or parliamentary systems
seek different outcomes via the referendum if the power of the Courts are considered to
be stronger? What about when they are weaker? Politics is politics: there’s always a “gun
behind a door” with another door and another gun somewhere nearby. Insofar as the
theoretical foundations developed here are applicable to any political system (assuming a
constitution was drafted at some point, that direct democracy exists in some form, and
that political elites are capable of manipulating direct democracy procedures), the
inclusion of other cases would help to further our understanding of the relationship
between institutions and individuals.
Conclusion
This dissertation is now complete. The study presented here represents small steps
in terms of developing an applicable theoretical framework to the complex and
unorganized study of direct democracy. The subfield has implications for the discipline,
as measures of direct democracy, their usage, frequency, and the role of elites in the
process answers questions related to the bigger question of how far a particular state has
come in terms of democratic consolidation (a seemingly ubiquitous question in the
literature). As was stated in the opening chapter, the benefits of this study included
understanding the importance of historical institutionalism (and the degree to which it is
compatible with new institutionalism), which has been shown across the cases. In
addition, a general purpose of this study was to show the importance of institutions, and
how they constrain the role of political elites. Though I have argued here that the role of
individuals has been given considerable attention throughout the literature, that is not to
say that other scholars have neglected the role of institutions (clearly, this would be
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difficult to do!). However, it is to say that, in my opinion, every study must consider the
role of institutions, and in particular, the context of the time in which it was created. Such
an examination (as shown here) may have tremendous power in explaining later
outcomes. Certainly, such an approach may defy the parsimony and elegance sought by
researchers, but with a clear theoretical approach, such elegance may simply be
redefined, rather than replaced.
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APPENDIX A: DIRECT DEMOCRACY CASES IN ITALY

Date

Title

Result
(%)

Turnout
(%)

6/2/1946

Form of Government

54.27

89.1

5/13/1974

Abrogation of divorce law

40.74

87.72

43.6

81.2

23.54

81.2

6/12/1978
6/12/1978
5/18/1981
5/18/1981

5/18/1981

5/18/1981
5/18/1981

Abrogation of financial support of the parties by
government
Abrogation of legislation on law and public
order

79.43

Abrogation of life imprisonment

22.6

Suspension of the Police Chiefs and Prefects
competence to grant firearm licenses
Abrogation of the Law on urgent provisions for
the protection of democratic order and public
security

14.1

79.42

14.88

79.38

11.58

79.41

32.00

79.41

Legalizing abortion
Amending the law on abortion

6/10/1985

Abrogation of urgent measures for fees fixed
prices and living costs

79.71

65.12

11/9/1987

Abrogation of the parliamentary commission for
investigations against government members

45.68

77.85

11/9/1987

Abrogation of ENEL contributions to nuclear
reactors

32.00

79.43

11/9/1987

Abrogation of civil responsibility of courts for
intentional misjudgments

11.58

79.41

11/9/1987

Abrogation of the choice of locations for nuclear
reactors by the CIPE government panel

14.88

79.38

14.08

79.42

11/9/1987

Abrogation of State subsidies for municipalities
with coal or nuclear power plants
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11/9/1987

Assignment of the European Parliament to
elaborate a European Constitution

22.63

79.43

6/4/1990

Abrogation of the permission to trespass private
property while hunting

49.58

91.52

6/4/1990

Prohibition of the use of pesticides in agriculture

30.2

85.58

6/4/1990

Abrogation of the hunting laws

30.15

74.06

30.29

71.69

30.15

83.55

30.05

66.85

30.21

80.9

30.04

65.52

57.36

64.68

57.22

49.97

57.25

63.68

58.07

43.59

57.24

35.63

57.27

56.24

57.4

49.4

57.34

37.4

58.06

43.07

58.12

44.34

57.17

62.14

57.38

54.9

76.87

89.8

6/4/1990
6/10/1991
4/19/1993
4/19/1993
4/19/1993
4/19/1993
4/19/1993
4/19/1993
4/19/1993
4/19/1993
6/11/1995
6/11/1995
6/11/1995
6/11/1995
6/11/1995
6/11/1995
6/11/1995
6/11/1995

Abrogation of the four preference votes in
parliamentary elections
Abolition of the Treasury's right to appoint the
board of directors of public banks
Abrogation of the Ministry for State Investments
Abrogation of proportional representation in the
Senate
Abrogation of the Ministry for Tourism and
Entertainment
Abrogation of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry
Abrogation of communal responsibility for
environmental protection
Legalizing the consumption of drugs
Suspension of financial support from the
government for political parties
Abrogation of the Prime Minister's powers in
matters pertaining to the representation of labor
unions
Complete reorganization of the administrative
councils
Restricting house arrest for Mafiosi to their
proper residence
Abrogation of the right to advertise on more than
three channels
Abrogation of municipal powers regarding trade
licenses
Abrogation of direct deduction of contributions
to labor unions from salaries and pensions
Abrogation of elections in two rounds for
municipalities of over 15 000 inhabitants
Abrogation of regional competences regarding
shop opening hours
Abrogation of the law limiting the possession of
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6/11/1995
6/11/1995

6/11/1995
6/11/1995
6/15/1997
6/15/1997
6/15/1997
6/15/1997
6/15/1997
6/15/1997
6/15/1997

4/18/1999
5/21/2000
5/21/2000
5/21/2000

5/21/2000
5/21/2000
5/21/2000
5/21/2000
10/7/2001

television channels by private individuals to 3
Abrogation of advertising interrupting television
programs
Partial reorganization of the administrative
councils
Abrogation of the restriction of state concessions
to public television stations
Abrogation of the right to additional extrajudicial professions for members of the Judiciary
Ending the Treasury's majority of shares
(Golden Share) in privatized businesses
Abrogation of admission restrictions to civilian
service
Abrogation of the automatic promotion of civil
servants
Abrogation of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fishery
Abrogation of the right to trespass private
property when hunting
Abrogation of the Association of Journalists
Abrogation of the election of 25% of the
parliament in relation to proportional
representation
Abrogation of the permission to trespass private
property while hunting
Abrogation of civil servants right to have a
second gainful employment
Abrogation of the proportional method of 25%
in the attribution of the seats of Parliament
Abrogation of the reimbursement of costs for
referendum and electoral campaigns
Abrogation of automatic salary deduction for
trade unions and worker associations
Abrogation of the electoral system concerning
the composition of the Consiglio Superiore Della
Magistratura
Abrogation of career link possibility between
Prosecutor and Judge
Abrogation of the norms restricting protection
against unjustified dismissals in enterprises with
more than 15 employees
Amendment of Title V second Part of the
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76.86

90.11

77.01

82.74

76.88

82.28

76.88

70.23

76.85

82.57

76.98

55.36

76.95

90.25

62.5

95.57

42.92

92.28

43.12

93.51

43.36

92.2

49.58

91.52

23.49

77.63

23.52

77.68

24.02

87

34.1

81.62

52.46

38.71

25.66

88.03

25.66

88.78

25.65

87.73

6/15/2003
6/15/2003
6/13/2005
6/13/2005
6/13/2005
6/13/2005

Constitution concerning Regionalization
Abrogation of the obligation for estate owners to
tolerate road rights for circuit lines
Abrogation of the restriction on protection
against unjustified dismissals to enterprises with
more than 15 employees
Abolition of the restrictions on embryonic
research
Abolition of restrictions on embryonic
implantation
Abolition of the restrictions on embryonic
implantation and of the recognition of the
embryo as participant
Abolition of the prohibition of heterologous
fertilization

25.63

77.38

25.56

85.55

25.52

86.74

34.05

64.21

31.99

75.22

32.44

82.02

6/26/2006

Constitutional reform

32.19

71.06

10/10/2007

Social security reform

32.2

61.82

31.86

70.57

31.96

69

32.51

33.36

95.3

54.82

95.8

54.83

6/22/2009
6/22/2009
6/22/2009
6/13/2011
6/13/2011

Abolition of combined lists for the elections of
the House of Representatives
Abolition of combined lists for the elections of
the Senate
Abolition of multiple candidacy for the elections
of the House of Representatives
Abolition of the partial privatization of the water
supply
Abolition of privatized profits from the water
supply

6/13/2011

Abolition of the planning and the construction of
new nuclear power plants

93.82

54.59

6/13/2011

Abolition of the duty of the holders of top state
offices to appear before court

94.62

54.78
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APPENDIX B: DIRECT DEMOCRACY CASES IN FRANCE

Date

Title

Result
(%)

Turnout
(%)

9/28/1958

Adopt New Constitution

85.15

80.48

1/8/1961

Algerian Self-Government

74.99

73.76

4/8/1962

The Evian Treaties

90.81

75.34

10/28/1962

Direct election of the president

62.25

76.97

4/27/1969

Regional Reforms and Reforms of the
Senate

47.6

80.13

4/23/1972

Enlargement of the European Community

68.32

60.24

11/6/1988

Self-determination for New Caledonia

80.00

36.89

9/24/2000

Reduction in presidential term of office

73.21

30.19

5/29/2005

Adoption of the European Constitution

45.33

69.37
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APPENDIX C: DIRECT DEMOCRACY CASES IN URUGUAY

Date

Title

Result (%)

Turnout
(%)

4/19/1934

New Constitution

96%

NA

3/27/1938

Constitutional Reform

52.47

NA

3/27/1938

Constitutional Reform

93.45

NA

11/29/1942

New Constitution

77.17

NA

11/24/1946

Constitutional Reform

43.15

67.43

12/16/1951

Constitution

54.00

NA

11/30/1958

Constitutional Reform

11/30/1980

New Constitution

41.8

86.87

12/13/1992

Abolition of Law on Public
Enterprises

66.6

82.80

8/28/1998

Electoral Reform

28.41

86.24

12/8/1996

Electoral Reform

50.45

85.90

10/31/1999

Financial Autonomy to Judiciary

43.09

91.78

10/31/2004

No privatization of water supply

64.61

89.62

10/25/2009

Voting Rights for Citizens
Abroad

37.42

89.91

10/25/2009

Amnesty Provisions

47.98

89.91
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76.00

72.38

APPENDIX D: DIRECT DEMOCRACY CASES IN VENEZUELA

Date

Title

Result
(%)

Turnout
(%)

12/15/1999

Mandatory Constitutional Referendum

71.78

44.05

04/25/1999

Approval of the presidential decree
concerning the convening of the
constitutional convention

86.5

37.37

04/25/1999

Convening a Constitutional Convention

92.36

37.47

12/03/2000

Suspension of Trade Union Leadership for
180 Days (consultative)

69.4

23.5

08/15/2004

Recall by the people

40.75

69.97

12/02/2007

Constitutional Reform (Block A)

48.99

12/02/2007

Constitutional Reform (Block B)

49.35

02/15/2009

Unlimited reelection of the president

54.87
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56.16
56.16
NA
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